The origins and development of Scottish nationalism c.1919-c.1945 by Finlay, Richard J.











1. The Scottish Home Rule Association and Scottish
Politics, 1919-1928 1
2. The Scots National League, 1920-1928 35
3. The National Party of Scotland, 1928-1933 90
4. The Formation of the Scottish National Party, 1933-1934 158
5. The Wilderness Years, the SNP 1934-1939 204






The main purpose of this thesis is to trace and examine the origins
and development of Scottish nationalism primarily as a political
movement. The wider role of cultural nationalism, although important
in itself, has not been considered here. In essence, the main
concern of this study is to explain the process which led to the
creation of the modern Scottish National Party. It starts with the
circumstances which forced those interested in obtaining self-
government to look for alternative means to attaining their goal;
namely the setting up of their own political party. The predecessors
of the SNP are examined, as is the evolution of nationalist strategy
and identity. The main thread of the story follows those who argued
that the SNP could only achieve its goal by contesting elections and
advocating distinct economic and social policies. Both of these
issues, which by no means commanded universal support, were of crucial
importance in establishing a unique nationalist political ethos which
has lasted up until today. Much of the thesis is devoted to
reviewing the internal disputes over strategy and policy that were
fought in order to create a nationalist orthodoxy.
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CHAPTER ONE
The Scottish Home Rule Association and Scottish Politics 1919-1928
Prior to the outbreak of war in 1914, the Liberal Party had been the
principal, but not exclusive, champion of Scottish Home Rule. This was
not the result of a deep seated political conviction, but was mainly a
consequence of the pressure brought to bear on the leadership by Party
activists and organisations such as the Young Scots Society. Also, it was
believed that by advocating Scottish Home Rule, Irish Home Rule would
become more palatable to the electorate.(1) However, by the end of the
war in 1918, the resultant social, economic and political changes induced
by the exigencies of the wartime situation, effectively sealed the fate of
the Liberal Party's hegemony in Scotland.(2) At the General Election of
1918, the Liberals only managed to return eight members without Lloyd
George's coupon, while Labour made an electoral breakthrough which
eventually culminated in them being able to eclipse the former as the main
party of opposition at the subsequent election of 1922.(3) It was against
this background of political turmoil and change, that the decision was
taken to reform the prewar Scottish Home Rule Association in September,
1918.(4)
The principal architect behind the postwar founding of the SHRA was Roland
Eugene Muirhead, who was a fairly well off businessman and owner of the
Gryffe Tannery Company of Bridge of Weir.(5) Before the war, he had been
an active member of the Young Scots Society, and had campaigned vigorously
within the Liberal Party for a firm commitment to enacting Home Rule
legislation. However, having become disillusioned with the failure to
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pass the requisite self-government Bill in 1914, Muirhead left the Liberals
and instead joined the Independent Labour Party in 1918.(6) In any case,
he had always been more in sympathy with the socialist principles of the
ILP, which suited his radical and republican tendencies, and in 1906 he
played an important part in helping Tom Johnston set up the socialist
weekly newspaper; Forward (7) Muirhead was essential in the
re-establishing of the Association, as it was he who provided the necessary
finance, and the organisational abilities required to get the organisation
off the ground.
At the time of the 'Khaki Election' in 1918, the SHRA was not sufficiently
organised to make any impact on the outcome of events, and, in any case,
the issue of Scottish self government was likely to be overshadowed by
events in Ireland, where demands for Home Rule had ended in bloodshed,
military occupation and ultimately, civil war. Many members of the SHRA
were afraid that unwelcome comparisons might have been made by their
opponents, especially elements within the Scottish Tory Party.(8) It was
only by May, 1919, that the Association felt confident enough to hold its
first public meeting, at which the broad aims of the organisation were
outlined.
"... whilst the objective of the meeting was political;
it was nonparty. They were out to band together people
of all different political faiths, so that the widely spread
feeling in favour of Scottish self-government might be focused
and an effective demand made for the re-establishment of a
Scottish Parliament in Scotland to deal with Scottish
affairs and administration."(9)
It was believed that the SHRA would be non-political in the sense that it
would appeal to, and receive support from, a wide spectrum of Scottish
society. Muirhead argued that the issue of Home Rule was of such
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importance that it would transcend normal party politics, and act as a
unifying force which would bind together people who held disparate
political beliefs into a common cause.(10)
However, the reality of the situation was quite different, as can be seen
from the initial composition of the hierarchy of the SHRA, which was
predominantly made up from Labour Party interests. Although the Labour
leadership discouraged any of its members from joining an organisation over
which they had no official control,(11) it was largely ignored, and it was
from the Labour movement that the Association received most support. At
an official level, the STUC was represented by its Secretary, Robert Allan,
while the Scottish Miners' Federation's Secretary, Robert Smilie and the
Scottish Farmservants' Union's Secretary, Joseph Duncan, also played an
important part in forming the SHRA. Other prominent Labour Party
officials who were involved at the inception of the Association, were
Thomas Johnston, the Rev. James Barr, William Gallacher, who was President
of the Scottish Co-operative Society, and Catriona Cameron, a member of the
Highland Land League.(12) Muirhead saw fit to only invite two Liberals,
neither of whom could be said in any way to occupy an important role in the
running of their party. (13) Perhaps this was a reflection of the low
esteem in which the former champions of Home Rule were now held. Also, in
an attempt to make the Association genuinely cross-party, Muirhead was able
to attract a solitary Conservative, although he was soon to leave in any
case.(14) The party political composition of the early SHRA mirrored the
wider changes which had taken place in postwar Scotland, in which the Home
Rule mantle fell firmly into the hands of the Labour Party.
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The role of the Association, as envisaged by Muirhead, was that it would
act as a pressure group which would endeavour to keep the Home Rule
question to the forefront of Scottish politics. It was decided that
attention ought to be focused on Parliamentarians, as they were considered
to be especially lax when it came to promoting and defending Scottish
interests. The failure of Scottish MPs to support the second reading of the
remnants of the prewar Home Rule Bill in 1919 was cited as evidence to
justify the existence of the SHRA.(15)
"This meeting of Scottish citizens views with alarm the
evidence of indifference and neglect shown by the elected
representatives of the people, especially the Scottish members
in absenting themselves from the House of Commons when the
Scottish Home Rule Bill came up for a second reading..."(16)
However, at a time when it was not envisaged that the Labour Party would
soon be in a position to form a government, the Association was not content
to leave the matter in the hands of Westminster. Aside from propaganda
and demonstrations, it was proposed that a National Convention ought to be
set up to add non-parliamentary weight to the case for self-government.
"...this meeting... reaffirms its conviction that instead
of depending on the present parliamentary machinery to
obtain self-government, the Scottish people should call
together a National Convention in order to consider what
steps should be taken to the early establishment of a
parliament in Scotland."(17)
The idea of calling a Convention was Muirhead's because although he
believed that a majority of Scottish MPs might advocate and support Home
Rule, as was the case in the past, Westminster had proved to be an
untrustworthy institution when it came to meeting such demands.(18) He
believed that the existence of a Convention, which represented popular
Scottish opinion, would act as the necessary focal point to bring
sufficient pressure to bear on Parliament for the passing of
4
self-government legislation.(19) However, it would take several years for
such an organisation to come into effect, mainly because there were other
more accessible avenues for the Association to follow, such as securing
Home Rule pledges from candidates at election times (see below). Also,
after the General Election in 1922, the Labour Party appeared to be able to
win power, and with this prospect came the belief that the Party which had
had a long standing commitment to self-government, would enact the
necessary legislation.
The popular definition of Home Rule within the SHRA was that it was
something akin to Dominion status, but with Scotland still playing a full
part in the running of the British Empire. Indeed, many believed that
Scottish self-government was part of the process in the evolution of the
British Commonwealth of Nations ideal. Home Rulers took inspiration from
the greater freedom allowed to the Dominion nations and argued that
Scotland should take her place among the other countries which would, it
was thought, make up an Imperial Federation. Developments in the British
Empire were a major influence on the ideas which formed the postwar Home
Rule movement.(20)
So far as the whole population is concerned, the British Qnpire
is a Home Rule Empire. The great white dominions enjoy self-
government in such large measure as to make them rather sister
than daughter nations, and yet they are all loyal members of
the Hnpire. They are even separately represented on the
Assembly of the League of Nations, and they determine their own
foreign policy.... Home Rule is the Empire's bond of union."(21)
By emphasising the self-government case within the context of the Imperial
ethos, there was no question of separatism, as the President of the SHRA,
William Gallacher, told an audience in September, 1919:
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"We are not a separatist party. We merely wish for Scottish
self-government, leaving the Imperial Parliament to deal with the
higher questions of Imperial policy."(22)
Instead of advocating Home Rule, first and foremost, as the right to
national self-determination, members of the Association tended to base
their claims on the fact that Westminster was over-worked and therefore,
unable to give the necessary time and attention to Scottish affairs.(23)
Also, it was claimed that the Imperial Parliament was not as efficient as
it might otherwise be, on account of having to deal with trifling Scottish
issues, which were best left to the Scots to sort out for themselves.
This case was put forward by Duncan Graham, the Labour MP for Hamilton,
when addressing a SHRA meeting in July, 1920.
"It seems clear to us that some such method will have to be
adopted to relieve the pressure of business in the Imperial
Parliament, as it is quite obvious that it cannot meet the demands
made on it ... What we want is Home Rule, and what we mean by that
expression is that we should have the right and the power to make
our laws at home, and not merely administer laws that are made
for us in another country."(24)
Home Rule, it was claimed, would benefit the government of the United
Kingdom and the running of the British Empire, by introducing a more
efficient and manageable form of administration.
However, one of the first tasks facing the Association was the need to
define in precise terms what was meant by Home Rule and also, what would be
the implications of such a policy. This was necessary in order to provide
the political credence to their claims that self-government would result in
beneficial gains for the Scottish people. From the outset, the SHRA
stressed that Home Rule would not mean a lessening of commitment to the
British Empire. Also, the extent of self-government was strictly limited
to domestic Scottish affairs only. In general terms, the objectives of
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the Association were:
"1) The creation of a National Scottish Parliament, to sit in
Scotland and pass laws on all matters affecting Scotland, and
Scotland only.
2) The creation of a National Scottish Executive or Ministry, to
control the administration of Scottish affairs, subject to the
Scottish Parliament alone."(25)
Within the SHRA there was a broad consensus that the Crown and Succession,
foreign and colonial policy, army, navy and airforce, together with
currency, weights and measures, should remain under the jurisdiction of the
Imperial Parliament at Westminster.(26) While, on the other hand, the
devolved Scottish government was expected to take control of the following:
"a) the Judicature and Executive, b) a Scottish National Treasury,
into which all taxes levied in Scotland ought to be paid and which
should arrange from time to time with the Imperial Treasury, the
payments to be made for Imperial purposes, c) Land tenure in town
and country, d) education, e) agriculture, fisheries and mines,
f) Labour, including national insurance against sickness and
unemployment, g) Local Government and health services, h) Board of
trade and transport."(27)
Also, it was envisaged that Scotland would take part in the Imperial
Conferences and would be represented at the Assembly of the League of
Nations.(28) However, with regard to defence and foreign policy, it was
expected that the two nations would jointly supervise the one set of
machinery and pursue the same set of objectives.(29) There was no
question of having a separate set of armed forces and it was also unlikely
that there would be an independent Scottish diplomatic service. Having
defined the parameters of its objectives, the Association had to then
convince politicians and people alike that they were worth endorsing.
By June, 1919, the SHRA had about 700 individual members, and more
importantly, over 100 organisations had affiliated membership and pledged
support to the cause.(30) A period of steady growth ensued, and by July,
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1920, the Association launched its own monthly bulletin, Scottish Home
Rule, and its membership had risen to 1,150 individuals and 138
organisations.(31) In the period prior to the 1922 General Election, the
SHRA took the first tentative steps to mobilize its members into a properly
organized and functioning pressure group. Although handicapped by vague
and indeterminate tactics, the basic structure of a strategy designed to
promote the self-government issue to the forefront of the Scottish
political agenda had come into existence.
The Association at all times stressed that Home Rule could only be achieved
by peaceful and constitutional methods, and it was universally accepted
that the final authority on the whole question rested in Parliament.
Members of the SHRA deplored the violence of Irish nationalists, as well as
the British Government's handling of the situation, and the few suggestions
that were made advocating a Sinn Fein policy were firmly rejected.(32) In
the early 1920s strenuous efforts were made to disclaim that Scottish Home
Rule would follow the same path as its Irish namesake, and much time and
effort was spent in proving that the two cases were entirely different.(33)
As the SHRA was ultimately dependent on Parliament for the realisation of
its goal, it was decided that those who sat in the Lower Chamber were the
most obvious targets for a Home Rule campaign. Prospective candidates at
election time were canvassed on their attitudes to self-government with an
eye to influencing the outcome in favour of a supporter of the cause.
This tactic was first tried out in February, 1920, on the occasion of the
by-elections in Argyll and Paisley, when the following questions were
presented to all the candidates:
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"1) Will you, if elected, press and vote for the introduction and
passing into law, during the present session, of a measure giving
self government to Scotland?
2) In the event of the Government failing to introduce a Scottish Home
Rule Bill during the present session of Parliament, are you prepared
to introduce such a measure the following session?"(34)
The nature of the replies were then duly recorded, and the Association
recommended its supporters to vote for those in favour of self-government.
However, as was to happen on many occasions, if more than one candidate
gave a positive response, no distinctions were made, and the decision was
left to the preference of the voters.(35) This technique enabled the SHRA
to gauge the strength of parliamentary Home Rule support, which in 1922
stood at 44 MPs, rising to 50 in 1923, although falling sharply to 24 in
1924, largely because of the collapse of the Liberals and a corresponding
Unionist upswing.(36) However, as was to become apparent in the fullness
of time, few MPs took the questionnaire seriously. Although many were
undoubtedly committed to the principle of self-government, they did not
necessarily regard it as the most important issue of the day. As a result
of the obliqueness of many of the Home Rule pledges, and the fact that
there was also no commitment to take any action to further the cause,
certain activists within the SHRA attempted to introduce a more specific
questionnaire, which sought candidates to give a pledge that they would
refrain from Government office until a Scottish Parliament had been
created. (37) Muirhead and others had hoped that this form of pressure
could be used at the Inverness by-election in March, 1922, which was a
constituency thought to be traditionally associated with the Home Rule
movement.(38) However this action was rejected by a majority of the
General Council of the Association, who argued that such tactics were an
unnecessary and harmful intrusion into the internal affairs of both the
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Liberal and Labour parties.(39) The efficacy of the policy of soliciting
Home Rule pledges was finally called to account at the by-election in
Ayrshire, 1925, when the SHRA was unable to secure from any of the
candidates a commitment that self-government was now "the most urgent
legislative need."(40) In the face of such stone-walling by parties
growing uneasy at the meddlesome nature of the Association, it soon became
apparent that some sort of a revision of strategy was necessary. It was
clear that the Association would have to take more direct and concerted
action if Home Rule was to find a prominent place in the Scottish political
agenda, especially as the dust was now beginning to settle from the chaos
which had produced a realignment in the arena of Scottish politics.
In the 1922 General Election, 26 out of the 29 successful Labour candidates
were in favour of self-government, while only 1 Tory out of 15 was so
inclined, 9 out of 14 Liberals expressed support, and 7 out of 14 National
Liberals were advocates of the Home Rule cause.(41) Contrary to the hopes
of several members of the SHRA, the debate became increasingly politicised
and, as the polarisation of post war politics became more pronounced,
supporters of the self-government cause were forced to rely on the Labour
Party as the Liberals disappeared only to be replaced by anti-devolutionist
Unionists.(42) The Conservative Party rejected self-government on the
grounds that it would be too costly, impractical, and that there was no
popular demand to justify its institution.(43) Those National Liberals
who were sympathetic to Home Rule had to dampen down their enthusiasm for
the sake of political expediency. One such person was the Scottish
Secretary, Robert Munro, who was aware that his ideas on the subject were
not popular with his Conservative partners. He refused an invitation from
Muirhead to attend an SHRA meeting, on these grounds, in 1922: "I am
quite in sympathy with the Scottish Home Rule movement. I do not think
that, as a member of the Government, it would be appropriate that I should
take part in the meeting. "(44) The Liberal Party, on the other hand, was
in a state of irreversible decline, and few protagonists of the
self-government cause thought that there was any realistic chance of them
recovering to an extent that would enable a return to government,
especially after the formal split in 1920.(45) Also, as the Labour
dominance of the Association became more pronounced, Tories and Liberals
shied away from the organisation, believing it to be nothing more than a
front for socialist activities.(46) The ending of the Irish troubles in
1922, which had constantly overshadowed the issue, together with the
emergence of Labour as the largest parliamentary party in Scotland, pushed
the self-government question on to new territory. Labour could finally
lay claim to be heirs of the Home Rule tradition.
During the war, the Scottish Labour movement had become increasingly
nationalistic, largely in response to the attempts by the British Party and
the TUC to curb their independence and bring them under greater centralised
control.(47) Although the Scottish section had been in favour of
devolution before the war,(48) Home Rule was given greater prominence in
the period following 1918. Government control during the war was
criticized as being inefficient and too far removed from the problems faced
by the Scottish people. The trouble was, as far as they were concerned, a
severe lack of knowledge about Scottish affairs, and this point was
stressed by the STUC in their annual report of 1918.
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"If any reconstruction is to take place in Scotland after the
war, then we should not be humbugged by writing and sending
deputations to people in London who know absolutely nothing of
our wants. A Parliament should be set up in Scotland, thus saving
time and expense and giving the people of Scotland a fair
opportunity of working out their salvation."(49)
A further factor in making Labour more committed to the self-government
cause was the defection of a substantial number of prominent Home Rulers
from the Liberal Party, many of whom were to play an important rule in the
SHRA.(50) Scottish Trade Unionists were especially keen on the
devolutionist principle as a method to stave off the TUCs centralising
influences, which would mean a loss of local power and freedom of
action.(51) It was no coincidence that the Associations first President,
William Gallacher, made strenuous efforts to maintain the independence of
the Scottish Co-operative Societies in the face of determined attempts to
integrate it more thoroughly into the overall British organisation.(52)
In 1919, a draft bill in the annual report of the Labour Party's Scottish
Council illustrates the depth of feeling concerning nationalist grievances:
"Whereas, Scotland, though temporarily deprived, without the
consent of her people, and by corrupt means in 1707, of the
exercise of her right to self-determination, is at present,
as anciently, entitled to legislate for the governance of her
national affairs in a Parliament of her own."(53)
However, it has to be pointed out that although there was a passionate
feeling for the need to implement some form of devolution by members of the
Labour movement in 1918, there was no corresponding political commitment in
the form of detailed policy studies or any other such forms of elaboration.
Also, there appears to have been little in the way of internal debate and
discussions of the ramifications of adopting a policy of
self-government.(54) Home Rule was simply one of the many issues which
went into the melting pot that was part of the process of the formation of
12
a coherent Labour Party philosophy and strategy. It was only by the
middle of the 1920s that there emerged a reasoned assessment of the
significance of devolution. (55) Until that time, Home Rule was taken on
board as part and parcel of the Scottish radical tradition and although the
idea received support, it did not necessarily command a serious political
commitment.(56)
One of the main reasons why self-government was popular within the Scottish
Labour Party was that it appealed to popular nationalist sentiment and, in
the absence of properly defined policies, it could be used as a panacea for
a whole range of social, political and economic problems. Also, it acted
as a unifying force, bringing disparate elements, such as the Rev. James
Barr and James Maxton, together in common cause. The use of nationalist
rhetoric was a speciality with Labour politicians when addressing large
audiences who, probably because of the simplicity of the Home Rule idea,
responded enthusiastically to the demands for a redress of Scottish
grievances.(57) Many Clydesiders blamed their lack of progress in
attaining social legislation on the fact that Westminster was slow and
cumbersome, and bound down by English traditions. According to George
Buchanan, what had taken seven months to complete in Parliament could have
been done in seven hours in Scotland. (58) What is striking about these
home Rule arguments is their simplicity and naivety, which was in itself an
indication of a lack of seriousness.
However, as the Labour Party was the only major political organisation
which had given a commitment to Home Rule, and, more importantly, was soon
likely to be in a position of government, it was not unnatural to find its
members playing an important role in the running of the SHRA. The Party,
and especially the STUC, brought thousands of indirect members and
potential recruits to the Association, as well as providing a large
platform for their propaganda efforts. By the end of 1928, there were
over 300 organisations affiliated to the SHRA, of which most were a result
of the unions' connections.(59) Within the General Council of the
Association, the power of policy making was in the hands of the union
leaders, especially the STUC's Secretary, Robert Allan, and its President,
Peter Webster.(60) Given the fact that the Labour movement had such a
large influence in the running of the SHRA, it comes as no surprise to find
that the organisation's direction and strategy were shaped to suit their
political masters' ends.
By the Summer of 1924, the Labour grip on the Association was absolute, and
blatant attempts were made to eschew all other political elements.
According to one former Liberal, there was now not even a pretence that the
SHRA was a cross-party organisation.
"Mr. Maxton then spoke and the meeting rapidly dissolved
into a Labour Party meeting. He indulged to a great extent in
what was pure and simply propaganda from the point of view of the
Labour Party and against that of other parties."(61)
The same writer lambasted the Labour Party for refusing to co-operate with
Scottish MPs from other parties in order to present a united front when
representing Scottish interests at Westminster. He concluded bitterly
that "The SHRA is an adjunct solely of the Labour Party. "(62) Writing in
April, 1924, Roland Muirhead was also showing signs of unease at the
apparent hi-jacking of his organisation by the Labour Party.
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"Speaking personally I often differ with decisions that are come
to but as an individual having had my opportunity of putting my
case before others, I have simply to accept the majority
decision."(63)
He was also concerned by the fact that the bellicose attitude to people
frail other parties was driving away potential Liberal and Tory support, and
had effectively scuttled his original idea of making Home Rule an issue of
cross-party co-operation.(64) However, there was little that Muirhead or
other activists could do as, by virtue of their holdings of large
affiliated membership, the Unions would always hold a controlling interest
in the leadership of the Association.(65) In any case, in early 1924, with
the advent of a minority Labour Government, such misgivings were only of a
minor nature. This was especially the case as the MP for Gorbals, George
Buchanan, had obtained through the private member's ballot a chance to put
a Home Rule bill on the statute book. With the prospect of attaining
their objective in sight, few Association members believed that the Labour
hold on the organisation was a disadvantage.
However, the speed with which events happened took everyone by surprise,
and it also highlighted the latent divisions which existed within the Home
Rule camp. As soon as the news reached the Association, several activists
took it upon themselves to prepare a draft bill and this was done without
the authority or knowledge of the Labour Party. (66) It was proposed that
once a Scottish Parliament had been set up, there would be a withdrawal of
Scottish MPs frail Westminster. Those areas of joint interest between the
two nations would then come under the authority of a reconstituted Imperial
Parliament.(67) However, although many members of the Labour Party
accepted this long-term vision of Home Rule, they would not, at this stage,
15
countenance any Scottish withdrawal from Parliament, as this would
seriously weaken their position, given the disproportionate number of
socialist MPs who were elected north of the border.(68) The sponsors of
the Bill were also against pulling out of Westminster. According to
George Buchanan:
"The majority of Liberal and Labour Scottish members
would like to retain a connection with the English
House of Commons, thinking that this connection
would be valuable as a means of co-ordinating
industrial legislation in the two countries, and
another reason for keeping a Scottish contingent
at Westminster is that, both in the past and
recently, Scotland has been the stronghold of
Radicalism, so that every democratic movement
that has an English wing realises that it must
have people from the north of the Tweed to give it
inspiration and outlook."(69)
By way of a compromise, the subject was kept in abeyance, with most Home
Rulers being thankful that the issue would be debated in Parliament.
Instead, efforts were concentrated on drumming up popular support to add
weight to the self-government claims.
The Association organised a rally at St. Andrew's Hall, Glasgow in April,
to demonstrate for Buchanan's Bill, and by all accounts, the meeting
attracted a large and responsive audience.(70) David Kirkwood and James
Maxton were the two principal speakers, who delighted the crowd with
anti-English and anti-establishment jibes.(71) The SHRA was confident of
success, and it was claimed that "the demonstration marks an epoch on the
road to Scottish self-government."(72) The Association also initiated a
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campaign to enlist the support of all those MPs who were even only mildly
in favour of Home Rule.(73) However, such preparation was all in vain as
the debate, which took place on the 9th of May, only lasted for several
hours and ended in a shambolic uproar. Things got off to a bad start when
the Scottish Secretary, William Adamson, opened the proceedings with
cautious approval for the Bill, although it was obvious that he was not
enthusiastic.(74) The debate was, for the most part, orderly, until the
Speaker refused to allow a vote because a Tory back-bencher had not been
allowed to speak. This caused an uproar of the type that the Clydesiders
were rapidly becoming famous (or infamous) for, and they accused the
Speaker of having taken sides. The net result of all this was that the
Bill would not be considered again that session.(75)
This failure led many activists to question the sincerity of the Prime
Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, and his commitment to the Home Rule cause. In
many ways, his support was taken for granted as he had been the Secretary
of the London branch of the SHRA in the prewar years.(76) However, his
apparent lack of zeal in promoting Buchanan's Bill tended to suggest to
many members of the SHRA that he was no longer as avid a Home Ruler as they
had thought. Indeed, as early as March 1923, there were some questioning
eyebrows raised about MacDonald.
"It fills one with dismay to find the leader of the Labour Party,
a Scotsman, elected to the leadership chiefly by Scottish votes,
I presume - talking of a system of devolution which would give
Scotland, Wales and England an "opportunity of exercising
individuality in local affairs and at the same time enable the
Government to work out more freely the general principles of
national policy". Will this wishy washy stuff satisfy the Scottish
members? Surely not!"(77)
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Such suspicions were reinforced by his failure to get the issue moving
again, especially as it was promised that another day would be set aside in
order to pursue the debate. However, in June, MacDonald informed Buchanan
that the second debate would not take place, although it was hoped to set
up an all-party select committee to discuss and consider the question.
Even this limited action fell through. MacDonald, according to one
contemporary source: "regretted to find that the Conservative Party was
not prepared to concur in this course, and it could not be carried out.
As to the future, he declines to give any pledge."(78)
He lowered his reputation further by refusing to meet members of the SHRA
when he visited Glasgow to receive the freedom of the city. (79) As far as
R.E. Muirhead was concerned, the failure to pass a measure of
self-government by the first Labour administration was the responsibility
of MacDonald.
"I see from today's Glasgow Herald (19th June, 1925) that you
(MacDonald) still take an interest in Scottish life. Why
the Government of which you were head last year failed to support
the Home Rule Bill, I cannot explain I must candidly admit
that the failure of your Government to make any serious attempt
to pass a Scottish Home Rule Bill caused your stock as a Scotsman
to fall heavily in my estimation."(80)
Further evidence that MacDonald's interest in devolution was not serious
can be gleaned from the correspondence between himself and Moirhead. In
January, 1924, when MacDonald had newly taken up the position of Prime
Minister, Muirhead wrote to him suggesting that a National Convention ought
to be set up to hammer out proposals and details for a Home Rule bill.
The Premier's response was lukewarm and it was emphasised that the SHRA
could not expect his personal involvement in initiating the process.
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"I am afraid at the present moment it is impossible for me with
all the burdens of straightening out matters, to go into details
about Scottish Home Rule. I am covered up under suggestions from
my friends about everything that ranges from the most important
matters to the most insignificant. You will all have to keep me
out for a while until I make the general arrangements, and then I
will come in and tackle details. In any event, the man who would
have to handle the matter, first of all at any rate, would be the
head of the responsible department."(81)
Also, the same lack of commitment was in evidence when the Scottish
Parliamentary Party tried to get MacDonald to set up a select committee,
even without the Tories. MacDonald was reluctant to push the issue and
stated that any future bill would have to meet the objections of several of
his ministers who were hostile to it in its present form. (82) On July,
21st, 1924, the MPs Tom Johnston, Neil McLean and Duncan Graham had a
meeting with the Prime Minister, who it transpired was unsympathetic to
their Home Rule claims.(83) At this stage in his career, MacDonald had no
enthusiasm for the self-government cause, as he was too busy with foreign
affairs and other domestic problems which were, he believed, of greater
importance than an issue which had already proved to be divisive. In any
case, he believed that the best remedy for Scottish grievances was the
action taken by a Labour Government in Westminster and not a separate
Edinburgh Parliament.(84) The net effect of the failure of Buchanan's
Bill was that it led to a lack of confidence in the abilities of the Labour
Party by SHRA activists. Also, it speeded up a process of reassessments
of the issue by many prominent Labour politicians, who would never support
the cause again with the same degree of enthusiasm (see below).
In response to this setback a Scottish National Convention was set up in
November, 1924, by the Association. An indication of the declining
support for Home Rule among the Parliamentary Labour Party was the fact
that only seven of their MPs turned up to offer support, which was a
significant decrease on previous Home Rule activities.(85) It was decided
to form a Parliamentary Committee to press for, and draw up, some form of
self-government bill. However, by April, 1925, little progress had been
made:
"Great difficulty has been experienced in getting
representatives from the three Scots Parliamentary groups.
The Labour group had appointed the Rev. James Barr and Mr.
Neil McLean as their representatives. The Liberals had not
yet appointed representatives but it was hoped that they would do so
soon. The Unionists do not propose to appoint representatives.
As soon as the Liberal representatives are appointed, the Committee
will get to work."(86)
The Liberal and Labour Parties were both hostile to the idea of setting up
an unofficial committee, and there was little agreement on the method to be
used to forward the campaign in Parliament. Worse still, was the fact
that the Labour representatives on the Committee could not claim that they
would receive the endorsement of their own Party for any proposals that
were put forward. James Barr spelled out the position in June, 1926:
'The Parliamentary Committee of the Scottish Labour Members feel
that three points must be kept in view:
1) The committee of Scottish Labour Members cannot commit the
Labour Party as a whole (The British Labour Party), to any decision
they may come to on this Draft Bill.
2) The question of the retention of Scottish Members of Parliament
comes into existence, it is considered essential by several of the
committee.
3) Scotland's place and influence in Imperial affairs must be
secured in any scheme of Self Government which is agreed to."(87)
Members of the Association were faced with coming to terms with the fact
that they were being left out of the framing of any future Home Rule bills.
Also, it was quite apparent that any measure of self-government which was
to receive Labour support, would have to take account of wider party
interests. Bluntly, the SHRA was told to mind its own business.
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"The Sub-committee of the Scottish Labour Group think it right
to point out that a future Labour Government will exercise
its own judgement as to the lines on which it will frame a bill
for the granting of Self Government to Scotland."(88)
The Labour Party's exclusive approach to Home Rule was in evidence in May,
1927, when Barr's private member's bill was put forward without any attempt
to secure cross-party support. However, by this time, divisions in the
SHRA had become more obvious and more entrenched.
After the failure of Buchanan's Bill in 1924, a number of dissenting voices
were heard within the Association, who increasingly vented their
frustration at the Labour Party. It was argued that by relying on
Westminster and especially, the existing political apparatus, the SHRA was
totally at the mercy of party interests, and it could do little that was
effective on its own. In October, 1925, suggestions were mooted within
the Association that the time was ripe for the formation of a national
party.(89) In December, 1925, Muirhead's brother, Robert, put forward the
argument for the creation of a nationalist party on the grounds that the
British political organisations were not interested in Scottish affairs,
and that the only way to overcome this obstacle was to put into Parliament
a body of MPs whose first and foremost commitment was to obtaining Home
Rule.(90) Those members of the SHRA whose loyalty lay with the Labour
Party dismissed the idea as impractical. David N. MacKay stated that it
was better to wait until the Labour Party came back to power. He also hit
upon the crux of the problem now facing the Association when he made the
statement that he was a socialist first and a nationalist second.(91)
This sentiment was not shared by a large section of activists, many of whom
believed that socialism would best be served by a Parliament in Scotland as
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a principal priority. Robert Muirhead expressed the rising tide of
frustration within this group when he wrote in May, 1926:
"The SHRA has now been in existence for seven years, and Scotland
is still ruled from London. It is time to take stock of our
progress, with a view to finding out whether further activity on
the lines on which we have been and are now working is well directed
and likely to secure Scottish self government at the earliest
possible date, and whether some change of policy or method is not
required."(92)
He wanted to abandon the passive approach of the Association, and instead
advocated that in future, all prospective candidates for Parliament should
be vetted "for a mandate to put Home Rule first when they got to
Westminster...then a Scots National Party would be in being." Robert
Muirhead rounded off his argument by concluding that "the demand for Home
Rule must be made more insistent and more passionate. This means that the
SHRA must revise its programme and adopt a more effective policy than it
has hitherto used."(93)
Implicit in Robert Muirhead's statement was a criticism of the Labour Party
members who lacked commitment and kowtowed to the demands of their London
headquarters. In August, 1926, he made an open attack on Labour's
credibility as a Party of Home Rule.
"The British Labour Party as a whole has, so far as we are
aware, never committed itself to support our cause - certainly
at the last General Election Scottish Home Rule found no place in
its manifesto nor did the late Labour Government show any eagerness
to get the question brought to a decision The fact is that the
most effective way to get the Labour Party or any other party to take
up Home Rule in earnest, is to show it votes will be lost if
neglected Until Scotland takes the trouble to have its claim for
Self government vowed in a more unmistakable manner than has hitherto
been done, there is small hope that any of the British political
parties will do anything effective for Scottish Home Rule."(94)
Roland Muirhead had likewise come to the same conclusion about the efficacy
of complete reliance on the Labour Party and in a private letter of June,
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1925, he wrote:
"I take the view that if party candidates in Scotland will not
put the question of a National Parliament in Scotland first on
their programme that we should put forward independent candidates
as soon as resources permit."(95)
After the collapse of the 1924 Home Rule Bill, there were increasing calls
for some new form of activity in order to circumvent the stranglehold of
the Labour Party's British interests. Some members of the SHRA advocated
a national party on the lines of the Irish model, while some merely wanted
to get a more emphatic commitment from existing MPs.(96) Although
Muirhead and others had as yet, little idea as to what form a national
party would take, it was becoming clear that this was the most attractive
option available to break out of the impasse in which the Home Rule
movement now found itself. Accordingly, there was an increase in
co-operation between the Association activists and other nationalist
organisations, and among the many things which were discussed, the
formation of an independent national party featured predominantly.(97)
At first, Robert Muirhead wanted to form an electoral pact with the Labour
Party, and contest constituencies on the Home Rule ticket, which perhaps a
socialist on his own would not win. The inspiration for this mode of
thought was the activities of Edwin Scrymgeour, the Prohibitionist MP for
Dundee, who seemed to have been tolerated by the Labour Party.
"I think there are quite a number of constituencies where
a good candidate, in earnest about Home Rule, and otherwise
acceptable to the electors, would have a good chance."(98)
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Robert Muirhead wanted to prove that Home Rule was a vote winning issue,
and that if the Labour Party stepped up its commitment, their electoral
standing would rise correspondingly. In many ways, the idea of putting up
independent candidates was only a tactic designed to put pressure on the
existing political establishment to take the self-government issue more
seriously, (see chapter Three) However, given the divisions which now
existed within the SHRA, the opportunity to reach some form of compromise
was rapidly diminishing.
One of the principal reasons why the split within the ranks of the
Association became increasingly bitter, was the dominance of the Trade
Union block vote. All attempts by the activist wing of the SHRA to
initiate any sort of change in strategy, found their efforts blocked by the
overwhelming power of the STUC's affiliated membership. The majority of
the activists, most of whom were also members of the ILP, were the real
workers who made the Association exist as a functioning organisation. They
were responsible for raising finance, arranging speaking tours, and
distributing propaganda and literature. It was this section which was the
most vocal wing of the SHRA, and it was they who took part in the debates
on policy and strategy. Their frustration at having their efforts to make
the Association a more dynamic force in Scottish politics continually
vetoed by Trade Union leaders, who relied on a passive membership which
took no part in the running of the organisation, was very great indeed. (99)
By the middle of the 1920s, these two groups moved further apart, while
elsewhere, there existed a general mood of despondency about the chances of
achieving self-government. Contrast Wheatley's statement on arriving in
London in 1922, that "there is no greater issue that arouses more interest
in Scotland than that of Home Rule",(100) with that of William Wright MP,
writing to Muirhead in 1925:
"I am renewing my annual subscription to the SHRA with
some reluctance. Not because of the amount subscribed, but
one feels the golden moments are passing and little progress is
being made. I feel had we met with Self-government in Scotland
in 1923, we should have accomplished ten times as much work."(101)
Throughout this period, attitudes hardened and members of the SHRA were
forced to choose between conflicting priorities. Former Home Rule
supporters openly began to display signs of hostility towards those who
would not accept that there were more important political objectives.
Calls for cross-party co-operation were dismissed outright by Maxton.
"I cannot see myself combining with any Scottish Members
either Liberal or Unionist.....1 am not going to say to the
Tories combine with me in handicapping the Labour Government in
order that we get Scottish Home Rule."(102)
Also, other members of the Association made it quite clear that they would
not support any change in tactics which would impinge on their loyalty to
the Labour Party. As one person put it:
"He was a Labour man first and a Nationalist afterwards.
If the choice lay between a Tory Nationalist Parliament in
Edinburgh and a Socialist Parliament in Westminster, he would
prefer the latter."(103)
In any case, by this time, prominent Labour politicians had reasoned out
their attitude towards Home Rule and had also made a judgement on its
significance. Their findings and conclusions would, at the end of the
day, prove unacceptable to many SHRA activists.
As was mentioned earlier, the heady days of Home Rule euphoria took place
at a time when the Labour movement was still in the process of defining a
coherent political philosophy, and the self-government cause was not
t subject to any form of analysis. Indeed, in 1922, the Rev James Barr
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stated that Home Rule was necessary primarily for the protection of the
Scottish Church's national identity, land abuse, and the need for a
stronger Temperance Act, all of which could not be deemed of great
importance in the mid-1920s.(104) By this time, the leading theorists of
the Scottish Labour Party, such as Wheatley and Johnston, had concluded
that it was impossible to separate the Scottish economy from the rest of
the United Kingdom. (105) It was believed that any form of self-government
which was unable to control the economic forces which governed national
life would be ineffective and doomed to failure.(106) More and more, the
idea became accepted that the British economy was a complete unit and
consequently, it was decided that it was only from Westminster that the
necessary powers required to rectify the excesses of the capitalist system
could be obtained. Much of this thought was induced as a result of the
prevailing economic climate and the widespread social problems which
followed in its wake. Although Home Rule sounded fine in theory, it was
deemed to be largely irrelevant to the bread and butter issues of the day,
and, accordingly, it was to those matters such as housing, unemployment and
poverty, that Labour MPs turned their attention. What was wanted was
immediate action, which, it was believed, could be attained from
Westminster, and these problems were to be tackled first by any future
Labour government. The theoretical nature of devolving sufficient powers
to a Scottish Parliament in order to deal with these issues, was believed
to be an unnecessary distraction, when the solution was already at
hand. (107) It was thought that the only role for self-government would be
in an administrative capacity, and as an issue of importance, this did not
rank too highly.
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Also, of crucial significance in the decline of the Labour movement's
commitment towards Home Rule was the attitude of the STUC. At a time of
rising unemployment and deflationary government policies, most Scottish
Trade Union leaders accepted the principle of safety in numbers, and in an
effort to secure better protection, they became more firmly enmeshed within
the TUC.(108) Smaller and separate Scottish unions, it was believed,
would make easier targets for employers who were set upon reducing wages
and manpower.(109) Also, this tendency towards greater integration was
further reinforced by the psychological effects of the failure of the
General Strike, which put the Trade Union movement, as a whole, on the
defensive.(110) Another factor which diminished the devolution
commitment, were the reforms of the Labour Party's organisation, initiated
in the mid 1920s by Arthur Henderson. The purpose of these changes was to
bring greater central control and discipline, while also removing any
traces of sectarianism. (Ill) The idea of Home Rule was unlikely to find
much sympathy in a Party which was committed to establishing a greater
uniformity, and removing ethnic and geographical differences. In any
case, few people believed that the self-government cause was a political
issue which commanded popular support. Attendances at the SHRA rallies
during the period after 1925, declined steadily as people became more
concerned with the bread and butter politics of the day.(112) By the time
of the introduction of the Rev. James Barr's private member's bill in 1927,
which was in itself a fortuitous accident, few members of the Labour
movement believed that the effort of introducing Home Rule was worthwhile.
As the author of 'The Better Government of Scotland Bill' and its sponsor,
Tom Johnston, were later to admit, the attempt was half-hearted, especially
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as there was a clause calling for the withdrawal of Scottish MPs from
Westminster. (113)
However, in contrast to such lukewarmness, the activists in the SHRA
believed that this was the most thoroughly prepared of all Home Rule Bills
yet submitted. (114) However, several were warning that if it proved to be
a failure "a more assertive policy is called for."(115) On the 7th May,
1927, the Bill was debated for only 45 minutes, after which the Speaker
refused to allow a vote in view of the short period of discussion and,
consequently, it was dropped.(116) The Scotsman's comment was typical of
the Scottish press at the time: "an absurd project by a negligible number
of excessively narrow and unthinkingly sentimental patriots."(117)
However, as far as the Home Rule activists were concerned, it was the last
straw, and it stiffened their resolve to find an alternative policy.
Within the SHRA, one body came increasingly to the forefront in the call
for independent political action. "The Scottish National Party group"
announced its existence in October, 1927, and one of its members explained
the reasons behind its foundation.
"This group was formed to press for the formation of
a Scottish National Party - and when funds permit to fight
every seat, both for Parliament and municipal contests
It would be too much, perhaps to expect it to be passed by a
majority at the present time, but at the same time I think
most of the delegates and those who attend the National
Convention realise that something drastic is called for or will
be necessary sooner or later."(118)
Meanwhile, the Scottish National Convention was also suffering from the
reverberations of the failure of Barr's Bill. At a meeting of the
Committee of the Convention on May, 29th, 1927, the activist anger at the
present policy, spilled over into outright condemnation of the Labour
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Party. An apologist for the Party suggested that the best solution to the
problem would be to persuade the Labour headquarters to officially take on
Home Rule and table a resolution in the House of Commons.(119) This option
was greeted with derision by the activist wing, which pointed out that the
Labour Party, as far as they were concerned, had failed twice already, and
that there was little point in continued reliance on this method.(120)
Antagonism between both groups became very bitter, with the bulk of
criticism going against the Labour Party:
"I certainly agree that the Parliamentary method is now
absolutely out of date The Labour Party when it
was in office, it did nothing and I am going to tell you
straight that the Labour MPs, with especial reference to
Glasgow, have revived instructions to do nothing to imperil
the future prospects of the Party holding office at
Westminster."(121)
The activists had come to the conclusion that Home Rule was being
sacrificed for party interests, and more importantly, many now believed
that the Labour Party was hostile to their intentions. The leader of the
nationalist organisation, the Scottish National Movement, Lewis Spence,
continued the attack:
"It is common knowledge to every press man in the House
of Commons that Mr. Ramsay MacDonald almost went down on
bended knees to the Scottish Labour Members, and asked them
not to back, not this last bill, but its predecessor."(122)
Upon what information such accusations were based is not known. However,
they are a striking example of the depth of feeling and the suspicion which
was now abounding within the ranks of the activist wing of the SHRA. The
section of the Association which rejected Labour involvement turned its
attention to formulating alternative strategies and policies. Although
suggestions were made to operate through local government and to petition
for the setting up of a Royal Commission, the area of greatest interest
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centred on the question of setting up an independent political party. It
was decided that such an organisation would be formed on the following
basis, "that any member of Parliament representing it would undertake to
put the question of Home Rule for Scotland in the first place, and give it
precedence to all other Parliamentary questions that should arise."(123)
The Labour loyalists were horrified at such a proposal, and the suggestion
that James Barr should leave the Labour Party and join the new
organisation, was treated with more or less disbelief. According to the
trade unionist, George Mather:
"To cut himself (Barr) adrift from the party he had
done a great deal to make, and that almost entirely
has made him the personality that he is in a
parliamentary sense, would be, in my judgement,
to ask Mr. Barr to descend from the position
of being an influential and serious politician,
and turn him quite definitely into a freak or a
crank."(124)
In many ways, Mather's attitude typified the belief held by the majority of
the Scottish Labour movement that those who so vehemently advocated Home
Rule, were nothing more than an isolated section of opinion on the fringe
of Scottish politics, and as such they could not be taken seriously.
At the meetings of the Convention which took place in November and
December, 1927, the arguments continued in an atmosphere of complete
intransigence. Robert Muirhead put forward the case that the Convention
ought to turn its attention to considering how best to create a National
Party, which was of course, blocked by the union vote.(125) Undetered,
the Nationalists continued the attack, and in December, the outline of the
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proposed party was clearly taking shape.
"The Nationalist Party is a political party to represent the
idea of a Scotland that it should have its own Government
I wish to put before the members a fact which I did not find in
the "Forward" that seventeen English Members voted against
Mr. Johnston and Mr. James Barr in the House of Commons. Those
English Labour members went out of their way to support the
English Tories against a motion which was favourable to Home
Rule for Scotland. These seventeen included seven members of
the late Labour Cabinet. It seems therefore, that there is no
hope in leaving this matter over until you have a Labour
Government There is no sign whatever that the Tories or
Liberals or the Labour Party are thinking of making Home Rule
an issue in Scotland. Therefore, we must make it an issue
ourselves. We can only do this by creating a party to be called
the Scottish National Party, which shall put up candidates at
elections for this one question and this alone."(126)
The Labour loyalists naturally opposed such a move, as it meant a direct
challenge to the authority of their Party. However, it was perhaps an
indication of their loss of the moral high ground that none of their MPs
took part in the debate. They all, quite bluntly, stated that they had
more important business to attend to, which was fuel to the nationalist
claims that they no longer took Home Rule seriously. (127) The loyalists
were under increasing pressure to vindicate the Association's present
course of action, and judging by the dwindling attendances at SHRA
meetings,(128) it appeared that few could be bothered with facing up to the
challenge. Many, such as David Kirkwood believed that the Association was
nothing more than a working class ancillary organisation of the Labour
Party:
"The English many a time thought they could buy Scottish
independence. They had bought the aristocracy, even the
middle classes. But the good thing about the Home Rule
Movement today was that it was composed of the working class,
and the working class has never been bought."(129)
It was taken for granted that the SHRA would follow the aims and objectives
of the Labour movement, and the ultimate goal was socialism, which they all
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had a duty to strive for.(130) It was also assumed that those activists,
the majority of whom belonged to the ILP, would observe Labour Party
discipline. The Labour loyalists in the Association were unable to
comprehend the motives which compelled the activist wing to promote the
cause of Home Rule at the expense of socialism. Indeed, it was this lack
of comprehension which led J.L. Kinloch to accuse those who wanted to form
a Scottish National Party of "being more interested in destroying socialism
than getting Home Rule."(131) He also believed that the formation of an
independent political party, which would challenge Labour in the electoral
arena, was tantamount to a declaration of war against the socialist
movement.(132)
Things came to a head in January, 1928, when R.E. Muirhead announced his
intention to stand as an independent Home Rule candidate for the West
Renfrewshire constituency. His attempts to receive endorsement from the
SHRA were blocked, and although there was no official Labour candidate at
that moment, no time was lost in appointing Captain Wedgewood Benn;
significantly a man with a strong devolutionist record.(133) As a result
of this, Muirhead announced that he would resign as Secretary of the
Scottish National Convention, although he was persuaded to stay on a little
longer while attempts were made to dissuade him from his present course of
action. However, the damage had already been done. In April, 1928, he
expressed his dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs in an
article for the Scots Independent, the monthly organ of the nationalist
organisation, the Scots National League. The first point he made was that
Home Rule could not be attained through the medium of British political
parties because they had no genuine interest in the issue. Also, he
blamed the latent hostility of English MPs as a salient factor in thwarting
previous attempts to pass self-government legislation:
"It transpires that the English Labour members take a very-
similar view about Scottish Home Rule to what the English
Liberals did when Gladstone was in power many years ago
It is well known that among Scottish Labour members that the
English Labour members are not at all anxious to give Scotland
Self Government It did not find a place in any of the three
manifestoes issued by the three Parliamentary parties at the 1924
General Election. To me, personally, this was the death knell
of my reasonable hope of the Labour Party, or any other mainly
English party, passing a Scottish self government measure of its
own accord."(134)
Muirhead explained how he interpreted contemporary events in the Home Rule
movement, and as far as he was concerned, the cause could only be forwarded
by independent political action.
"Lately there has been a marked increase in the number of
those who have come to realise the hopelessness of expecting
any effective steps to be taken by one or other of the present
London controlled parties. Although there are still a large
number of earnest Scotsmen and women, potential nationalists,
who fail to perceive the futility of continuing to expect a
national Parliament through the initiative of the present
parliamentary parties, there is a very evident and large
increase in the number of thorough going Scottish Nationalists
who realise the need for an independent Scots National Party
to ginger things up at Westminster and force to the foreground
the demand for self-government."(135)
He rounded off his argument by concluding that the only way in which the
self-government cause would make a serious impact on Scottish political
life, was for nationalists to make a full scale assault on the electoral
battlefield.
"Nationalist candidates to contest many of the Scottish
constituencies at the coming general election. If Scotsmen
and women awaken to their own interests, there is no reason why
the Scots National Party should not put forward a candidate in
each of the constituencies in Scotland."(136)
By calling for the unification of all nationalists, both within the SHRA
and from other nationalist organisations, in order to form a new party
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which would challenge the Labour Party for electoral support, Muirhead made
any reconciliation between the two factions in the Association impossible.
Labour loyalists were furious, although still reluctant to accept the fact
that Muirhead was intent on breaking up the SHRA. Peter Webster
threatened to withdraw STUC affiliation, but Muirhead had called his
bluff.(137) At the annual meeting of the Association, which took place a
few days after the founding of the National Party of Scotland in April,
1928, Muirhead announced that he had joined the new organisation and urged
those who were likewise disillusioned with the Labour Party's commitment to
Home Rule, to follow suit.(138) His action had effectively ostracised
himself from the Labour movement, and within a short time the new party was
categorised as "communist or other party which is not eligible for members
to affiliate to or become members of."(139) When Muirhead left the SHRA,
he took with him his financial support, and his call to join the NPS
decimated grass root membership and activities.
Throughout the rest of the year, the Association faded away with more and
more branches closing down until the annual meeting of April, 1929, when it
was decided that the organisation should dissolve itself.(140) The short
postwar history of the SHRA had, if nothing else, forced nationalists and
Home Rulers to come to the conclusion that they would have to take control
of their own political destiny in order to achieve their ambitions.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Scots National League 1920 - 1928
In many respects the Scots National League was the most important of all
the inter-war nationalist groups, especially with regard to the future
development of Scottish nationalist philosophy. Much of the mainstream
thinking of the post-war Scottish National Party has its roots in ideas
originally expounded by the League. From a hazy beginning, in which the
principal idea was a form of "Celtic Romanticism", members of the SNL
gradually built up a credible political organisation and were to the
forefront in developing nationalist strategy and objectives designed to
meet the challenges posed by the contemporary social, economic and
political problems faced by Scotland in the inter war years. Much of the
relevance of the SNL's thinking to modern Scottish Nationalism is
accountable by the fact that many similar problems such as unemployment,
de-industrialisation, housing, state welfare, the Scottish Assembly, or
lack of it, etc., have continued up until the present. After 1924, the
SNL was the first nationalist group to formulate and implement a policy of
separation and independence from the main British political parties,
arguing that the existence of English majorities in these groups, would
militate against Scottish interests. Unlike their contemporary and
previous nationalist associations, which relied on the established
political parties to represent their interests, the League advocated the
creation of a new Scottish party, which was to be set up solely for the
purpose of obtaining Scottish self-government. This new party was to run
candidates at local and general elections and its loyalty was to be first
and foremost to the principle of Scottish Home Rule. Indeed, the Scots
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National League was the first nationalist organisation to run a candidate
at an election, albeit an unsuccessful one at local government level. In
1926, the League set up the nationalist newspaper, the Scots Independent,
which is still on sale today. The S.I, acted as a valuable mouthpiece
for the propagation of detailed social, economic and political policies,
which in turn, gave the League more credibility among nationalists in other
organisations. The fact that many other nationalists had come round to
the SNL's way of thinking was borne out in 1928 with the creation of the
National Party of Scotland, whose raison d'etre was the League's dictum
that political independence for Scotland could only be achieved by a party
set up specifically for that purpose.
The Scots National League was formed sometime during the year of 1920.(1)
There is no official founding date of the organisation because most of the
original members had known each other, and their mutually held political
ideas, for a considerable amount of time during their association with the
Highland Land League and various Gaelic cultural organisations.
Initially, the League was built up around a group of Scottish nationalists,
most of whom lived in London, who wished to set up an organisation which
would give further emphasis to their political and cultural ideas. Most
of the London exiles were Gaelic speakers who had a passionate interest in
all things Celtic. Of primary significance in the decision to form the
SNL was the need to frame an organisation which would be able to act as the
successor to the once influential Highland Land League. Most members of
the London SNL had been, at one time or another, members of the Highland
Land League, which had seen its heyday in the second half of the 19th
century under the leadership of John Murdoch and was now in a state of
continual decline, being constantly disbanded and reformed.(2) It was
hoped that the new organisation would provide the necessary impetus
required for a Gaelic political and cultural revival in Scotland, which was
something the Highland Land League had not really attempted to do.
Another important stimulus in the creation of the SNL was the situation in
Ireland after the Easter Rising in 1916, which witnessed an organised
suppression of Irish Gaelic culture by the British Government. Members of
the League had a great affection and admiration for the Irish and their
nationalist aspirations, and regarded them as being part of the great
Celtic family of peoples. It was argued that, given the similarities
between Irish and Scottish Celtic culture, Gaelic might also receive the
same treatment of out and out suppression. Many believed this was
probable and considered that it was necessary to set up an organisation
which would promote and protect Gaelic culture. This, in turn, led to the
creation of the Scots National League.
Perhaps the most valuable insight available to the historian as to the
thinking that underlay the formation of the League can be obtained by a
brief examination of the careers of the two principal leaders of the
organisation: William Gillies and Stuart R. Erskine of Mar. William
Gillies (Liam Mac Gille Losa) was born in Galloway, but was to spend most
of his adult life in London. (3) The son of a merchant in the City of
London, Gillies as a young man taught himself Gaelic and, at the age of
seventeen, befriended John Murdoch, the editor of the Highlander, while
working as a propagandist for the Highland Land League. In the late 19th
and early 20th centuries, Gillies was impressed by the rise of the Sinn
Fein movement and Irish nationalism in general, and it was his hope that a
similar phenomenon would appear in Scotland. With this objective in mind,
he launched the Comunn nan Albanach in 1912, which however, soon passed
into oblivion without achieving any success. Gillies was an important
contributor to the Gaelic cultural movement and was the Secretary of the
Gaelic Society in the years from 1904 to 1905. However, he left this
organisation after the rejection of his motion that the Society's objective
should be the extension of Gaelic as a living tongue and its recognition by
all as the national language of Scotland. He helped form the London
Gaelic Choir and frequently gave sermons in the London Gaelic Church. He
also wrote five plays in his adopted language, which were produced on the
stage in London between 1904 and 1908. He contributed some material to
Erskine of Mar's periodicals; Guth na Bliadhna and Alba. Like many, who
had joined the Highland Land League, Gillies was inclined towards the left
of the political spectrum, declaring himself to be a committed socialist.
He was a consistent supporter of Sinn Fein and an original member - the
first Scot so honoured - of the Gaelic League in London, where he met and
formed a close friendship with Art O'Brien, who was later to become the
head of the Irish Self Determination League in Great Britain. In 1916, he
openly supported the Easter Rising in Dublin and was dismayed at the lack
of support it received from both Scottish socialists and Gaelic enthusiasts
alike. However, in spite of this, Gillies worked tirelessly as a
propagandist for the Irish cause and it was during this time that he came
into increasing contact with Erskine of Mar; both men finding that they had
much common political and cultural ground between them.
Ruaraidh Erskine of Mar (Ruaraidh Arascain is Mharr), the second son of the
fifth Lord Erskine, was born in Brighton in 1869.(4) He was a fluent
Gaelic speaker and writer, having learnt it as a child from his Lewisian
nanny. Arguably Erskine, because of the proliferation of his Gaelic
periodicals and his untiring work as a propagandist, was to do more than
any other individual to implant Gaelic national ideals in Scotland in the
first quarter of the 20th century. In 1901, he was the Scottish delegate
at the pan-Celtic congress held in Dublin where he met and was influenced
by many Irish nationalists. In 1903 Erskine founded the influential
periodic Guth na Bliadhna, which acted as a platform for his pro-Gaelic,
pan-Celtic ideas. Erskine was motivated by a belief that the growth of
Irish nationalism would be reciprocated by a similar movement in Scotland
because of, he argued, the underlying "racial cohesiveness" of the two
nations. This was part of his idea that, at some point in the future,
there would eventually be a Celtic federation comprising of Scotland,
Ireland, Wales, the Isle of Man, Cornwall, Brittany and any other Celtic
regions which could be unearthed. However, before any of this could be
done it was necessary, he argued, to re-Celticize Scotland and this would
entail making the Gaelic language and culture dominant over the whole of
the country. At this juncture it is important to stress the fact that
Erskine believed at one time in the dim and distant past, all of Scotland
had been Gaelic, although the evidence upon which this thesis was based
received little elaboration.(5)
Like Gillies, in 1916 he supported the Easter Rising believing it to be a
"racial obligation" to his Celtic brothers in Ireland. At the end of the
First World War, Erskine led an attempt to have Scotland represented at the
Paris Peace Conference. The "Petition National de l'Ecosse pour obtenir
sa Representation au Congress de la Paix" had the support of many Scottish
politicians including Tom Johnston, David Kirkwood, John Maclean, Neil
Maclean, James Maxton, Edwin Scrymegeour and Emanuel Shinwell among
others.(6) Although in pre-war times he denounced socialism as a
"predatory creed",(7) Erskine, by the end of the war, had moved to a more
left wing stance. He was impressed by the Bolshevik Revolution, which he
claimed was a popular rising against oppression. This, he believed, had
great implications for Scotland as a guide to future political action.
Erskine displayed a remarkable degree of ideological agility in
incorporating left wing revolutionary tendencies into his own political
philosophy. This hybrid creation called "celtic communism" was based on
the way the clan system was supposed to have operated in the dim and mystic
past. It is hard to tell if this was what Erskine genuinely believed, or
whether it was a sop to his only potential ally at the time who had
considerable popular appeal, the Clydeside revolutionary John Maclean.
Both men had certain features in common. They shared an anti-British,
anti-militarist outlook and had both supported James Connolly's action in
Ireland, although Maclean was the slower of the two in coming round to this
opinion. Both men were in agreement that the English labour movement was
more reactionary than its counterpart in Scotland.(8) However, perhaps
the most important reason for their cooperation was the fact that Maclean
was becoming more and more isolated from the mainstream of Scottish
Labour's political thought and desperately needed allies. His advocation
of the nationalist question within the context of socialism, a la Connolly,
brought him opposition from both the moderate and extreme sections of the
Scottish socialist movement.(9) Maclean's post war objective was "the
definite forming of a communist party composed of all the left wing
elements in Scotland," which would have non-affiliation to the Labour Party
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as one of its philosophical tenets.(10) Although much of this idea was,
in the end, undermined by William Gallacher, (11) it is fairly safe to
assume that Maclean's contact with Erskine was a result of his plan to
create a unified Scottish left wing movement. In any case, the net result
was that both men worked well together and cooperated in an attempt to stop
Clydeside workers shipping Government arms to Ireland. Erskine wrote
articles on "celtic communism" for Maclean's newspaper Vanguard, which
revealed just how shallow his "socialism" was. He believed that some form
of communism was an intrinsic value of the Celtic peoples and was, in many
cases, primarily attributable to racial qualities and characteristics.(12)
Erskine's socialism was not based on economic factors, or marxist
historical determinism, which he had little time for, but rather on
romantic images of the Gaelic past. This was in direct contrast to the
rigid materialist conceptions which underlay Maclean's thinking. However,
it was from the background of pre war cultural nationalism that Erskine and
Gillies founded the Scots National League.
As already stated most of the initial League members lived in London and,
for an organisation dedicated to the task of mobilizing the Scottish people
towards the goal of political independence, this was a geographical
disadvantage of considerable importance. In the years between 1920 and
1922, real political contact with Scotland remained tenuous. This was of
little account, because the League did not have any policies or objectives
detailed enough to appeal to the Scottish populace. The only idea that
the SNL could bandy about was the broad objective of Scottish independence.
However, a definition of what this was, or how it was to be achieved,
received only a minimum of elaboration. This lack of political clarity
was a result of the fact that most members had known each other for some
time and the early history of the League resembles more that of a private
club than a political organisation. In such a relaxed and friendly
atmosphere, there appears to have been little pressure to hammer out
concrete plans and objectives, which could be practical, and potentially
divisive. The situation in Ireland acted as a convenient diversion and
absorbed most of the League's early energies and frustrations.(13) All
agreed that the plight of their Irish brethren was more serious than their
own and, consequently, little beyond propaganda operated in Scotland.
Another reason for the League's ideological poverty was the fact that both
its leaders, Erskine and Gillies, were not detailed planners. Most of
their ideas were abstract and neither of them could be bothered with the
elaborate planning required to set up an effective political organisation.
Both men were willing to point out the main objective, but not so keen to
go into the details of how it was to be achieved. In any case, they
believed that propaganda was the most important function of the League
stressing, as they perceived it, the need to alert the Scottish people to
their "true situation".
John MacArthur was the SNL's most important man in 1920, both for
establishing links with Scotland and disseminating the "essential"
propaganda. MacArthur lived in Glasgow and it was from there that he
edited and published his journal Liberty, which first appeared in December,
1919. Unfortunately, little is known about MacArthur, although it does
seem likely that he was initially involved with the Scottish Home Rule
Association when he was first approached by Erskine to join the League.
To begin with, Liberty was advertised as the "Scottish Home Rule Journal"
and its pages contained news of the SHRA's activities. It is not
unreasonable to speculate that Roland Muirhead helped to provide funds to
set up the journal, but later disassociated himself and the SHRA from it
because of its increasingly radical and Sinn Fein sentiments. Indeed,
after a short time Liberty was to change its title from the "Scottish Home
Rule Journal" to the "Scottish National Journal" and the Muirhead brothers
brought out their own Scottish Home Rule News-sheet to fill the gap caused
by MacArthur's departure. However, Liberty was not really an official
journal of the League and there were usually articles in favour of Scottish
Self Government, aspects of Scottish culture and football, as well as
plentiful helpings of pro-Irish nationalist news items. An irony worth
pointing out was the fact that MacArthur used to sell his newspaper outside
Ibrox football ground.(14)
By using the columns of Liberty it is possible to glean some information as
to the structural apparatus, in so far as it existed, of the SNL in
Scotland. The only public meeting organised by the League in 1920 was a
demonstration at Arbroath Abbey in October to mark the 600th anniversary of
the Declaration of Scottish Independence. The main speaker was supposed
to have been Erskine of Mar, who, because of illness, had to step down.
His place was taken by John Maclean who, by all accounts, managed to boost
the attendance figures.(15) Evidence of the League's weak membership and
lack of political direction was given in the speech made by MacArthur at
the meeting: "The League stood for the complete restoration of Scotland's
independence and membership was open to all men and women regardless of
party, so long as they approved of that object."(16) Acceptance of
members from the Conservative and, to some extent, the Liberal parties went
square in the face of their accusations against these people of being
responsible for a military occupation in Ireland. Also, for an
organisation which was decidely anti-British, their willingness to tolerate
as members individuals belongings to political parties which were committed
to the unity of the British state, displayed a total lack of realism.
However, perhaps due to the nature of the League's propaganda, no-one of
any significance from these parties was persuaded to join.
The perennial weakness of the League during the first years of its
existence was the failure to attract new members and any amount of public
sympathy. This state of affairs, they argued, was the result of English
propaganda, which had duped the Scottish people, who now were no longer
aware of just how serious their plight was. It was therefore necessary,
they maintained, to intensify their propaganda campaign in order to bring
about an "enlightened" Scottish national consiousness. As far as League
members were concerned, Scotland, like Ireland, was little more than a
colony of England. They asserted that from the earliest times, the
English had tried to subjugate the Scots to their rule, destroy their
culture and economically exploit them. Erskine, Gillies, MacArthur and
other members of the League believed that this English policy had almost
been totally successful and had just been recognised in the nick of time.
They now made it their objective to reverse this process. In the years
from 1920 to 1924, the Scots National League began to take steps to build a
philosophy which explained and justified the role and necessity of
Scottish nationalism. In the initial stages, central to this philosophy
was their interpretation and understanding of Scottish history with
particular reference to affairs with England. In order to understand the
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political development of the SNL, it is first of all necessary to elucidate
their peculiar and, at times, rather unique and colourful interpretation of
Scottish history.
In order to build up Scottish national consciousness and awareness, the
League believed, it was important to provide a "corrective" analysis of
Scottish history which, they argued, had been distorted since the Union as
part of the plan to destroy the Scottish national identity. The teaching
of "bogus" Scottish history at schools, they claimed, was a favourite
Unionist tactic. They complained that "The two most serious defects in
the teaching of Scottish history are the neglect of the more Celtic period
on the one hand and the decided Whiggish interpretations given to the later
periods of the other".(17) This, according to the League, was propaganda
being used to undermine Scottish cultural unity. As the SNL equated
Scottishness with celticism, the absence of attention paid to the early
part of Scottish history was not due to any problems connected with
historical research, but was part of the plot to diminish the Celtic aspect
of Scottish culture while promoting English influences. Liberty thundered
against this.
"The pernicious stuff labelled as "history" usually dealt
out to Scottish children is largely composed of barefaced
lies concocted under the baneful influence of John Bull.
Such "history" affects to regard the ancient Celtic speaking
peoples of Scotland as being ignorant barbarians without
any distinctive culture, or political ability, and who, because
of these supposed defects in their character were, for their own
ultimate good, driven into the mountains by a supposed superior
"race", the so called Anglo-Saxons of the lowlands, who are
regarded as the bringers of civilization into the darkness of
Celtic barbarism. Lies such as these only serve to spread discord
among the Scottish people, in fact, they were largely invented
for that purpose, and are still propagated for the same reason,
although at the same time many well meaning, but unreflecting
Scots accept them as Gospel and pass them on."(18)
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As one might expect, similar inducements of unfairness and bias were made
by League historians on aspects of later Scottish history -
As regards the later periods of our country's history the
usual unhistorical "history" affects to regard the promoters
of "Union" with England as far seeing statesmen and high
minded patriots, dis-interested men with never a thought for
themselves, devoting all their energies to the betterment of
their country. Genuine history, which is taught in our schools,
exposes these men as mere agents of England, nearly all of them
in receipt of English money or other favours of John Bull."(19)
Members of the League believed it was more important to undo the
contemporary state of Scottish historical interpretations and replace them
with "corrected" versions than concentrate on the "petty and transient"
aspects of political life. Until this was done, they argued, the Scots
would not have the necessary cultural base upon which they could build
their national aspirations. Consequently, the years between 1920 and 1922
witnessed members of the League engaging in the task of reshaping Scottish
history with considerable relish, anxious to make amends for two centuries
of Unionist bias.
In the League's account of history objectivity was often replaced by a
desire to illustrate contemporary ideas in a historical context. For
example, the Scots were portrayed as an inherently democratic and
progressive people, and this could be traced back to the English invasion
led by Edward I in the 13th century. William Wallace was an example of
"the great Scots patriot and lover of liberty (who) played a very important
role in bursting the chains of feudalism and paved the way for the
democratic principle in government."(20) The left wing ideas of the
League were also injected into the new history of Scotland. However, the
conventional marxist interpretation of two opposed classes struggling
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against each other was not deemed applicable in Scotland's case. The reason
given for this was that it would imply that the Scots had been divided
amongst themselves. Instead a colonial explanation was used to show how
the whole of the Scottish people (with the exception of the unionists and
Anglo-Scots) were exploited by an alien power. The reason why the
exploiters had to come from England was the fact that the Scots were
naturally pre-disposed towards communism and socialism: "The community
will be the ruling power and on the sane and stable foundations of Celtic
culture and Celtic communism, from which Wallace drew his inspirations, we
who share his convictions and speak his tongue, will use both to work out
freedom for our beloved land. "(21) Just as the Scots were naturally
inclined towards the left, the English tended to be capitalist exploiters
and oppressors. These values, so they believed, were attributed to the
result of racial characteristics. This argument was used to explain the
persistent English habit of trying to conquer her Northern neighbour and
the latter's ability to resist.
Scotland has fought over three hundred field battles with
England to guard her sovereign rights...the Scottish people
never at any time surrendered these...Scotland's position
as a self-contained nation with a resourceful and unconquerable
people, considerable national wealth, home industries and foreign
trade attracted the envy of her southern neighbour, England, who
made repeated efforts to conquer her for the possession of
these".(22)
It was argued that, in keeping with an evolving imperialist nature, the
English were forced to adopt new methods in order to try and gain control
of the Scots. In other words "what England was not able to wrest from
Scotland on the battlefield, she set about attaining by chicanery and
political intrigue."(23) As one would expect in a "communistically
minded" nation the King eventually had to let the side down. According to
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the League, James VI was the lever the English first used in their new
strategy of underhand colonization. Scottish hopes that in 1603 "the Auld
enemy would cease their cruel and unprovoked attacks" were soon dashed
because "James accustomed as he was to being strictly kept in his place by
sturdy Scots, whose outlook was distinctly democratic and republican, was
amazed and delighted to find that the English were the exact opposite;
servile and grovelling. "(24) The real irony, in the opinion of John
MacArthur, being patriotic as ever, was the fact that it took the ability
of a Scottish king to set in motion the English policy of insidious
conquest. From this point onwards, the League argued, the campaign was
stepped up, reaching its fruition with the Treaty of Union.
Significantly, the Reformation and the religious conflicts of the 17th
century receive little attention because of the inability to explain them
within the League's concept of the perennial unity of the Scottish nation.
However, there did slip through the occasional few swipes at the Protestant
church.(25) The essence of pre Union history in the eyes of the Scottish
National League was that of a struggle between a democratic, progressive
and Celtic people on the one hand, and an authoritarian, imperialist
teutonic people on the other.
Of all the chapters of Scottish history none received such violent and
vehement denunciation from members of the SNL as the era of the Treaty of
Union. To them, the Union was the root cause of all Scotland's current
troubles in that it openly and freely facilitated the colonization of
Scottish culture, society and economy. The League did not believe there
was any need to justify its termination.
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"The so called Treaty of Union is a spurious document in as
much as it was procured to be passed as an Act through the
Scottish Parliament by force and fraud and in defiance of
democratic opinion throughout the country, to say nothing of
the laws regulating to the Scottish constitution."(26)
The Treaty was also condemned from the "socialist" angle in that "the
Scottish nobles had no right or power to sell Scotland and the Scottish
people. The latter opposed the Union, but were never consulted."(27)
The Treaty was not regarded as being an equal union between two nations,
but rather as an underhand method of incorporating Scotland into England
under the guise of the British state. It was argued that the English
would not surrender any of their interests for the sake of Union and, in
any case, they could always use their numerical superiority in the House of
Commons. Erskine of Mar characteristically explained the situation in
racial terms: "The Teutonic character of the English Parliament is not
affected by the fact that a small minority of Scots and Welsh cells sit in
it...the presence of a few Scottish lackeys in an English household does
not constitute that household a British dwelling place."(28) However,
after the Union, according to the League, there rose to prominence the
greatest enemy of Scottish nationality; the so called Anglo-Scot. This
group was accused of collaborating with the English in order to undermine
Scottish culture and national aspirations. "Anglo Scots" were also
condemned on account of their capitalist inclinations and their tendency to
suppression. It was argued that they were prominent in crushing the 1820
rising and that they exploited the situation for their own ends.
"Want and starvation, aided by a carefully arranged provocation
of soldiers let loose on the street with ball cartridge and bayonet
by an "oversight" of their officers, led to the premature rising
(assisted, I am led to believe, by the aid of what we now call agent
provocateurs) and so, with the usual English - and shall I say
Anglo-Scottish? hypocrisy, examples were made of Baird, Hardie and
Wilson..."(29)
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However, as far as members of the League were concerned, the greatest
threat posed by "Anglo-Scots" was their perpetration of the idea of
separate Lowland and Highland cultures, which was designed to be harmful to
national unity.
The creation of false divisions, the League argued, was a standard practice
of English colonial policy, which grouped subjugated people against each
other. As one League historian explained: "The whole of English policy
throughout history has been to divide and sub-divide... she has divided the
houses of her enemies against each other."(30) This policy was considered
especially loathsome as it was more often than not the Celtic side which
got the short shrift of things. What the Scots needed, they argued was
unity and they only had to look to Ireland for an example.
"We in Scotland have much to learn from Ireland; in this
respect, we are more than ten years behind her. First we
must build up our national conscience, and blushing from
its discovery, we must set ourselves to build up our
nationality from the foundation. The foundation - the
bedrock of our Celtic origin - is already there awaiting
the builders, and the cornerstone - our Gaelic language; the
only national language of Scotland, is already in the hands
of the hewers."(31)
As might be gathered from the above extract, during the "Celtic" period of
its history from 1920 to 1924, members of the League had little time for
aspects of Lowland Scottish culture. Despite the obvious socialist and
nationalist parallels which could have been made, Robert Burns received
little attention. People who belonged to the League during this time
were, above all, Celtic nationalists and there were many implicit
criticisms of Scottish culture which had been tinged with "Anglo-Saxon
teutonism." The SNL wanted to purge Scotland of all these cultural
blemishes and using some Irish nationalists as a model, create an
unadulterated Celtic state. The Irish were held up as examples because
they fitted into Erskine's concept of the "race struggle" between Celtic
and Teutonic cultures. Racial and racist thinking determined much of the
League's attitude towards contemporary situations and this type of
behaviour was fairly common in many parts of Europe during the interwar
years.(32) However, the idea of a "race struggle" often went to absurd
and paranoid levels: "It was an ill day for the Celtic people when the
German Georges and their German Jew supporters got their grip on Alba, Erin
and England. We must unite again, clear them out, and re-establish our
noble Celtic ideas in place of "Teutonic Kultur" and its military despotism
now trying to rule our nations."(33) Although in their ambitions to
"re-celticize" Scotland members of the League often brought positive
cultural values to bear such as encouraging an interest in Gaelic and
Scottish history, they often plunged head first into vulgar racism.
Scottish independence was advocated by one person simply because Scots
"hate Anglo Saxon rule as heartily as their brethren in Ireland."(34)
Others claimed that the English were racially predisposed towards lies,
deceit, treachery, etc.(35) Much of this vulgar anti-English feeling was
fuelled by events in Ireland, which raised many League tempers. The
problems, they argued, were caused by the English trying to force colonial
rule on Ireland through military means. The British Army was referred to
as the "English Army of Occupation" and Liberty regularly disseminated Sinn
Fein propaganda. A common example reads as follows.
"They invade a peaceful and prosperous Irish town, they stir
up hell and leave it like Ypres, and as they depart after an
outrage and murder, leaving blackened and bare walls smouldering
fire and death, they raise their drunken throats in the battle
hymn of Britain; "Boys of the Bulldog breed". Balbriggen will
go down to history amongst all the other English atrocities as
The Scots, the League argued, should have no truck with the British in
Ireland because, as Erskine of Mar explained, "It is the English and the
Irish that are now at feud, as they have been for centuries, and not
ourselves."(37) However, racial obligations dictated which side ought to
receive moral support, "we desire nothing so much as she (Ireland) should
"down" England in her unequal struggle with that power."(38)
Although most founders of the SNL displayed a close affinity to a vague
concept of socialism, their attitude towards the Labour Party was much more
ambiguous and confused. Much of this confusion arose from the fact that
the Labour Party in 1920 was paying regular lip service to the idea of
Scottish Home Rule. William Gillies and several other members of the
London branch were also members of that city's Scots Labour Club.
Initially, the League's presidency was shared by Erskine of Mar and Govan
Labour M.P., Neil Maclean, who, after a year's service, resigned because he
thought the organisation was far too extremist.(39) It seems very likely
that Maclean, like many others, had no idea what the League was about when
he agreed to sharing its presidency. Robert Smilie was one of many trade
union leaders who, in principle, promised to support the SNL and Scots
Labour M.P.s were invited in 1920 to speak at the League's meetings in
London, and a few did. (40) At this time nothing was considered amiss with
having members, who also belonged to another political organisation.
However, this benign view of the Labour Party was to come under increasing
attack because of its association of "Westminsterism". Erskine of Mar was
the most fervent opponent of this, arguing that to go to the House of
Commons was to admit English dominance and sovereignty over Scotland.
Independence, he argued, would not be obtained by this method and soon
scepticism about the intentions of the Labour Party became evident.
"The possible advent of a Labour Government in so called
"Great Britain" would not give Scotland freedom. The English
Labour men would predominate, and being Englishmen, with a
natural gift for interfering in what does not concern them,
would now and again, as long as the Union lasts, prevent
the development of Scottish aspirations."(41)
However, members of the League found a contemporary solution to the
problem of reconciling their "socialism" with nationalism, by questioning
the integrity and objectives of English socialists while, at the same time,
attempting to persuade their Scottish comrades of the merits of greater
detachment from the British movement. Again the Scots' racial
predisposition towards socialism was emphasised: "It is not without
significance, that, with scarcely one exception, the doughtiest opponents
of capitalist rule throughout England's cracking Empire are men of Celtic
blood and Gaelic name."(42) There were few direct denunciations of the
Scottish Labour Party as most members of the League hoped to persuade them
of the errors of their ways. Many argued that the current political
system and the British parties were of no use and had always failed
Scottish Home Rule in the past. The British commitment to Scottish
self-government was skin deep, as one member claimed: "in order that
constituents may be properly gulled, a sham Bill is from time to time
introduced. After some show of mock heroics the Bill disappears."(43)
Although the Parliamentary system was not considered as a suitable avenue
for achieving progress, neither was violence or armed insurrection. In
spite of the fact that they were greatly influenced by Irish nationalists,
few League members believed anything constructive could be achieved by
emulating their armed struggle. In any case, the option was not available
because, as they readily admitted, militant nationalism did not exist in
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Scotland and even if it did, it would simply play into the hands of the
British militia: "We... are not going to oblige with an Amritsar, nor even
a Peterloo. Our weapons are not material, but they will be none the less
effective."(44)
What exactly these "weapons" were received no elaboration and the League's
policy of political action languished in a sea of indecision. The Sinn
Fein tactic of having elected MPs convening in Dublin and refusing to go to
Westminster struck a positive chord among many members. This policy was
thought to have potential for Scotland and was named the Lockhart policy
after Lockhart of Carnwath who, in the 18th century, advocated that the
Scottish MPs should withdraw as a body from Westminster and reconstitute
the Scottish Parliament. A number of League members believed this to be
the only viable option available.
"The only policy consistent with national self-respect
and with potential efficiency is to revive and improve
the Lockhart policy...Our remedy is the first General
Election, when we can have our candidates in the field
ready to go to Edinburgh as our representatives. Ireland
has done this."(45)
However, in 1920, this was idle day dreaming. The League had neither the
public support nor the necessary organisation built up to make this a
realistic option. Also, it ran against the views of Erskine of Mar, who
was against using even the smallest part of the Westminster machinery.
The inability of the League to agree on what political direction to take,
opened up the floodgates for most naive and simplistic notions: "In place
of Westminsterism let us engage in constructive work in Scotland itself.
By doing so the English government machine may gradually be edged out.
Bit by bit, the Scottish people can obtain control of their own
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affairs".(46) Members of the League showed an extreme reluctance to face
up to the reality of the problems posed by the British political system and
by doing so rendered their political ambitions futile.
By 1922, the League had made little progress. They had neglected to
develop the degree of political philosophy necessary to appear as a
credible political organisation. The chronic lack of realistic policies,
the ineffective and limited party machinery, together with half baked and
muddy objectives, had led the League to struggle to maintain the support
of its handful of followers. No one, inside or outside, could make up
their minds as to what kind of organisation the SNL was. The leadership
still regarded detailed discussions of policies, other than general
propaganda, as irrelevant. The fact that the League was wandering about
like some headless political chicken led to increasing dissatisfaction
among rank and file members. Action was demanded, especially, as by now,
the Irish question had been resolved.
"What shall we do to be saved? Form up, get shoulder
to shoulder, stand together, proclaim our principles,
raise the banner of Scotland once again. Talk during the
winter months will not suffice. Ceilidhs and picnics will
not do, meetings at intervals, without sustained effort is
unavailing...Let the Scots National League move, or for that
matter, any League that has for its object, the Independence
of Scotland. But for God's sake move."(47)
Many felt an urge for more action because the Labour Party had made
significant electoral gains in Scotland. With the Clydesiders proclaiming
the necessity of Home Rule many in the League felt they would be left
behind in the clamour for Scottish Self-government. However, the
responses of the leadership to the charges of inactivity were full of
self-justification and probably did more to damage their credibility than
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allay membership fears. Confusion and woolly-mindedness reigned supreme.
"A chief theme...is an absence of any constructive policy
on the part of the League...The League has a very well thought
out scheme based on the past history, present conditions and
future development of Scotland. Connected with the movement,
not out of necessity, but prominent on the propaganda side,
are writers and thinkers well versed in the peculiar needs of
their own country and students of the other national renaissances
in other lands, who are eminently qualified to give a lead in
the initiation and launching of organised efforts in the special
departments for which their experience and research qualifies them
so well."(48)
This was vacuous nonsense, more concerned with promoting self-flattery than
an attempt to answer the accusations of inactivity and lack of direction.
There is no evidence of any such "experts", and, in any case, their advice,
identity and knowledge was never divulged in any meaningful way. The more
the leadership tried to justify themselves the more ridiculous they
sounded. Members were asked to believe that the League was following an
intricate and pre-determined plan.
"A moment's thought also should convince our critical
friend that the time for construction has not yet arrived.
"A time to break down", in the words of the preacher, very
significantly preceded "a time to build up", we are at the first
stage now. Attempts to build up our Celtic state while the soil
is encumbered by the fallen and still tumbling edifice of
post feudalistic cum capitalist masses of crumbling masonry would
be worse than futile. There are many well meanimg reformers,
who are still endeavouring to do this. Not only are they wasting
their own labour and obstructing the pioneer levellers of the
old fabric, but in most cases they are even bolstering up the
ruins and making them tenable still longer for the ghouls to
infest them."(49)
This philosophy displayed an incredible degree of naivety and arrogance.
In pseudo-marxist terms, Scottish nationality was portrayed as something
inevitable, which would triumph as a result of impersonal historical forces
in which endeavours to change the political scene were of no account.
What was worse still the League, not content with its own inaction, began
to fire off at random at other groups, whose actions were helping, to bring
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public attention to the Home Rule issue. Even the Highland Land League
was criticized: "Our Land League friends are out for the freeing of the
soil from the grasp of the stranger, and instead of making all sport in
Scotland impossible, they spend money to send candidates to the sportsman's
club in Westminster."(50) As the SNL was not itself prepared to advocate
a policy of civil disobedience and disruption in the Highland estates,
their criticisms of the Highland Land League were not even a case of the
kettle calling the pot black. The Labour Party was also attacked for
trying to be constructive: "Our socialist friends of all shades of opinion
follow suit, oblivious to the fact that, patent to all who use their
senses, the power to put their laudable schemes to the practical test can
never be obtained from Westminster."(51) The League's attitude towards
the Home Rule movement was negative, obstructionist and offered no credible
alternative strategy. Few people in Scotland believed there was anything
wrong in giving the Labour Party a chance to carry the Home Rule banner
and, judging from the contemporary political scene in 1922, they had the
best chance of bringing this policy to fruition. Discounting omniscience,
the League had no evidence of how the Labour Party would act once in
government. Much of the League's leadership's grumbling simply may have
been sour grapes because the Home Rule movement had taken off without them
and no one appeared desirous of their expert advice. The simple formula
of "First the destruction of alien power and influence where ever it
appears on the surface or under the surface, and then it will be time for
the measuring tape. The architect's plans will be produced when
required"(52) appealed to no one. Apart from colourful metaphors and the
prospect of waging a cultural guerilla war, the League, during this phase
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of its history, had nothing positive to offer the Scottish national
movement. This simple fact accounts for their small amount of support.
During its "Celtic romanticist period", what the League lacked in terms of
concrete policies it made up by giving vent to furious anti-English
sentiment. Of all things, abstract or otherwise, the English were to
receive the most generous helpings of League abuse, which was usually based
on the pretext of an examination of racial characteristics. Erskine of
Mar described the history of the British Isles as a struggle between two
races and cultures, Celtic and Teutonic. The English had gradually become
the dominant influence, and as a result of their direct influence Celtic
culture experienced a severe setback in 1745. Erskine and others believed
this situation was being reversed. Accordingly, the attempts to promote
the Gaelic language and the re-emergence of Scottish nationalism were
evidence of a "rising tide of Celtic awareness."(53) This "Celticism" was
used as the basis to explain the racial difference between the Scots and
the English. However, these ideas often spilled over into rampant
anglophobia and relegated political considerations to second place.
Hence, Scots should not use the British Parliamentary system because: "it
was humiliating and degrading for Scotland to beg for justice in
Westminster."(54) The League was forever reluctant to let bygones be
bygones, especially the history of armed conflict between the two nations.
When the Scots people make up their minds to have freedom
again, it will be theirs for the taking. There will be
no repetition of England's "method of barbarism" in Ireland,
which she now sees and admits to have been a failure. England
would not dare attempt such methods in Scotland. She knows too
well what came of her former attempts, and does not want
another Bannockburn...we are not afraid of war and do not desire
war with England."(55)
58
Although much of this anti-English sentiment was expressed in the format of
"racial" theories, and in a non-personal way, on many occasions the
intellectual trappings fell off to expose a naked prejudice of a less
sophisticated nature. In March, 1922, Lewis Spence wrote about "The
English Peril in Scotland." His main concern was his perceived increase
in English immigration and its effect on Scottish society. Spence believed
that this was evidence of an attempt to colonize Scotland and destroy the
native culture.
"I feel it my duty to warn my fellow countrymen of the
danger which undoubtedly threatens them of being absorbed
by the swarming thousands of the South...Such conditions, of
course, constitute a serious menace to Scots nationality.
These thousands have come to stay. Filled with Saxon
arrogance and contemptuous of their neighbours and
surroundings, they are not content to accept the manners
of their adopted country but constitute in themselves a
distinct colony - the nucleus of a settlement which
if prompt measures be not forthcoming for its suppression,
is destined to strike a serious and damaging blow at the
entire fabric of Scots Nationality."(56)
William Gillies was just as paranoid, bemoaning the quality of the new
immigrants: "Insidious and increasing, the English peril has recently
taken on alarming proportions, as the English cities have to get rid of
their surplus population, undesirables and weaklings unfit for the rougher
life of the colonies, and from these elements Scotland gets her new
citizens."(57) The social implications of this immigration was claimed to
have grave consequences for Scottish daily life. Not only was there a
threat to culture, the Scots were also being economically undermined.
"The character of the neighbourhood in which the English
reside has undergone a complete alteration. The shops in
the district have been taken over by glib English tradesmen,
who not only supply the strangers, but by assiduous hat
touching, and the sycophantic manners peculiar to the lesser
Saxon, have secured the patronage of many Scots people; so that
the business of the native tradesmen languish."(58)
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Such attitudes put paid to any attempt to make the League a serious
political organisation. Despite the garb of racial anthropology, the
League's ideas about the English were little more than vulgar prejudice.
However, in fairness it must be stated that the League was not racially
chauvinistic. They supported Indian, Arabic and African nationalists in
their quest for independence within the British Empire on the principle of
national self-determination.(59)
Negative and obscure thinking reached new depths of unreality in March
1922, when the leadership decided that members ought to boycott the
electoral system.
"Members of the SNL are reminded that in neither
general nor particular elections ordered by the English
Government to be held in Scotland, is it becoming for them
to take any part whatsover. As such elections are held by a
usurpal power, as it is in no way obligatory to take part in
them, they should be boycotted by all Leaguers. The National
Committee hopes that this rule will be strictly observed by all
head branches, provincial branches and groups. Further, the
National Committee recommends to all nationalists throughout
the country that they follow the League's example and abstain
from exercising the English Parliamentary sufferage."(60)
Erskine of Mar's pathological disdain for all things connected with
Westminster only helped to disenfranchise League members; a move that was
unlikely to bring any amount of progress. This motion was another
indication of the chronic lack of realism prevalent among the leadership,
which was becoming simultaneously more paranoid and ridiculous in its
outlook. A lack of concern about ordinary political issues was stemmed by
more and more bizarre conjectures. For example, Lewis Spence claimed that
the SNL's fortunes were being undermined by an extensive Unionist
conspiracy: "Recent intensive examination of forces at work in Scotland
have led me to form the opinion that a secret organisation, the object of
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which is to destroy the nationality of Scotland, exists in London."(61)
According to Spence, this organisation was responsible for a campaign
designed to destroy Scottish cultural, industrial, banking, and railway
interests. Whether Spence genuinely believed his own propaganda or not is
a matter for contention, but the statement does illustrate the farcical
depth to which the League had sunk. Foremost among these conspirators
were "English diehards and Anglo Scots of vindictive anti national
proclivities, chief among them, it is believed, is Sir Henry Craik,
Scotland's old man of the Sea. Colonel John Buchan, the novelist,
pseudo-Scot and late chief of the English Secret Service is also believed
to be implicated."(62) In spite of all their efforts to evade the issue,
the main problem facing the League as a political organisation was its lack
of support and credibility. Neither of these two things would be
forthcoming to a group as politically barren as the Scots National League.
What this meant was that until the League had more concrete and feasible
political goals and objectives which were strong enough to enter the
political arena and challenge the existing political parties, they would
remain an obscure pressure group. The main reason for the League's
initial failure was the inability of the leadership to grasp the political
realities of the day. Much of the outlook of the early SNL was shaped by
19th Century and pre-First World War ideas about Scottish nationalism,
which was romantic, backward looking and largely apolitical. Erskine of
Mar, William Gillies and Lewis Spence had their nationalism shaped more by
cultural inclinations rather than social, economic and political factors.
Likewise, Gillies and Erskine were more influenced by events in Ireland
than in Scotland. Pragmatism was not their forte, and it is easier to
catagorize them among 19th century nationalists such as John Stuart Blackie
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and John Murdoch, than with people like Roland Muirhead and Tom Gibson, who
were firmly grounded in the 20th century. However, events which happened
outside in the real political world were to save the Scottish National
League from political oblivion.
When George Buchanan's Home Rule Bill failed its first stage in the House
of Commons in May 1924, it sent shock waves through all the nationalist
circles. The waves of disquiet were extenuated because there appeared to
be a considerable degree of ambiguity in support for the Bill among the
leadership of the Parliamentary Labour Party.(63) Although most Scottish
Home Rulers held their peace and continued to hold their faith in the
Labour Party, several did not and left the SHRA. One of these people was
Tom Gibson, who then joined the SNL and was to have a crucial impact on the
development of the organisation. Gibson argued, in clear and precise
terms, that the only way forward for Scottish Home Rule was through a
purely Scottish organisation dedicated to that principle. This movement
ought to have no connections with the established British political parties
because, he argued, by virtue of an English numerical superiority, Scottish
interests would be subordinated, or over-ridden in favour of the British
majority. All these conclusions were based on the experiences he had
gained as a member of the Scottish Home Rule Association and its gradual
domination by the Labour Party which, in any case, had failed to deliver
the goods in May, 1924. Gibson's argument was simple and straight to the
point: "The present political parties are dominated by, and their policies
controlled by English majorities in each, and I cannot conceive that
Scottish political independence will ever be acquired through the medium of
any of the parties."(64) Gibson, who was more inclined to the centre of
the political stage, was sceptical of the Labour Party's future pledges on
Home Rule, because they had blown a perfect chanceand seemed none too
perturbed about it. The tame attitude of the SHRA had shown it was little
more than an adjunct of the Labour Party. They were, he argued, "under
the domination of the Socialist Party, a party which is in turn dominated
by an English majority."(65) No British political party, he stated, would
ever secure Scottish Home Rule as this went against English imperial
aspirations over its northern neighbour: "The failure in the past of any
Home Rule Organisation was, in my opinion, due to the predominance of
English elements in these parties."(66) Although the Labour Party had
emerged as a new force in British politics, Gibson did not believe that
they would change the situation in any way because they would eventually
succumb to the same pressures of British orientation which had affected the
Liberal Party in the past. The goal of Scottish independence, he argued,
"would only be obtained through the medium of a Scottish National Party,
independent of any of the present political parties and having as its chief
objective the attainment of Scottish political independence, but at the
same time paying attention to the more pressing problems of the day. "(67)
This latter point was very important because Gibson realized that in order
to attract support and make it a "live" political issue, it was necessary
to tackle and explain existing social and economic problems within the
context of the Home Rule debate. Such problems, he argued, could not be
ignored because their ultimate solution would not be obtained without
self-government. Although Home Rule as an abstract idea found ready
public approval, Gibson believed that until it was explained to ordinary
people in terms of its relevance to bread and butter issues, it would not
receive the priority of attention necessary to make it the most important
political issue of the day. However, before Gibson could do any of this,
his first task was to help put the League's house in order. As the SNL
never had a large following, they suffered comparatively little in the way
of contact with the British political parties. Gibson believed that this
"freedom from contamination" would be the League's main source of strength,
and was indeed the principal reason for his own enrolment. He was soon
made chairman of the Glasgow Area Branch and set to work in an effort to
resolve the League's ambiguity pertaining to the question of British
parties. Largely at his own instigation, the following branch resolution
appeared in December, 1924.
"That any person or organisation attached to, working
with, or in any way bound to any party, institution or
organisation interfering in any way politically with
Scottish affairs and dominated by an English majority,
is not competent or authorized to speak on behalf of the
independent Scottish nation and any action taken by such
a person, party or organisation and not approved by the
League, shall be and is hereby repudiated and that branch
secretary be instructed to inform the National Secretary
accordingly"(68).
After a short period of time, this resolution was accepted in principle by
the League and was incorporated into their constitution. Gibson's
immediate objective in following this course of action was to isolate the
SNL from the SHRA, which, as a result of its involvement in the 1924 Home
Rule failure, was now believed to be a discredited organisation. Any
members, who belonged to both groups were given the choice of remaining in
one or the other as the Association was filed under the category of a
British political establishment. League members were urged to hold no
sympathies with the SHRA and rumours of a possible fusion of the two groups
and the idea of sending a delegation to the Scottish National Convention,
were quickly scotched. The National Secretary, Ian Scott, assured members
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that: "no overtures have been made by the League concerning a fusion from
our side with them. They shall have to join the SNL if they want our
help...The Scots National League is going stand on its own feet."(69)
Gibson was confident that the SNL's uncompromising attitude would
ultimately be vindicated, and that all those in favour of Scottish
self-government would come to realize that the only way to obtain their
objective was through the League or some other tailor made Home Rule party.
By 1925, there was an air of optimism among members. Although much work
remained to be done, membership was on the increase and more realistic
modes of operation were being adopted. The first victim to fall to
Gibson's quest against League "collaborators" was Erskine of Mar, who had
unwittingly agreed to speak at the SHRA Wallace Day meeting in 1925. At
first diplomacy was tried and the situation was explained in philosophical
terms justifying the necessity of isolating themselves from British
groups.(70) However, when his appeals to reason failed, Gibson challenged
Erskine's position within the leadership of the League in forthright terms.
The following Glasgow Branch resolution was threatened
"Having heard with astonishment that the President of
the League has consented to be one of the speakers at a
demonstration held under the auspices of the SHRA, believes
that the invitation was engineered by the anti-home rule section
of the SHRA, in order to embarrass the Glasgow Area Branch in
its activities, the Glasgow Area Branch declares that it can
no longer have confidence in the Hon. R. Erskine of Mar as
president of the League and requests that action be taken
forthwith by the National Executive."(71)
Gibson refused to back down over the issue; stating that "by this
resolution I stand or fall." Few people in the National Executive were
prepared to support the erratic Erskine against their most gifted organiser
who had built up the Glasgow Area Branch into the largest in the League.
Also, if the resolution had been passed it is unlikely that Erskine's
credibility would have taken the strain. Hardly anybody in the SNL had
any respect left for his romantic notions on Celticism, which was now being
challenged by Gibson's reasoned and logical political pragmatism. Shortly
before the demonstration was to have taken place, Erskine backed down and
Gibson's point had been made. From now on Erskine was no longer able to
treat the League as if it was his own private organisation. By the end of
1925, the League had taken the first steps towards becoming a more
self-disciplined organisation with all officials having given written
affirmation of the constitution, which prohibited contact with
organisations, or associations, connected with the established British
political parties.
Throughout 1925 and 1926, further moves were taken to knock the League into
the shape of a functioning political organisation by instigating regular
conferences, making officials and leaders more responsible to the members
and streamlining the decision making process. Objectives and policy were
no longer the narrow prerogative of the London Celticists, but were to be
formulated by the membership, who elected representatives to give
expression to these opinions at annual conferences, where decisions were
voted on. One of the first objectives expressed in the inaugural annual
conference held in June 1926, was to reduce the influence of the London
leadership. It was a considerable source of grievance that both the
President and the Vice-President, Erskine of Mar and William Gillies
respectively, resided in London. Also, the League's unofficial journal
the Monthly Intelligencer was printed and largely written in London. The
appalling lack of success prior to 1926 was blamed on the influence of the
Celticists and their lack of real contact with Scotland. However, the
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June 1926 conference decreed that all members of the Executive Committee
now had to live in Scotland. Also the conference voted to establish a
chairman, Hugh Paterson, who would act as a focal point for the
leadership, while the Presidencies of Erskine and Gillies were demoted
upstairs to "honorary" ones.
Although the League was beginning to tighten up its organisational
structure, the day to day running of the League left a great deal to be
desired. The most urgent need was for an effective Central Office, which
could control and administer the network of emerging branches. Gibson
wrote to Paterson highlighting their inadequacies.
"I am in perfect agreement with what you say about
Central Offices...we could make no progress until we
had a secretary at C.O. with time, ability, education
and enthusiasm, capable of carrying out the instructions
of the Executive Conmittee. At present the E.C. is most
ineffective. We meet, we jaw, we disperse to our
various caves until the next meeting...a strong and
intelligent C.O. is absolutely essential if we are to
open new branches or even keep in touch with the existing
ones."(72)
Throughout 1926, Gibson and Paterson made concerted efforts to establish
and embellish the administrative framework of the League in order to
facilitate its expansion. In addition to more local branches, an
informative new journal, the Scots Independent was established, which acted
as the League's official mouthpiece. The Scots Independent kept members
informed of organisational progress and was a forum for policy objectives
and ideas, which, in turn, helped to attract new members and kept morale
high. However, in spite of progress made on the administrative front, the
League had to contend with a history of chronic interfactional disputes, of
which many were well publicised. (73) The most serious incident was the
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argument which led Lewis Spence to form a breakaway group called the
Scottish National Movement. The SNM, which was set up in the first months
of 1926, was created not from ideological or political reasons, but was the
result of petty bickering and slandering between Spence and the Treasurer
of the SNL, R.M. Brown. The incident caused dismay among League members
because, politically and ideologically, there were supposedly no real
differences between the two organisations.
"There is no difference between the objects of the
SNL and the "movement"...There is no doubt that, owing
to a few officials in the East taking sides In a petty
quarrel - we in the West refuse to take sides or interfere -
some interruption in the work of the SNL took place. But that
has now been overcome."(74)
Perhaps Gibson was trying to . be blase in this last statement, and
underestimated the damage in the interest of morale. However, the
departure of Spence considerably reduced membership in Edinburgh and the
entire Dunfermline Branch (bar one) of 65 members joined the Movement en
bloc.(75) The pettiness of the squabble and its ensuing results, together
with the bad publicity which followed the affair, obviously had some
demoralizing effect on members of the League. Even in June, 1926, Iain
Gillies was complaining of a lack of commitment among some members, who
"presently at least, take too detached an interest in activities."(76)
What was worse, after Spence's departure, the Edinburgh branch sank into
organisational chaos, which as one of the key centres of the League, was
potentially disastrous. Even after the "disruption" petty bickering still
continued in the East. Iain Gillies lamented, with perhaps more than a
slight touch of Western bias, that "it is a great pity Edinburgh folk are
so lacking in spirit and common sense, presumably".(77)
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Undoubtedly the departure of Spence and his brood was a blow to the SNL,
however its effects were harmful in the short-term only. It is important
to place these difficulties within the context of a changing and developing
political organisation. After all, much of the petty squabbling was a
result of the efforts to build the League into an expanding and credible
political group. After four or five years of stagnation, such a process
was not likely to be easy, as it involved considerable re-orientation in an
organisation which had been very conservative in its ways. The bickering
was symptomatic of the SNL's lack of self-discipline, which was now
gradually being brought under control. Although Spence was a colourful
and charismatic figure, he was also politically naive and had little time
for nor understanding of the political apparatus. He was first and
foremost a cultural nationalist and failed to take account of anything
outside that sphere. Spence was also guilty of some of the League's most
virulent anti-English writings and the author of some bizarre ideas on
achieving Scottish self-government.(78) In the long-term such an
obstreperous and naive leader would have been a positive hindrance to the
League's progress, and few pragmatists in the organisation viewed his
departure with sorrow.
However, while the League was experiencing negative setbacks, it was also
on the threshold of receiving major positive boosts. Perhaps the most
important event to change the SNL's political fortunes was the publication
of its new journal, the Scots Independent. In April,1926, Gibson first
drew up plans for a newspaper which would contain articles on such matters
as the social and economic problems facing contemporary Scottish life.(79)
As mentioned earlier, this was considered vital because it illustrated the
Importance and relevance of Home Rule to the ordinary person. The Celtic
Romanticism of Erskine of Mar had proved a heroic failure and had motivated
no one to action. What was now required was a philosophical underpinning
of Scottish nationalism which was pragmatic and relevant to the
contemporary political issues. The Scots Independent was to be the
vehicle for the expression of these new ideas on Scottish nationality.
The emphasis was now on issues that were positive and forward looking.
Social, economic, political and cultural affairs were to be tackled by the
new philosophy, which would act as a polemic against opponents of the
League. Also, it was hoped that it would attract new members: "It will
be a paper for the man in the street, you will find no highbrow stuff or
articles written just for the sake of smart phrasing...What the editor does
not want are; long letters with padding, articles breathing hate or
jealousy of England; hysterical statements and above all, abuse of persons
who may be opposed to us."(80) The Scots Independent was an attempt to
dispel the cranky image of the League by the advocation of rational
argument which was aimed at ordinary Scots people in order to further their
case. Gibson was the S.I'.s business manager while William Gillies was
the editor. Although a member of the London branch and one of the
original Celticists, Gillies had acted as one of Gibson's consorts in
helping to usher in an era of reform. He had abandoned Celticism as a
political idea and had replaced it with a much more positive image of
Scottish nationalism. In doing this, he had been much influenced by his
son Iain, who put pressure on his father to accept Gibson's directives,
because he believed them to be the only way forward for the League. Iain
Gillies acted as an intermediary between the two men and had no doubts as
to what kind of organisation the SNL ought to be.
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"To my mind Scotland's need is a National Party,
advocating full self-government; anti-jingo and
anti-militarist; strongly radical in its general outlook
and prepared to face the question of housing and land on
socialist lines: These two problems at least...I feel
that if the SNL object included some such progressive
platform, our position would be clearer and greater support
would be forthcoming."(81)
Iain Gillies was to be a main contributor to the new journal and his
attitude was to take a modernised Scottish nationalism into the political
arena and intellectually challenge the other political parties for support
among the electorate. Gillies was inclined to the left and believed that
the new dominant political idea in the world would be socialism.
Consequently, he targeted his brand of nationalism at potential Labour
voters. Also, he believed that it was important to educate people about
the "political realities" of the Scottish situation.
"Convince the Scottish progressive that Westminster
action is futile, prove by our radical policy that
we are not reactionary and I believe we shall get our
necessary support... Attempts at conciliation and
cooperation will only encourage them (the SHRA) in a
belief of our weakness. Quiet confidence will force
them to move along the right road in order that they may
not suffer loss of membership...The day will come when the
divergence of interests between Scots and English sections
of the parties can no linger be ignored."(82)
When that day dawned Gillies wanted the SNL, by virtue of its policies and
support, to be in a position to be the most able representative of the
Scottish national movement.
An obvious first target for the League to challenge was the authority of
the Labour Party in Scotland. The basis and principles of this party were
subjected to close scrutiny. The Scottish socialist was called on to take
cognizance of the concept of nationality and accept the fact that no truly
scientific socialism could fail to take account of it. Indeed, it was
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argued that any legitimate intellectual foundation for the Scottish Labour
Party was lacking because of its subservience to the British Labour
leadership. This, it was claimed, rendered all their Scottish aspirations
bogus. There was a need, the Rev. Malcolm Mac Colla argued, for Scottish
socialists to subject themselves to considerable self-analysis. "The
circumstances call for a review of the entire position of Scotland by
Scottish socialists and especially by those who are engaged in Labour
college work. Their text books have been English, their study of past
history has been confined to England. They have built around themselves a
paper wall of English books; no wonder the common marxist cannot see
Scotland."(83) The lack of independence faced by Scottish socialists was
highlighted by drawing attention to the failure of Buchanan's Home Rule
Bill and the exclusion of some of Wheatley's Housing Act clauses. The
failure in both cases was attributed to English Labour interests. How,
argued the League, could Scottish Labour deliver Home Rule when it did not
even enjoy this as a principle within the ranks of the British Labour
movement?
"Socialist members! Do you remember that memorable
occasion, when fired by election triumphs, you raised
your voices in psalm and pledged yourselves to the cause
of Scottish self-government...your pledges have been cast
aside; the English Government formed by your Party refused
facilities for the introduction of a Scots Home Rule Bill,
refused to allow in its Wheatley's Housing Act clauses
necessary to ensure the provision of houses in Scotland.
You have been as neglectful of Scotland as the members of
any other Party; you have wasted in futile discussions
opportunities that might have been devoted to Scottish
affairs. You pay lip service to self-government; you have
admitted its urgent need. You have drafted a separate Land
policy for Scotland and admit the impossibility of its ever
becoming law and its impracticability of operation without
prior attainment of a new Scottish Parliament. You have
raised no effective protest against any of the many recent
insults to Scotland and encroachments on her rights. Can
you wonder that in Scottish eyes you are deemed as useless."(84)
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The kid gloves were off! Labour was attacked more than the other parties
because of the seeming ambiguity in their policies and also, because it was
believed the League would be able to steal their support. It was felt
that this was a soft spot worth exploiting. As regards to the other
parties, the Liberals had become, more or less, a spent force in Scottish
politics, and it was thought that they were no longer worth bothering
about. The Conservative Party, which had an uncompromising view on
Scottish Home Rule, received only the usual habitual condemnation. Apart
from theoretical ambiguities, the League seized with a vengeance any
dichotomies between Scottish and British Labour interests. The confused
approach by the Scottish Labour Party to the threatened closure of the
Rosyth naval dockyards was exploited mercilessly. It was argued that the
proposed closure was partially the result of the Labour Party's demands for
pacifism and disarmament. The SNL accused the Scottish Labour MPs of
being little more than Westminster lackeys, while the SHRA kept, as far as
possible, an awkward silence about the whole affair.(85) In October 1925,
the League organised its first full scale protest meeting, which pulled in
over 1000 people who were anxious as to the future of the dockyards. As a
result of this successful activity, several local branches were set up in
the area, with the one in Inverkeithing attracting a respectable figure of
over 200 members.(86) An extension of the theme of attacking the Labour
Party was highlighting the lack of freedom the SHRA suffered. The failure
of the Rev. James Barr's Bill in May, 1927, and the almost total lack of
enthusiasm with which it was pursued was gleefully reported by the SNL to
create tensions within the Association.
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The Bill was introduced with the usual talk by the
Rev. James Barr, seconded by Mr. Tom Johnston and talked out
by Mr. MacQuisten. The Labour members achieved their objective;
they can now return to Scotland and say they have done everything
within their power to secure self-government! It was a pity -
from his own point of view - that Mr. Johnston showed how little
he cared for the Bill by predicting the result of the Half hour
talk. The mover and seconder well knew that the Bill was doomed
to be talked out, and the whole farce would have to be started over
again - not this year, but next year or sometime. Surely our Home
Rule friends can now realize the futility of all their efforts
and tactics - the utter stupidity of putting any trust, so far
as Scotland's rights are concerned, in the pledges of any members
representing Scots sections of the three English parties. The
Scots National League points the right way with its policy
of ignoring English politics, concentrating on Scottish issues
and endeavouring to rally supporters of Scottish self-government
into one democratic and progressive League with the sole object
of securing for Scotland this most important and first of
all reforms."(87)
In spite of the fact that no official contacts existed between the SNL and
the SHRA, many of the Association's members were coming to the same
political conclusions as held by the League, much to the chagrin of the
Scottish Labour Party.(88) The SNL played on the fact that many members
of the SHRA were readers of the Scots Independent and tried to foster
demands for the creation of a new "national party". Also, from inside and
outside the Association, more hefty commitments were now being sought from
the Scottish Labour Party. Malcolm MacColla's demands were typical:
Scottish Labour MPs should pledge to "work and vote as a Scottish Party.
To decline office in any English Labour Government; to demand as English
Labour's first use of its power the fulfilment of its pledges in favour of
Scottish self-determination."(89) Few people with any sense of political
realism believed the Labour Party would change its order of priorities,
and the League concentrated on giving tacit support to those people in the
SHRA who advocated the creation of a new "national party". Calls for such
a party had become more and more insistent and were only defeated by
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Labour's stranglehold on the policies of the Association.(90) However,
the League encouraged these people to persist: "We regret that the Scottish
Home Rule Association has been compelled by an adverse vote to put aside
the idea of a national party. We trust that this may only be temporary,
and that when the "National Party" is again mooted in that body, the idea
will be divested of any connection with the Westminster Parliament."(91)
As the Labour Party's indifference to the nationalist claims increased,
many in the League believed there would soon be an opportunity to lead the
Home Rule movement under their own philosophical flag.
The Scots Independent was an effective proponent of the new nationalist
ideas and had subscriptions placed in over 100 public libraries.(92) Even
Tom Johnston's Forward had to sit up and take notice of the newcomer and a
defence campaign was launched to protect the record of Scots Labour MPs,
although the challenge to intellectual debate was declined.(93) Also,
Edwin Scrymgeour M.P. quoted facts and figures from the S.I, in
Parliamentary debates.(94) In September, 1927, the journal carried an
article of considerable importance written by Iain Gillies called
"Scotland's need: A National Party." The article was designed to sway
Home Rulers in the SHRA to adopt the League's dictum that self-government
could only be obtained by an organisation independent of the British
political parties. Gillies was hopeful that, with mounting disaffection
in the Association over Labour's policies, the article would receive a
sympathetic hearing. His emphasis was on the need for unity among
nationalists:
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"Various organisations, with more or less success, are
spreading the gospel of Self Determination for Scotland.
One may well ask what good purpose is served by this multiplicity
of bodies that profess the same, or similar objects. But of
these there are notably two - the Scots National League and
the Scottish Home Rule Association - that show some signs
of effective propaganda and durable work in organisation. It
is the height of greatness to produce two blades of grass where
one grew before; but it is surely the height of folly to
perpetuate two organisations where one would do."(95)
Gillies was obviously being generous to the Association in his assessment
of their achievements and propaganda in order not to give offence. This
was a sop in order to make more palatable his suggestion that the two
groups should combine their respective forces into one organisation. He
believed that the League's policies and ideological motivation, when
combined with Muirhead's finance, and the boost that would accrue from the
activities of the SHRA membership, would present an effective challenge to
the British parties in Scotland. However, there remained a number of
differences between the two groups, especially concerning the definition of
"Home Rule" and it was by no means clear that the Association would lie
down and submit to the League's ideological domination. Gillies felt that
the best way to persuade members of the Association that the SNL had the
best policies, was to highlight SHRA weaknesses. As the League had not
yet undergone any acid test of political importance, this was a safe option
to try.
As far as the SNL was concerned, nationalists would now have to stand for
election on their own ticket. However, as elections were expensive and
required effort and an effective political machine, many believed it was
only sensible for all Scottish nationalists to pool their resources.
"To achieve independence it is necessary to bring Scottish
politics before the Scottish electors and to organise opinion
in favour of Self-government independently of the Scottish
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sections of the English political parties...The present
policy of the League as recently adopted "by means of the
existing electoral machinery to obtain a ma.jority of Scottish
representatives pledged to remain on Scottish soil and to resume
the powers of government"...Abstention from Westminster is
not necessarily entailed by the League policy until such time
as a majority of the representatives in favour of independence
is obtained."(96)
This was a significant step forward in the League's political thinking, and
may well have been designed to motivate members of the SHRA into action
because it is questionable if the SNL had, at that time (June, 1927),
sufficient resources to fight elections on its own. They compared their
own policies to those of the Association.
"In our campaign we are forced up against the vested
interests in Scotland of the English political parties
and their agents. That fact is often ignored. The
efforts of our Home Rule friends to achieve their object
by stroking the backs of the Scottish candidates of the
English parties is futile. It reminds us of the remark
made by the celebrated wit, Sidney Smith, to a little girl
who was stroking a tortoise. "You might as well pat the dome
of St Pauls Cathedral to give pleasure to the Dean and Chapter!"(97)
While, at the same time, as condemning the Association's policies as
futile, the League did offer an olive branch in the form of the idea of a
national party. The national party idea was used by the League as an
honourable way out for nationalists in the SHRA who, much to their
embarrassment, had backed a lame horse. Throughout 1927, the League
applied psychological pressure on members of the Association by forcing
them to chose between the two modes of operation available. The League's
criticism was temperate; it was designed to hurt, but not to provoke
hostility.
"In terms of the latest Bill sponsored by the Home Rule
Association, it certainly failed in important respects...Its
form of presentation to the predominantly English Parliament
for approval was acceptance of the implicit English claim to
deny, or limit as England pleases, the rights of Scottish
self-government. However, if one may judge by public
utterances, our friends in the Association are coming 'up to
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scratch' - and it may be that there is little now to distinguish
the aim of a strong body of opinion in the Association from the
aim of the Scots National League."(98)
The SHRA, argued the League, was under "a two fold spell. It is hypnotised
by Westminster and it has the faith of a suckling in the Liberal and Labour
humbug."(99) It was also criticized for the degree of Home Rule they
advocated: "The aim of the Scottish Home Rule Association is not clear.
But apart from the practical necessities of Scotland, it is surely
incredible that any Scottish organisation would demand for our country a
status and powers inferior to these which have been admitted as the right
of Canada."(100) Many in the League believed that, after the failure of
Barr's Bill, there would be a fundamental re-orientation in the
Association's policies. There was a constant barrage of criticism
directed against the SHRA's dependence on the Labour Party and calls for a
new "national party" were, by now, monthly features in the association's
news-sheet.(101) Gibson and other members of the League were desperate to
influence the state of flux in the SHRA to further their own interests.
"The policy of the Home Rule Association is presumably
in the melting pot. There is evidently much keen
dis-satisfaction at the cavalier treatment of their
Government of Scotland Bill. Faith in the ability, if
not also in the sincerity, of members of the Westminster
parties is giving place to the realization that there is
hope alone in the policy advocated by the League. Scots
MPs of the three political parties neither enjoy Home Rule
nor attempt to show any independence of spirit within
these predominantly English parties. The folly of expecting
them to advocate Scottish self-government successfully has
long been recognised by the League's policy of a Scottish
National Party."(102)
Many in the SNL were hoping that the Association would throw in its lot
with a new National Party headed by League members. The National Party,
they argued, was ready and waiting to be set up. All that was now
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required was clarification from the SHRA To many in the SNL, it appeared
that they had won a crucial ideological war over which method of political
representation would further the interests of the Scottish national
movement. In the meantime, co-operation between the two groups increased.
In June, 1927, the Scotland's day parade and demonstration held in
Stirling, was organised by both groups and was based on the understanding
that, for this occasion, the SHRA would sever its ties with the British
political parties.(103) The demonstration was important in that it proved
conclusively that the nationalists could work together. Many in the SNL
believed that, when the new party would come into existence, it would fly a
banner which had been woven by the League.
"The Scots National League has laid the foundations of
a National Party - democratic, progressive and radical
minded - with a demand that will gain the support of all
Scots save the reactionary who may, with advantage, be left
to amuse themselves with the "red letters" and red
herrings of English politics. If and when the Home Rule
Association boldly proclaims adherence to this policy,
what is to prevent its co-operation in the League's work
of putting forward and securing the return of National
candidates."(104)
However, the process was not going to be as easy as many imagined. It was
to be almost another year before the National Party of Scotland would be
formed. During this time, the Home Rulers still persisted with the
Scottish National Convention as a forum for political debate and policy
options. As the SNL, on principle, boycotted this forum, they were left
out of the decision making process. There is no doubt that the options
being mooted by the League had a profound influence on other nationalists,
however, it was not guaranteed that they would follow without any
reservations the line being given by Gibson. Members of the Association
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displayed a greater sense of imperviousness than many in the SNL had
expected. Indeed, as events were to prove the creation of the National
Party of Scotland did not happen as many League members had planned.(105)
The establishment of a broad political strategy was an ongoing process and
this framework was bolstered from within by specific arguments from the
social and economic perspective in favour of Scottish independence. The
League's main thrust was that Scottish social and economic maladies were
the result of bad government from Westminster and that once Scotland was in
control of her own destiny, the economy would flourish. Such discussions
were designed both to impress nationalists outside the League and to bring
a greater degree of immediacy to the Home Rule debate. The SNL had no
doubt as to the economic feasibility of an independent Scotland: "It is
clear that Scotland's area, population and revenues are greater than those
of many prosperous European states."(106) To ram this message home,
figures were given to lend authority to their arguments, although it is,
more often than not, impossible to tell how these statistics were computed.
Comparisons were drawn to show how much different countries earned in their
national incomes. Iain Gillies believed that the annual revenue in
£millions for the following countries were; Denmark £18; Switzerland £12;
Sweden £40; Holland £51 and Czechoslovakia £63, while Scotland's was
£90.(107) Westminster government was condemned for its costliness, which
devoured most of the earnings created by the Scottish economy.
"The annual cost of government per head to the independent
citizens of Denmark is roughly £4 10/-; of Switzerland £3;
Sweden £6 15/-; Holland £7 5/-; whilst the hard headed Scot,
glorying in his business ability and his position of office
boy in the great imperial concern, the cost is £18 per head!
If the Scots prefer to be ruled by another nation rather than
manage their own affairs, why in the name of shrewdness can't
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we give the contract to a country more economical than
England."(108)
The League regarded Scotland as being part of the British Empire only in
the sense that she was a colony, which was being economically exploited.
"The Milch cow of the Empire", they argued, was consistently over taxed and
received none of the spin off benefits from Government expenditure.(109)
Scotland, they believed, produced, manufactured, and exported more per head
of population than England. This state of affairs, they argued, was
necessary in order to pay for the upkeep of Imperial concerns, which, they
maintained, were of no practical benefit to Scotland.(110) Current
economic phenomena were used to back up these claims especially with regard
to the defensive amalgamations which, they argued, did considerable harm to
the economy. The SNL used the October edition of the Glasgow Chamber of
Commerce Journal in 1927, to back up its argument that industry naturally
gravitates towards the area of government: "The significant fact, to
which we have alluded, that the area of profitable enterprise is shifting
southeastward."(Ill) Gibson argued that this was the economic price
Scotland had to pay for its political subordination to England:
"Railways, shipping, basic industries are all coming under English control:
banking, insurance, trade unions - everything that materially counts -
safely into English hands."(112) It was claimed that self-government was
the only effective remedy for Scottish economic problems.
Reform within the context of the Union was not considered as a viable
policy option by the League, because they believed that, in many important
aspects, the economic interests of the two countries were diametrically
opposed to one another. To stay in the Union, they argued, would only
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mean more deindustrialization, depopulation and unemployment as the English
promoted and protected their own economy at the Scots' expense. This was
all the more likely, they believed, because of the structural changes that
were then shaking the world economy
"industries and trade will be sucked dry to keep London going.
Its Highlands will be more and more completely depopulated to
supply English and American millionaires with a playground.
Its workers will be ground down by the taxation necessary to
provide the great navy and the heavy debt settlements needed
to buy American friendship. In the end, the prosperity of
the new "little England" will centre round the cities of the
South, and Scotland will be as poor and deserted as are
the agricultural eastern provinces of Holland."(113)
The only solution to these economic problems, the League argued, was to
break the Union which had caused them in the first place. Once this had
been achieved it would be able to utilise the natural resources of the
nation in order to generate economic prosperity. Attention would be paid
to agriculture and rural industries. The models the SNL based their
arguments for economic growth on were taken from the small western European
nations, particularly Norway, Holland, Belgium and Switzerland.
"We must get rid of our partnership with England.. .we must
get out of it now, while the situation is still fluid.
Independent Scotland will, of course, have to face the
industrial difficulties in which the Union has involved us,
but if it faces them alone it will do so with great hope
of success. For it will be free to escape the expensive
business of being a world power. Moreover, Scotland has
far greater resources on which to base a new type of
agriculture and industry than England has. Our highlands
and southern mountains contain thousands of acres suitable for
small holdings and afforestation. They contain waterpower
enough to give cheap electricity to many small industries,
though not enough to be of great use to such 'big business'
as the United Kingdom has come to depend on...We shall be
able to embark as a small nation on the sort of economic
prosperity that Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Sweden have
shown to be so possible and so desirable"(114)
The land issue received a great deal of attention from the League. This
was a result of the Highland Land League influence and, more directly, the
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fact that landownership in Scotland by absentee landlords was the most
conspicuous piece of evidence for their claim that the nation was
colonially exploited. The SNL demanded that the land had to be used for
productive purposes and support a substantial rural population. T.H.
Gibson played an important part in developing nationalist land policies,
and he also, in an indirect way, helped to shape the Scottish Labour
Party's land policy by communicating ideas to J.M. MacDiarmid.(115) For
Gibson, the issue was best explained in simple terms: "It is generally
accepted as a basic principle that in the interests of the general
community, the fullest use must be made of the economic resources of a
country. Therefore, it follows that unless the fullest opportunity is
made available to those desirous of working the land - the primary source
of all wealth - the economic and therefore, the social life of a country
will never be complete,"(116) He believed that small holding farming
would provide the key to a vital redevelopment of the Scottish economy.
Forestation and cottage industries would become valuable sources of income
as well as providing farmers and their families with part-time employment.
Land reclamation, fencing and draining schemes were also advocated as part
of the plan to build up the rural economy. The fishing industry was
believed to have greater scope for development and Gibson argued that
railways designed for such an economy should be built to help with
transportation costs.(117) Why members of the SNL were more interested in
agricultural expansion rather than industrial regeneration is not
particularly clear. Although industrial problems featured in many of the
economic tracts produced by the League, they are not nearly as prominent as
ones concerning agriculture. It is possible members of the SNL believed
agriculture, particularly small farming, would create a society more
conducive to their cultural aspirations. Industry, on the other hand, was
impersonal and always brought social problems in its wake. Also, the
League was keen to repopulate the Highlands and crofting and fishing seemed
the best way to achieve this. Whereas small farms were under individual
control, industry was often subject to outside control and capital. The
implications this had for economic independence probably led many in the
SNL to shun it.
The economic policies of the League set them apart from other nationalists
because they advocated, for the first time, projections of what an
independent Scotland would look like. The economic reasons for going it
alone were put forward only by the SNL The idea that the two nations'
economies were not compatible and that the larger's interests impinged on
the smaller's, would be of great significance to future nationalist ideas.
By advocating a different and alternative economy, based on the principles
to be found in other European small nations, the SNL offered something
positive and, to many people, desirable. The old idea of Home Rule being
a good thing in an abstract sense but not worth elaborating on was no
longer tenable. The League, through its economic policies, tried to
illustrate, in a practical way, why independence would be beneficial. By
claiming that people would be materially better off, the SNL attempted to
bring the Home Rule issue to the forefront of the Scottish political
debate. It is also worth mentioning the calibre of the League's economic
thinking. Gibson, who was later to rationalize steel production during
the Second World War, was a precise and exacting thinker. Evidence of
their intellectual quality is to be found in the fact that many of their
ideas, particularly concerning land use, were subsequently put into
practice and of those that were not, many of them are still in circulation
today.
As one might expect, the Scottish National League argued that Scottish
social problems were the result of her economic subservience to England.
Once there was political and economic independence, so the argument went,
social problems would effectively be dealt with. However, in order to
convey the idea that the League, as a political organisation, was concerned
about the social plight of ordinary working class people, time was spent on
highlighting the issue with an eye to winning their support. The most
endemic social problem facing Scotland during the interwar period was the
appalling living conditions in the many slum areas. In December, 1926,
Peter Fyfe, director of housing in Glasgow, delivered a talk on the issue
at a meeting held under the auspices of the SNL. Fyfe backed the League's
position concerning the origins of the problems.
"We are too much in the hands of Parliamentary Committees
set up from London, composed of gentlemen, who have no
knowledge of Glasgow, and never took the trouble to see for
themselves the state of affairs and ascertain what the
word "backlands" really means...I sincerely trust you will,
before long, be strong enough and influential enough to
take the handling of this problem out of the jurisdiction
of an English Parliament, and place it untrammelled by the
voting power of a parliament sitting in London, before one
composesd of Scotsmen assembled in the city of Edinburgh."(118)
This was a major coup for the League as Fyfe was a respected and
influential member of the SHRA and his speech at the meeting indicated his
frustration with the lack of progress being made by the Association. The
SNL was keen to point out that the housing problem would have its
importance dictated by the House of Commons and although people in Scotland
might believe it to be of major significance, this was not necessarily the
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view of Westminster.
"Whilst the politicians have been wrangling about English
politics, the housing problem still remains as bad as ever.
All three political parties, Labour, Liberal, and Conservative,
have made an attempt to solve the problem, but it is still as
acute as it ever was. The real blame for this state of
affairs is with the Scots people, who have attached themselves
to English parties, for the English governments - of all
political complexions - have consistently refused to
recognise that Scotland had a problem in any way different
from that of England."(119)
As far as the League was concerned all the attempted solutions to the
problem failed because the Parliamentary Acts were based on assumptions and
information taken from England, which had less of a housing problem than
Scotland. The net result of this, they argued, was that the Scots got
fewer houses than were needed and worse still, they were usually far too
expensive. The Wheatly Housing Act of 1924 was often used as a case in
point to back up the validity of their argument.(120) Housing was another
issue the League used to bring home to people the relevance of their case
for independence.
The questions of immigration and emigration were two issues, which were
often hotly debated within the ranks of the SNL. Many believed that the
greatest threat to Scottish national hegemony was English immigration,
which, they argued, was a far greater peril than Irish immigration.(121)
However, unlike previous times, the "Celtic" aspect of this question was
not brought up. Attention was focused on the fact that the peak of Irish
immigration had passed while the English were still arriving in increasing
numbers at a time when Scottish emigration was high. The question of race
brought up by the Celticists received very little attention. Erskine of
Mar was, by now, nothing more than a colourful figurehead with no effective
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say in the running of the SNL. However, this did not prevent him from
coming up with the occasional hare-brained scheme. He wrote to Gibson,
for example, advocating the idea of "race co-operation" between Scots and
Scots of Irish descent: "They might be of much use to us and to neglect
them would be bad policy.. .We should seek to strengthen our relations with
the race conscious Irish in Scotland. "(122) Gibson, as chairman of the
Glasgow Area branch, was only too well aware how such a policy would go
down. However, by now he was quite an expert at fobbing off Erskine's
schemes. A more serious problem was the question of emigration and
depopulation especially when: "other nationals are coming in and filling
the places they have vacated."(123) This emigration, they argued, was the
result of land hunger and industrial depression which could only be solved
by a Scottish Parliament with the necessary economic clout.
Perhaps the most fundamental difference between the SNL and other
nationalist groups was the priority they gave to the question of national
sovereignty. Although the League often talked of Home Rule and
self-government, what was really meant by these terms was full political
separation of Scotland from the rest of the United Kingdom. Indeed, this
strand of thought is the one constant link throughout the League's history
that all members agreed on. The 1926 British Imperial Conference was used
to highlight their case and the following resolutions were passed.
"(1) That at all international and other conferences,
Scotland is not represented, despite at these conferences
decisions on matters vitally affecting Scottish life are
arrived at;
(2) That this humiliating position is again emphasised
by the exclusion of Scotland - a mother nation - from
the participation in the conference of countries
comprising the British Empire;
(3) That the resumption of the Scottish people of their
independent status as a sovereign nation is the only remedy
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for this deplorable state of affairs; and urges all
democratic Scotsmen and women to protect their welfare by
combining to prevent a continuance of this humble subordination
of Scottish interests."(124)
The lack of independent government affected Scots in their everyday life.
For example, the herring trade, they argued, was disrupted with Russia
because of the break in relations between the two countries as a result of
the Bolshevik Revolution. This was given as an incidence of how British
foreign policy was carried out without regard to Scottish interests.(125)
Until Scotland had independence, the League maintained, her economic and
international interests would not receive the necessary attention to make
them function properly.
By April, 1928, the Scots National League had over 1000 members in 15 local
branches.(126) In November, 1927, Donald Clark had contested a local
council by-election and although he lost, he was able to win it for the
National Party of Scotland in May, 1928. In September,1926, Compton
Mackenzie, the novelist, joined the League and in December, C.M. Grieve
(Hugh MacDiarmid) wrote in Contemporary Scottish Studies that the SNL was
"the most promising Nationalist movement that has been formed in Scotland
since the Union."(127) The same author had also begun to contribute
articles for the Scots Independent in 1927.(128) The Welsh Nationalists
regarded the League as the best representatives of the Scottish national
movement by late 1926.(129) On the eve of the formation of the National
Party of Scotland in April, 1928, it was clear that the SNL was an
organisation that the nationalist movement, as a whole, could not afford to
ignore. However, in assessing the performance of the League, it is easy
to over-emphasise their effect on the Scottish political scene. The truth
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is that they were mostly regarded as a nuisance by the three main political
parties, although the Labour Party often accused them of trying to split
the Labour vote.(130) Their real success lay with the impact they had on
the nationalist movement, especially regarding the policy of putting
forward their own electoral candidates. In this respect, they broke the
hold of nationalist thought, which, up until then, had relied on British
political parties to further their cause. Also, by advocating social and
economic policies geared for an independent Scotland, the SNL ensured that




The National Party of Scotland 1928 - 1933
The idea of creating a "Scottish National Party" in order to unite the
various disparate sections of the Scottish national movement into a
coherent political organisation was one that had been constantly mooted by
a growing number of people from within the various nationalist groups
during the 1920s. The impetus for this movement arose from the political
vacuum that had come to exist concerning the Scottish Home Rule question.
Much of the debate focused on the suitability of using the existing
political apparatus to represent and forward Scottish issues. After
October 1925, there were more persistent calls for the setting up of some
form of "National Party" which would act as an umbrella organisation for
Scottish political interests.(1) As was stated earlier many of the
original proponents of this idea believed that the Home Rule question would
provide a unifying quality in Scottish politics that would override
conventional ideological differences. However, given the naivety of the
proposals, it is hardly surprising that plans for the new party received
little more than a passing interest amongst established politicians. At
the same time as these ideas were being mooted, there was a perceptible
decline of interest in the Scottish Home Rule question among leading
members of the Labour Party, which had been the stalwart carrier of the
issue during the early twenties. This forced several members of the
Scottish Home Rule Association, including its principal architect and
founder Roland Muirhead, to begin a search for new ways to put the issue of
Scottish self-government more firmly on the political agenda.(2)
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Initially, members of the SHRA thought that the best way to forward their
cause would be to sting the Labour Party into action: "The fact is that
the most effective way to get the Labour Party or any other Party to take
Home Rule in earnest, is to show it that votes will be lost if neglected.
Even if a Scottish National Party never became strong enough to carry
Scottish Home Rule on its own effort, its existence might well prove to be
just the stimulus required to make the Labour Party move."(3) An
important section of thought involved in the creation of the National Party
of Scotland was that which stressed the need for the organisation to be
first and foremost a catalyst in Scottish politics. The advocates of this
philosophy felt that there was little need for the Party to adopt specific
policies relating to social and economic questions because their only
concern was to stimulate the demand for Home Rule, rather then be
responsible for its delivery.
However, there were other groups of nationalists, which each had its own
set of priorities and ideas as to the future role of the new National
Party. One group, drawn mainly from the ranks of the Scots National
League and led by Tom Gibson, argued that the new organisation would have
to lead the Scottish people towards the goal of independence.(4) As far
as they were concerned, the National Party would have to emerge as the
strongest political force in Scotland by challenging and defeating the
existing "Westminster" parties for electoral support. Concurrent with
this view was the belief that votes would only be forthcoming if the
nationalists could firmly place Home Rule, or independence, as some
preferred to call it, within the context of desired social and economic
objectives. Without explaining self-government in terms which related to
issues of political concern such as employment, housing, industry and
social welfare, it was argued, few people would see the relevance of giving
it support. Another interested party were those who saw Home Rule
primarily in cultural terms and viewed it as a way of redressing the
decline of a distinctive national identity and culture. This group of
cultural nationalists were to be found within the ranks of all the various
nationalist organisations and were, more often than not, the least
concerned with political strategy. Perhaps the most influential group in
the creation of the NPS was the gathering of pragmatic young men from the
Glasgow University Scottish Nationalist Association led by the charismatic
and able John MacCormick. These students were new to the nationalist
scene and had little time for, nor understanding of, the complex arguments
that raged between the various factions. For them the most important
thing was to do something positive and leave behind the disputes on tactics
no matter how important the others believed them to be. In doing so, the
GUSNA brought a freshness of approach and a sense of urgency to the
nationalist cause, which had long been lacking. The raw political
material of the future National Party of Scotland was made up from all
shades of ideological opinion and there was within this a further plethora
of divisions concerning the preferred use of tactics and strategy.
However, by early 1928, they were united in the one belief that, within the
present political scenario, there was no future for their nationalist
aspirations other than to take matters into their own hands.
The process leading up to the creation of the National Party of Scotland
was, by all accounts , a tortuous affair. Although the SNL and the SHRA
had maintained a formal and at times, hostile, distance from each other,
several important contacts had been established during the middle 1920s.
The most important of these was the relationship between Tom Gibson and
R.E. Muirhead, who discussed possible opportunities for co-operation
between the two organisations and both men tentatively hinted at the option
of creating some form of nationalist popular front.(5) However, the main
barrier to achieving this was the fact that they each had their own
preferred political strategy, which was largely incompatible with the
other. Muirhead was convinced that the best way forward was to use and
work with the existing political parties, especially the Labour Party.
Gibson, on the other hand, believed that this strategy was doomed to
failure and he was the strongest proponent of the argument that the only
viable option available to nationalists was for a new political party to
campaign on the specific issue of Scottish self-government against the
"London controlled" organisations. However, as early as June, 1925,
Muirhead was beginning to concede ground to Gibson's argument.(6) He was
propelled further along this road by the summer of 1927, when it became
obvious that no candidates from the major parties were prepared to give
Scottish Home Rule the ultimate political priority.(7) Increasingly, he
began to find more common ground with other nationalists and his
disaffection with the Labour Party led to his decision to contest East
Renfrewshire as a Home Rule candidate at the next general election. (8)
Although this action effectively isolated him from the Independent Labour
Party, it does appear that it was his intention to provoke a stronger
commitment to Home Rule from the Labour movement rather than blaze a trail
for the new National Party of Scotland. It was only when the Labour Party
refused to endorse his candidature, or give him significant reassurance on
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the Home Rule question, that he felt compelled to throw his lot in with the
NPS.
The National Party of Scotland was not born in a blaze of glory, but rather
experienced a slow and painful birth, which was bedevilled by suspicion and
procrastination by members from all the interested parties. Initial
optimism that "the time is not far by distant when Scottish Nationalists
united in one progressive and democratic National Party will form an
unbroken front" was significantly misplaced. (9) Although as an
intellectual idea there had been considerable discussion about creating a
National Party, the first practical steps were taken by a member of the
SHRA, A.L. Henry, who, as chairman of the Scottish National Party group
within the Association, contacted members of the SNL and Lewis Spence's SNM
and arranged a meeting for the 24th of August, 1927.(10) Muirhead did not
attend the meeting, because he was still unconvinced of the efficacy of a
National Party going it alone. Also, it would have meant overriding the
Scottish National Convention, of which he was secretary, and, as far as he
was concerned, it was still the best organisation for putting forward the
case for the Home Rule. This was in spite of the fact that many now
regarded the Convention as nothing more than a Labour dominated talking
shop. Muirhead was uncomfortably aware of the increasing unease that many
were expressing about the viability of the SNC as an effective forum for
the self government cause. Lewis Spence wrote to him asking for a
clarification of the issue and the reply reveals a man obviously engaging
in a political juggling act keeping as many options open as possible.
"With respect to...a proposed Scottish National Party.
As hon. Secretary of the Convention I have no knowledge of
such a Party, but as a private individual I understand that
some of those who brought forward the suggestion of a National
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Party...are forming themselves into a group...There is, I think,
a considerable number of the members of the SHRA, who feel that
if a Scottish National Party were formed, the demand for self-
government for Scotland would take precedence of all other
matters."(11)
Muirhead's confidence in the Convention was put under pressure from the
fact that members of the SNL refused to take part in the discussions,
because of the SNC's association with British parties. The absence of the
League from a forum which was either to create a new National Party or to
focus pressure on the existing political parties to step up their
commitment to Home Rule was damaging to its credibility and authority,
especially as the SNL was foremost in the agitation for a new nationalist
strategy. (12) Although Spence and the SNM were quite happy with this
arrangement largely because of the personal animosity that existed between
the two groups, a compromise about procedure was finally reached. The
League was allowed to attend the Convention as spectators, although they
were not represented in an official capacity. Also in attendance were
members from Glasgow University Scottish Nationalist Association who,
despite their appeals for calm, could do little to stop the meeting from
degenerating into a pointless shouting match. During the debate members
of the SNL made their presence and displeasure known by engaging in bouts
of continuous heckling, before symbolically storming out in protest at the
influence of British political parties at the meeting.(13)
MacCormick and the GUSNA students brought new blood into the Scottish
national movement. Their non-dogmatic approach to the problems of
nationalist strategy helped to put some of the problems in perspective.
As far as they were concerned, the fundamental problem was one of arranging
priorities.
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"One point nearly everyone who has spoken has failed to see
is that this motion (calling for the creation of a National
Party) does not express any policy on the Scottish National
Party going forward. It does not say whether the policy of
the Party will be to go to Westminster, or to appeal to the League
of Nations, or organise a national plebiscite. It merely states
it is time that we had in this movement a united front, and
by forming this National Party we shall be forming a centre to
which every man who loves his country can come. We will be
forming a centre where we can discuss matters of policy".(14)
MacCormick believed that the starting point had to be to find the areas of
universal agreement and, consequently, build upon them.
However, the key difficulty was to reconcile the differences between
Muirhead and Gibson. Both men were stubborn in their beliefs and Gibson
had a tendency to be very abrasive while under pressure.(15) As
MacCormick noted Muirhead was "dour, intransigent, but sincere", while
Gibson had "a capacity to get so enthusiastic in argument that he almost
literally drowned all opposition".(16) Both men occupied different
positions in the conventional political spectrum; Muirhead was a fabian
socialist while Gibson was better fitted to the Liberal mould. Muirhead
was an enthusiastic member of the ILP and would hardly be endeared to
Gibson for his vitriolic attacks on Labour's connection with the SHRA.
Also, Gibson was responsible for a particularly insensitive attack on the
Association for allowing a collection to be taken for the widow and family
of John Maclean within the premises of one of their meetings.(17) Of the
two men, Muirhead was put in a more difficult position regarding the
creation of the National Party. He was, after all, very closely involved
with the growth of the Labour movement in Scotland. He had provided
funding for the Forward newspaper and had worked alongside such prominent
Labour politicians as Tom Johnston, James Barr, James Maxton, David
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Kirkwood and Ramsay MacDonald.(18) The prospect of throwing all this over
to join with a group of political unknowns with no previous track record in
public or political life must have been a daunting decision. Also, some
of the more extreme elements within the national movement would have filled
him with great reservations about the potential for success of the proposed
party. Comments such as follows from Lewis Spence could not have filled
him with confidence.
"We do not yet advocate taking up the rifle, because that is a
course I feel that would hardly appeal to the majority of our
fellow countrymen - although it is the method I would prefer.
I will not deny that for a moment. I believe the only way to
beat an Englishman is to beat him physically. You cannot drive
it into the thick head of a southerner by any other means".(19)
Muirhead was not convinced that the new party ought to contest elections
and Gibson had to apply considerable pressure before he would change his
mind.
"All my efforts were mainly directed to showing the utter
futility of the Home RuleAssociation, and at long last I
managed to persuade Muirhead, albeit perhaps rather
unwillingly. But it ultimately became recognised that
unity would be unity in name only, and not in practice if
we did not establish the principle of independence of action,
although in the process the negotiations nearly fell down on
two or three occasions because people did not want to give up
their particular parties".(20)
Another area of conflict between the two men was the proposed policies of
the National Party. Muirhead wanted a broad policy and believed that
there was no point in going into detailed objectives.
"If I had my own way I would have no constitution, but
simply the object stated and leave the body to develop its
policy as it goes along".(21)
Gibson took the opposite view and believed that, unless the new party could
translate the Home Rule issue for the benefit of the man in the street and
explain its relevance in bread and butter terms, they would never attract
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sufficient electoral support.(22) Also, a clear social and economic
policy was considered necessary for establishing a sense of Party indentity
and discipline. Eventually Muirhead succumbed to the majority of Gibson's
arguments, especially the one concerning the independence of the Party from
other political groups. However, Muirhead was slow in giving up his hopes
that the Labour Party would eventually come round to a more vigorous stance
on Home Rule. Indeed, much of his subsequent actions can be explained by
the fact that a salient motive in his involvement with the National Party
was the desire to stimulate the Labour movement to take nationalist
aspirations more seriously.
On the 11th of February, 1928, a meeting of all the main nationalist groups
was held under the presidency of John MacCormick with the objective of
narrowing down the areas of potential disagreement. Although the SHRA
members attended only in an official capacity as representing the
nationalist wing of the Association,(23) the following resolutions were
passed without too much difficulty.
"1) This meeting representative of the SHRA; SNL; SNM;
the National Party Group and the G.U. Scottish Nationalists
Association is agreed in principle to the formation of an
independent Scottish National Party and to the merging of
the existing bodies into one organisation, subject to the
approval of the governing committees of each organisation.
2) The object of the new Party shall be self-government for
Scotland".(24)
It was also agreed that "the object of the new Party shall be attained by
putting forward national candidates at Parliamentary and local government
elections, independent of the present political parties, and by the
presentation of a nationalist programme for Scottish affairs." After this
promising start a provisional steering committee, supervised by MacCormick,
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was set up to hammer out more precise details on policy and objectives.
The choice of MacCormick as chairman was a good one. He was neutral in
the eyes of the opposing camps and his pragmatic approach to the problems
was backed up with a sense of urgency and a desire to achieve positive
results. He was also suitable because of his easy going manner and an
ability to motivate people no matter how difficult the circumstances.
"I cannot say the agreement was easy to reach. All the
infinite capacity of the Scots to bicker over definitions,
words and even commas was fully displayed throughout the
period of negotiation. Often Valentine and I, who represented
the University, and who attended the negotiation committee
as secretary and chairman respectively, were either privately
amused or thoroughly exasperated by the endless arguments
which took place. To us it did not seem to matter very
much how our objectives were stated as long as we could
create an organisation aiming, by and large, at a measure of
Home Rule, but to our seniors it seemed as though we were
actually framing a whole constitution for a new Scotland."(25)
Unfortunately for MacCormick many at the meeting did believe that they were
laying down the framework for a new Scottish constitution. However, he
regarded this as mere pedantry, which obscured and detracted from the more
vital and realistic issues.
In the main, the arguments revolved around the issue of how much Home Rule
the Party would fight for and how this was to be defined. According to
MacCormick, the problem was to find a way "as to how our objects could be
stated so as to satisfy those who wished to break away completely from
England and the others who had slightly milder views".(26) However, at
this point in time, this was not the principal problem concerning the
formation of the NPS. The real issue, which had already been decided, was
the debate between Gibson and Muirhead concerning the efficacy of
contesting elections and it was only when a consensus on this question had
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been reached, that progress could be made. MacCormick was not party to
these discussions and, as a consequence, down-graded their importance.(27)
Although the arguments concerning Home Rule or independence were important,
most members expected the debate to take place after the Party had been
formed with protagonists on both sides of the fence confident that they
would win the day. Indeed, many assumed it was an issue that would be
developed and expanded as part of the National Party's political growth.
However, in the initial phases of the Party's career, discretion was
considered the better part of valour and members were warned against making
the divisions too apparent.
"It is more than ever incumbent on all who wish for Scotland
to do everything in their power to prevent the trailing
of red herrings across the track. It is still more imperative
that those whose names are associated prominently with the
National Party give the enemy no chance of making capital
out of indiscreet expressions of purely personal opinion".(28)
The debates were to be conducted in an orderly fashion with the principle
of contesting elections on the self-government ticket as the Party's
cohesive raison detre.
On the whole, discipline was maintained and there were no widespread
reports of significant differences of opinion during the Party's formative
period. Although several members of the SNL were reluctant to use the
Westminster electoral machinery and believed that if any candidates were
elected then they ought to follow a Sinn Fein policy of abstention from
London, they were prepared to compromise this in order to achieve unity so
long as the NPS was independent from other political parties. Iain
Gillies wrote to Gibson highlighting the bottom line as far as the rank and
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file of the League were concerned.
It has been discussed briefly with Angus Clark. You
already know our general opinion that provided the idea
(aim and policy) is safeguarded and upheld we are in
support of unity at the cost of the League's individuality
...if Muirhead and co accept this then all will be ok...
but so far as Parliamentary action is concerned our view
is that we must stick to our attitude outlined on your
Saturday's motion. Muirhead must give up the idea of
Home Rule Bills and any such paltry actions that would
lead to an understanding with the three English parties."(29)
So long as electoral independence was not compromised the more strident
definitions of Scottish self-government held by some League members would
be tamed for the time being.
Although Tom Gibson was a separatist, he was also a political realist and
was only too well aware that devolution, as a political objective,
commanded more support among the Scottish people than outright
independence. However, he believed that a politically independent
National Party would act as an effective forum to educate people away from
the devolutionist point of view.
"The present situation is that there is a considerable
number of people interested in a more or less degree
of Scottish nationalism, but these people are divided
into compartments with no real connecting link and barred
from each other by means of so many organisations.
Their organisations are admittedly weak except in petty
jealousies and, consequently, there is no effective drawing
force. There is also a considerable number of people
outside who have given indications that they might come in
and help if we could offer them something in the nature of
a decided directing force. Then there is a vast number of
people who could be forced in simply because they would
follow the line of least resistance when we present a
sufficiently strong ultimatum. Lastly, there are the
people who would never come in whom we would render
impotent by reason of our strength and activity".(30)
The new party was to be designed to appeal to as broad a spectrum of the
Scottish people as possible and, consequently, a series of social and
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economic policies were taken on board which were believed to represent a
consensus of Scottish opinion. This also reflected the predominantly
radical left of centre stance of most individual members of the NPS. The
Sinn Fein policy received only a limited amount of support; most people
believed that active work in Westminster would attract more profitable
public attention.
"Until such pledged nationalists be a majority
of the elected representatives of Scotland, they shall
attend at Westminster and endeavour, so far as inherent
limitations of that Parliament allow, to protect the
national interests of Scotland and to promote the
amelioration of social conditions and general standard
of living in Scotland and by the pressing of practical
schemes of housing and sliam clearance, land settlement
and afforestation, utilisation of water power, development
of sufficient transport by land and water and such other
expedients preparatory to the effecting of comprehensive
schemes of national development by an independent
Scottish Parliament".(31)
Gibson argued that if people could be induced to bite the bait of Home Rule
then they would ultimately swallow the hook of independence.
My line is first of all to break down the compartments
in the nationalist movement and get in as many people as
we can: people who will be detached from the other and
anti-nationalist forces. With this mass we can by means
of an effective organisation direct them on to the proper
road and constantly shift them onwards. A good many will
advance to our point of view and we will be dragging others
along with us".(32)
Gibson's pragmatic approach to the question of Scottish independence and
how it was to be defined was essential to provide the necessary degree of
unity required to get the National Party off the ground.
Although the NPS was officially founded in April 1928, it was only later on
in the summer that it began to function as a proper political party. Both
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the SNL and the SNM did not dissolve themselves until after their
respective annual conferences in June, while Roland Muirhead, who did not
have the power to dissolve the SHRA, appealed to individual members of the
Association to join the new Party. By the 10th November, the Party had
assumed enough shape and members to hold its first annual conference.
R.B. Cunninghame Graham, the veteran radical socialist and Home Ruler, was
poached from the SHRA and adopted as the Party's president. Although he
did not play an important part in the negotiations, his support did lend
credibility to the Party's image. Muirhead was elected chairman; Lewis
Spence, vice chairman and John MacCormick found room for his organisational
talents as the honorary secretary. A National Council of sixteen members
was formed; which accurately represented all the various strands of
nationalist opinion, of which former members of the SNL were most vocal.
The Partys brief was:
"The National Party stands for the reconstruction of
Scottish national life, including self-government for
Scotland with independent national status within the British
group of nations. Entirely independent of London controlled
parties, the National Party's appeal is to every Scotsman and
woman without distinction of class or creed."(33)
The pro independence lobby won an important point in the wording of the
object by insisting that the term "British group of nations" be used
instead of "British Commonwealth of Nations", which had been preferred by
many moderates. As MacCormick was later to recall "even the word
Commonwealth was expunged from our vocabulary".(34) The conference gave
the go ahead to elaborate on policies concerning social and economic
issues, which reflected the prominent influence of radical left of centre
thinking among the Party's rank and file. The comprehensive programme of
national reconstruction was a package of reforms which was designed to
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appeal to Labour and Liberal voters.(35) The plans for reconstruction
were not gone into any precise manner and there was a sparseness of detail
concerning financial calculations. Most of the economic policies had been
formulated by Tom Gibson during his time with the Scots National League and
were adopted by the National Party with little modification. Many of the
proposals had a quasi Utopian ring about them and this was an obvious
factor in keeping friction among party members to a minimum. The
establishment of a necessary cohesiveness paved the way for the adoption of
parliamentary candidates and the creation of a network of local branches,
which heralded the entry of the National Party into the Scottish political
arena.
By January, 1929, seven parliamentary candidates had been adopted for the
forthcoming general election and an analysis of those chosen can give some
indication of the state of play within the National Party at this time.
Of those whose previous political activity can be traced, four of the seven
had connections with a left of centre political organisations prior to the
formation of the Party.(36) Another of the candidates, Lewis Spence,
although mainly a cultural nationalist, was identified by many as belonging
to the radical stable with his previous connections with the SNL Along
with Spence, Muirhead and MacCormick were the only prominent leaders of the
Party to stand as candidates. One of the candidates, C.M.Grieve gave
members of the National Executive a hard time by attempting to stand as a
Labour Nationalist candidate in Dundee in conjunction with the local Labour
Party and in doing so revealed many of the latent tensions which still
existed within the NPS. Fortunately for the Party's unity, he was
persuaded to abandon this project.(37) On the whole, the preference was
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for urban seats in the central belt, which reflected their weakness outside
this area.
The first electoral test for the NPS came during a by election at North
Mid-Lothian in February, 1929. Lewis Spence was adopted as the candidate,
but, according to John MacCormick, this was a mistake.
"Nor was our candidate the right man for the job. Lewis
Spence is one of the most lovable of men, but he is no
politician. Time and again he answered questions so
clumsily as to give our opponents handfuls of ammunition
to fire against us".(38)
Spence's electoral address reveals much of the ambiguities, which pertained
to the nationalist cause at this time. Apart from very general
objectives, very little was offered to the voter in terms of what a
nationalist could achieve at Westminster and how a significant nationalist
vote would benefit the populace as a whole. Instead, a negative campaign
was run, which highlighted Scottish grievances and whose only solution was
a large helping of Scottish patriotism.(39) The result was a poor one and
the Party's organisation was exposed as being inadequate with charges of
confusion and inefficiency levelled against the campaign coordinators.(40)
However, although confidence and pride was dented, their faith in their
politics remained firm. The problems lay with "ourselves and
circumstances, not in our cause".(41)
For some the solution lay with a more dynamic and radical image for the
Party, which would mean the adoption of a more solid left wing political
programme. As has already been mentioned, the NPS was created with a
vacuum on issues of post independence policies with little more than a
fragile framework of broad statements of intent. The issue had been left
105
deliberately vague and, although many members of the SNL had felt that
there had been a watering down of their principles in the creation of the
NPS, Gibson did not believe this to be a bad thing.
"No one need give up their principles by joining this
new party. Surely if in other movements there are right
and left wings then there can be the same in our Party. It
is to the advantage of the left wings that there can be the
same in our Party. It is to the advantage of the left wing
to have a right wing to work on, or where are the left wing
to get their recruits".(42)
Gibson believed that a plurality of political opinion within the Party
would provide an important stimulus to debate and policy formulation.
Others saw it only as an opportunity to win their case and change strategy
to suit their own political ends.
Along with the demands for a more radical left wing stance on policies
there was also pressure for increasing the profile of independence and
separation from England. These demands emanated mainly from former League
members, who had the advantage of controlling the Party's journal, the
Scots Independent, which was edited from London by William and Iain
Gillies.(43) They were unhappy with what they regarded as the ca-canny
policy taken by the Party leadership.
"There is a dis-heartening lack of spirit and ideas in
the N.P. - in fact a poverty that, like material poverty,
breeds suspicion and dislike of possession by others. The
cry is moderation; reasonableness, dare not to upset the
prejudicies from which nine-tenths of the N.P. are not free.
There is no understanding of their function at this stage in
two out of three among the leading lights. They should be
made to read "the fool" three times daily...but no we must
be content meantime to fight on mainly with appeals and
economic arguments that are at least partially false to the
future... We are attempting, however, in easy doses to
introduce a different flavour - not without an
accompaniment of critical growls that the S.I. should be
a propaganda paper not the medium for the expression of
individual opinions".(44)
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Gillies believed that it was necessary to improve the quality of
intellectual debate within the Party in order to achieve better strategies
and policies. He was also convinced that education in Scottish matters
and politics was essential if people were to break free of the prejudicies
inculcated by centuries of British political dominance. It was only once
this had been achieved, he argued, that the healthy development of Scottish
nationalism would take place.
C.M.Grieve was strongly attracted to this element within the National Party
and used them as a base from which to push his own political ideas.
Although he was not involved in the formation of the NPS, (45) he gradually
came to represent to many in the National Party its radical, or
fundamentalist wing. This was unfortunate for many radicals, such as the
Gillies because it meant that their ideas were associated with Grieve's
even though they often held totally different points of view. Grieve
acted as an intellectual agent provocateur which, essential from an
artistic point of view, was, more often than not, damaging in a party
political context, especially when it involved promoting fascism.
"It is in the power of a handful to create or recreate
in this powerfully spiritually dynamic way, and to
convict their antipathetic fellow countrymen of a
species of imbecility in the face of the world. The
next - or the next - generation will hasten to remove the
reproach; and adjust itself to the concept of these few...
for still deeper reasons aristocratic standards must be
re-erected. We in Scotland have been too long grotesquely
over democratised. What is wanted now is a species of
Scottish Fascism".(46)
Grieve expressed strongly anti-democratic and intolerant ideas, which
resembled some of the more inane early writings of the Scots National
League.(47) Whatever his literary merits, politics was not his forte.
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Grieve became a focal point for Celtic nationalism and he endeavoured to
give ideological body to its romantic notions.
However, perhaps the most credible and realistic proposal he advocated was
Douglas's economic theory of Social Credit, which he bound together with
nationalism to challenge the threat of international socialism.(48)
"That is the danger of the socialist championship of a class -
as against the Nationalist espousal of the interests of the
whole people. Workers are inveighing against capitalism; but
their employers are hard put to it. Cannot some economic
policy to match the nationalist concern for the whole people
be substituted for the socialist concern for a section of the
spirit of class antagonism it carries with it? Some such
economic policy should be part and parcel of the national genius
in the sphere of economics - and it is to hand...The socialists
hate it like poison. It reconciles the interests of
capitalist and wage earner, rich and poor. Tories, Liberals
and Socialists can equally espouse it - although their
psychological dispuritives make them Tory, Liberal or
Socialist, there is no need for them to disregard any
longer their common interests in this connection and perptuate
the false antagonisms that play into the hands of the bankers
- the international financiers - playing off one section against
the other. This is the Douglas system of Social Credit".(49)
Perhaps the greatest difficulty facing the historian is placing Grieve and
his genre within the bounds of conventional right-left wing politics of the
period. Although much of what they advocated is recognisably socialist in
tone, they also had much in common with other right wing anti-capitalist
movements of the period. (50) Perhaps the most common link between such
groups was the heavy emphasis they placed on racial questions. Grieve
believed that Irish immigration had been good for Scotland, because it
reinforced their Celtic racial stock and Social Creditism was mooted
because it fitted in with Scottish racial characteristics.
"It will be easy to show that it is in accordance with
the principles of the ancient Gaelic Commonwealth; that
it supersedes the economic differences of Conservatism
and Liberalism on the one hand and socialism on the other;
and that it effectively challenges standardisation and
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robotisation of humanity towards which international
capitalism is now tending towards which international
socialism would only more quickly hasten us".(51)
Not only was he responsible for producing policies, which were of a dubious
political nature, Grieve was also severe in his criticism of the Party's
leadership. He was looking for the type of leadership, which Mussolini
inspired in Italy.
"Fundamental developments inevitably produce big men.
That is the main criticism of the National Party so far.
There is something wrong with it; it has not produced real
leaders - or its organisation is still of such a kind as to
frustrate them instead of develop them. What I have said
about the need for aristocratic standards, for a species of
fascism applies equally here. I feel we will never make
any real headway till we cease to imitate English
organisations by running the Party on democratic lines
or wanting anything similar in organisation or programme
to the English parties".(52)
During this period, and it has to be emphasised that Grieve constantly
changed his political philosophy, he championed a Scottish nationalism that
was proto-fascist, anti-democratic and was all too ready to endorse
political violence. The historian is allowed a fascinating insight into
his political philosphy at this time by examining an article, in which he
gave his vision of how politics would develop in a Scotland of the future.
It contains his blueprint for Scottish nationalist strategy.
"The younger people, who had never been subjected to the
demoralizing influence of the old Anglo Scottish party
political system, specially repudiated the methods and
ideology of organised and English controlled democracy
then in vogue; and, no longer confining themselves
to English precedents, availed themselves readily of the
examples of Italy and Ireland, and, powerfully
reinforcing the transitional organisation of the
Scottish National Party (up until then still deplorably
liberal and anglophile) with their militaristic and
neo-fascist auxilary "Claim Albann", carried the movement
to the successful conclusion we know of by 1965, and
reestablished the Ancient Gaelic Commonwealth in Scotland
on a modern basis".(53)
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Grieve's philosophy was a hotch potch drawn loosely from Italian fascism,
the radical nationalism of some Irish socialists and John Maclean, and the
Celtic romanticism of Erskine of Mar. However, it was a political vision
which did not strike a resonant chord among other members of the National
Party of Scotland.
The initial response of the Party leadership to Grieve's advocacy of
militant nationalism was one of liberal tolerance, although many profoundly
disagreed with him. Arthur Donaldson was one member who was not unduly
concerned about these outpourings. He believed it was part and parcel of
the intellectual development of the Party and saw this as evidence of a
more progressive movement within the NPS.
"I am glad to see a more vigorous policy is now in
prospect. I realise fully that the leadership of
the Party cannot afford to move too far ahead of the
bulk of the membership, but it seems to me from
my imperfect knowledge of events in Scotland that
matters are now beginning to move rapidly and that a
stronger more spectacular policy is now justified".(54)
However, Donaldson did express some concern that Grieve was trying to push
things too far too fast, especially after he announced the creation of a
militaristic organisation "Clann Albann" in 1930.
"I note also that there were some unfriendly remarks
about the cautious character of the Party's leadership.
Some folks, of course, look for beards on infants and
the more irresponsible they are the freer they talk.
Grieve's announcement of Clann Albann was not very politic.
Such an organisation, I believe, will be necessary but
announcement of it at this time is too premature".(55)
However, Party chairman, Roland Muirhead, was furious at Grieve's
behaviour.
"Mr Grieve is a very clever man and some of his matter
is very apt. I agree with his view that it is to the young
men of the party that we must look for vigorous leadership
in the future, but I do not agree with Grieve in his idea of
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fascism, further I think it will be time enough to
consider underground methods of organisation after we have
made an earnest endeavour to make use of the powers we have.
The Scots are not held down by a Coercion Act such as the
Irish were held down and we are free to take whatever
propaganda methods we feel most likely to achieve our end".(56)
This was the start of a bitter dispute, not only over the Party's political
objectives, but also over questions of strategy and tactics, which was
ultimately to culminate in the expulsion of Grieve and his accomplices.
It was an intrinsic fault built into the NPS at the time of its creation
which assumed that such questions would be able to be dealt with in an
orderly and intellectual manner. No one raised the possibility that the
Party could contain elements which differed on such fundamental issues as
to make compromise impossible. It is an all too common assumption to see
this dispute as a straight fight between those committed to the
fundamentalist position of total independence on the one hand, and those of
a more moderate stance on the other. The reality of the situation was in
fact much more complex. Many of those on the moderate wing of the Party
did share some of the same values and objectives held by the
Fundamentalists. However, they were separated from each other and their
conmonly held assumptions were forgotten as the dispute galvanized,
sometimes as a result of personality clashes, and forced members into one
of two camps in which they often felt uneasy. While many, such as
Muirhead, Gibson and, to some extent, MacCormick, shared the belief that
the National Party ought to campaign for a Scottish Parliament with full
sovereign powers, they were, however, uneasy as to the effect the
Celticists and Fundamentalists were having on the image of the Party among
the electorate. They were also concerned that the celticism that some
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advocated would, electorally, have an adverse effect on the NPS as it was
more likely to frighten potential support away.
Although Gibson had done much to bring Celtic romanticism in the SNL under
control, by 1929, it had broken out again under the leadership of Erskine
of Mar and C.M.Grieve. Erskine was once again letting fly with bouts of
political gibberish, which this time round replaced Celtic communism with
Celtic aristrocracy.
"its spirit or genius is aristocratic not democratic,
though the principle of popular election runs through
all its institutions. Celticism contemplates no office
that is elective, no rule that is not aristocratic by
nature...The important point to note is that the Celtic
people should be ruled on Celtic principles and to that
end is Celticism instituted".(57)
Although Erskine was regarded as eccentric, Grieve was believed by many in
the Party to be dangerous. Both men caused anxiety with their
Anglo-phobia, which was believed to be excessive and damaging to the NPS's
credibility. On the issue of separation from England they were emphatic.
"We are out for Scottish independence in the fullest
sense of the term and the abrogation of English ascendancy
alike in our imperial, internal and international relationship,
and in every other objective or subjective connection... Any
refusal to give Scotland free choice to remain or go out
of the Empire, to associate freely or dis-associate itself
at will from England, to share a common financial and
economic policy with other nations, or pursue a separate
policy of its own, is to subject Scotland to a species
of slavery, involving the assumptions that Scottish people
are so stupid that they cannot be trusted for themselves
for fear they jeopardise "wider interests".(58)
Although many in the NPS would agree in principle with what was said, they
did not like the excessive way Erskine and Grieve laboured the issue
because it was believed that this would not bring them any political
capital. Most members of the NPS felt that a softly, softly approach was
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the best way forward on this issue. Also, the Fundamentalists were
inclined to take the view that they should have nothing to do with England,
which most Party leaders believed was an unrealistic attitude and one which
tainted the movement with vulgar anglophobia. Muirhead believed that
Grieve and his fellow writer, Compton MacKenzie, were having a disruptive
influence on the Party's progress.
"I cannot share the opinion he (William Gillies) holds
of Grieve and MacKenzie. The goal of the Celtic
dictatorship is not in my opinion one that many Scots
have sympathy with...we are getting in more and more
members and doubtless if Grieve and MacKenzie do not
frighten them away we may gain a number of young men
and women holding normal Scottish nationalist ideals".(59)
Other moderate nationalists were likewise unimpressed with the
Fundamentalist wing which was tarnishing the Party's image.
The initial tolerance of the Party leadership towards the Fundamentalists
can be partially explained by the fact that the National Party virtually
held a monopoly over nationalist political aspirations until the creation
of the Scottish Party in June, 1932. Up to that time, most leaders of the
NPS viewed the activities of the Celticists as little more than a nuisance
which embarrassed them in thier efforts to be taken seriously as a
political party. The Celticists, although active in the columns of the
Scots Independent, were not strong in the branches and were largely
confined to the London area. In any case, most members of the National
Executive were far too busy building up the Party's organisation and
contesting elections, to be bothered with refuting fundamentalist claims.
The initial optimism about the NPS's electoral prospects were soon
confounded. This was a considerable disappointment, especially after
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MacCormick's spectacular challenge in the 1928 Glasgow University Rectorial
contest where R.B. Cunninghame Graham, the nationalist candidate, was only
narrowly defeated by Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, by a mere 68
votes.(60) The result was a shock to everyone concerned and the campaign
showed off MacCormick's flair for organisation and also his talent as an
orator of great skill. As was previously mentioned, Lewis Spence's
performance in Midlothian was a disappointing failure and further problems
dogged the Party's electoral strategy, especially concerning finance and
suitable candidates. The number of prospective Parliamentary candidates
for the 1929 General Election was slashed from seven to two; R.E. Muirhead
in West Renfrewshire and J.M. MacCormick in Camlachie. However, many
moderates considered it a stroke of luck that C.M. Grieve had to cancel his
candidature in Dundee.
"It was felt that Mr Grieve would have secured a
reasonable number of votes but it was recognised
that he stood no chance of winning the seat on this
occasion. It was accordingly regretfully decided
that it was not advisable to spend so much money to
secure an inconclusive result".(61)
Both MacCormick and Muirhead polled less than 5% votes cast in each contest
at the election. Organisational and campaigning weaknesses were blamed
for the poor result and also the fact that the party could not expect to be
taken seriously as a major political force while only contesting two
seats.(62) However, despite the disappointment, there was no challenge to
the efficacy of contesting elections and it was also recognised that
valuable experience had been gained.
By June, 1930, the National Party had begun to make electoral inroads by
securing 10.1% of the vote at a by election in Shettleston and, sub-
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sequently, sectored a respectable 13% in November at East Renfrewshire.
This by election resulted in the Party saving their deposit and was seen by
many to herald a new era in Scottish politics. Nationalist aspirations
were further raised by the victory of Compton Mackenzie in the Glasgow
University rectorial election in 1931.(62) However, this momentum was not
carried over to the General Election held in November, 1931. The Party
contested five seats and the results were a mixed bag of failure and only
moderate improvement. Three of the candidates saved their deposit with
MacCormick doing best in Inverness where he secured 14% of the vote. The
other two, which included Roland Muirhead, only managed to secure about 10%
each.(63) However, it can be said that in the confusion created by Ramsay
MacDonald's decision to form a National Government, the nationalist vote
held up fairly well. The creation of a more effective political
organisation had begun to pay small dividends in by elections held the
following year. In Montrose and Dumbartonshire the Party was able to
maintain its normal level of support by securing 13.5% and 11.7% of the
vote, respectively. However, the main problem facing the Party's
organisers was that their vote seemed to have reached a plateau, which
showed no signs of rising above the normal 12 to 13 per cent. Several
members of the NPS believed that the way out of this situation was to
exploit the opportunities which opened up following the Labour Party's
split with MacDonald. It has already been noted that several members of
the National Party believed that one of the organisation's prime functions
was to maintain pressure on the Labour Party with regard to the Home Rule
issue. Arthur Donaldson was convinced that the adverse effect the
Nationalist vote had on the Labour Party's fortunes was of more
significance in the short term than the unlikely prospect of a nationalist
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win. This was how he analysed the result of the East Renfrewshire by
election.
"Probably the most important and significant feature
of the result is the division of the votes. Had the
Labour man polled the total nationalist in addition to his
own vote, he would have made as good a show as the Labour
candidate in the General Election. As it was the
nationalist vote made it impossible for Labour to win.
I am sure that this aspect of the matter must be giving
serious thought to many of our Home Rule Labour members
whose hold on their seats could ill stand the strain of a
Nationalist attack. It may lead them to reconsider
carefully their Home Rule stand."(64)
The same form of argument was used at the by election in Dumbartonshire in
March, 1932, in which Tom Johnston was kept out of Parliament by the
Nationalist vote. Muirhead was jubilant at the result because the NPS had
"saved our deposit...and kept Tom Johnston from Westminster for the
present. This may cause some of our halfway Scottish Nationalists to
reconsider their position".(65) Johnston himself had no doubts as to the
fact that it was the NPS, which had ensured his defeat, while, at the same
time he admitted that the result would make Labour candidates more wary of
the Home Rule issue.(66)
This negative form of political pressure was keenly advocated by Roland
Muirhead who never lost faith in the Labour Party's ability to take up the
cause of Scottish self-government. He believed that the formation of the
National Government and the ensiling electoral collapse of the Labour Party
presented a prime opportunity for the formation of an alliance between the
National Party and Labour Home Rulers. However, the bottom line for such
an agreement was that the principle of self-government must take precedence
over all others.
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"I would certainly not like to oppose him (Tom Johnston) or
men like the Rev. James Barr, but one must carry on with the
Party to secure the best interests of the movement and having
assisted to carry the National or Home Rule Party, that, of
course, will have, by far and away my chief interests. I am sorry
that David N. MacKay, Tom Johnston, and the Rev. James Barr do
not see their way to stand for an independent Scotland."(67)
Muirhead kept in contact with several of his old ILP colleagues, who did
their best to get him to leave the NPS and to rejoin his old party. For
his part, Muirhead reciprocated the compliment, but likewise found no
takers willing to join the National Party. Indeed, few in the ILP could
understand his motives and J.M. MacDiarmid took a grim view of Muirhead's
activities.
"I am sorry to tell you that a Home Rule Party in
Scotland which cannot command the support of men like
Tom Johnston, James Barr, D. MacKay and men of that type
is doomed to futility. I am doing what I can to assist
you entirely out of personal regard to yourself and I
am quite convinced that working on your present lines and
a policy of abstention from all other issues except Home
Rule is ploughing the sands. Now that MacDonald has
ruptured his Party a new orientation of the Scottish Home
Rulers should be aligned by which the S.N.P. (sic) could
save its face by walking over to the Labour Party and
impregnating it with the S.H. Rule principle. Now is your
opportunity".(68)
Muirhead believed that this policy was not feasible because no matter how
many Home Rule supporters there were in the Scottish Labour Party, their
aspirations could be circumvented by the numerical superiority of their
English colleagues. He tried in vain to interest Scottish Labour
politicians and failed to read how the tide was turning against Home Rule.
"Unless my logical facility is mixed, it seems to me that
what Maxton said in 1924 is about as strong support as we
could get for the demand which is being put forward by the
National Party of Scotland, and, as far as I am concerned,
I will do all I can to get such men as Maxton to help us get
Scottish control of Scottish affairs."(69)
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Muirhead had high hopes for Maxton especially after the latter's decision
to split the ILP from the official Labour Party. "In view of the fact that
Maxton's supporters are practically all Scotsmen, the commonsense plan for
him would be to join up with the Nationalist Party in order to achieve his
goal in the quickest possible way".(70) However, such hopes were forlorn
as the philosophy, which was now beginning to harden among Labour members,
stressed the primacy of the United Kingdom as an economic and social unit.
According to Maxton and others, the national question was of little
importance. "The general social problem always takes the premier place in
my mind, before the nationalist or political changes, and I do not think
that I am likely to change in that respect".(71)
The Labour Party's attitude, if anything, hardened towards the NPS because
it was seen as fostering unnecessary divisions and was responsible for an
electoral wrecking policy which benefited no one but the National
Government. According to one member of the ILP
"If the National Party persists in a policy of
injuring and opposing all who aim at Scottish
management of Scottish affairs unless they abandon
all other causes than Home Rule, then I can safely
predict the youngest members of the N.P. will be mouldering
in their graves and Home Rule still in the future".(72)
Others in the Labour Party, who were less sympathetic to Home Rule,
regarded the National Party as little more than a political nuisance which
was, according to Patrick Dollan, "a mutual admiration society for
struggling poets and novelists and of no use to the working class".(73)
Although the policy of contesting elections made Labour politicians more
aware of the potential dangers of ignoring Home Rule, it had a long term
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effect of alienating former sympathizers and helped to move the issue to
the periphery of Scottish political life.
The failure of the National Party to make any significant electoral
breakthrough in the early years of the 1930s, coupled with a decline of
interest amongst the political mainstream Home Rulers, led to an
exacerbation of the inherent divisions within the NPS. The leadership's
initial tolerance of the Celticists began to wane as the Party failed to
project itself as a serious challenger in the political arena. Likewise,
there was an increasing output of criticism from Grieve and others about
the National Party's timid approach to politics. Many moderates believed
that the Fundamentalists, or the 'wildmen of Scottish nationalism', were
seriously damaging the Party's image, especially as they had a flair for
attracting public attention. One observer expressed many of the doubts
which were held about the National Party and its political ability and,
consequently, believed them to be unsuitable for anything other than local
government.
"In many quarters the National Party is suspected for
the good reason that the people who have made most noise
about nationalism till now have been cranks, more or less
incompetent wooly witted creatures. That is why I
advocate infiltration: If there was a majority of
nationalists in every local authority in Scotland we would
not need Home Rule. We would have it".(74)
Another feature at this time was the willingness of many moderates to court
the "right type" of people. John MacCormick was aware that many such
notables were beginning to take an interest in the ideas and progress of
the National Party and, in view of this fact, he was keen to manoeuvre the
Party into as favourable light as possible without compromising the ideals
and objectives of his organisation. For some months there had been
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rumours circulating in the National Executive and elsewhere that a group of
prominent people were ready to join the Party. (75) A further stimulus for
emphasising the Party's moderate image came from the interest that was
shown by Daily Record editor, David Anderson, who was willing to give
coverage to their ideas and activities.
"Mr Anderson informed us that he was not yet convinced
that Scotland would be better off economically under Home
Rule which the Nationalists advocate. Mr. Anderson is
friendly to us although he is much more interested in the
cultural side of our movement than the political or economic
and while it will be a good thing for us if he will increasingly
give us publicity, it will be valuable to him and his owners".(76)
Although Anderson gave coverage to the Party's activities, he also raised
alarm at the prospect of compulsory Gaelic, border posts and other such
'sinister activities'. Muirhead, MacCormick and Gibson were quick off the
mark to dispel and play down such fears, much to the chagrin of Grieve and
his clique.
Increasingly, attempts were made to present the Party as one consisting of
moderate and reasonable people, whose prime objective was to secure a more
efficient system of Scottish government. Moves were undertaken to
emphasise the positive aspects of the Party's programme in order to divert
attention away from some of the wilder aspirations held by several members.
However, this added fuel to the claims of the Fundamentalists that
underhand methods of conniving were going on and that the Party was
straying from its original course. This led Tom Gibson to urge MacCormick
to adopt a more restrained approach towards moderation: "I was asked if I
had heard that we were out for the conservatives on the basis that they
would give us some committees and that Sir Iain Colquhoun had been invited
to join on that basis".(77) He also warned that in courting such people
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there should be no indication that the National Party would change its
policy. What was needed, he argued, was a more open policy to prevent the
development of rumours, which only helped to further an atmosphere of
paranoia and suspicion. Should any prominent people want to come in, he
argued, then they should do so only as ordinary members.
G. Malcolm Thompson, Dewar Gibb or Buchan (John). Let these
people come in as ordinary members of the Party, not as
dictators. What we must watch out for is an attempt by
interested parties to use us for their own ends...our ship
must be carefully sailed through the troubled waters of
political intrigue and do not be too much impressed by
the distinguished or notorious people...By all means, have
new people in, but let them come in as acceptors of the ideals
we have the Party for".(78)
However, MacCormick did make a special effort to recruit figures from the
establishment and one success was Lord Dalziel of Kirkcaldy, the former
Liberal MP.(79) He also set about establishing contact with the Duke of
Montrose, who agreed to support Compton Mackenzie in the Glasgow University
rector's election. However, the Duke was unsympathetic towards the
Celticists within the National Party and would not accept an invitation to
join. Indeed, after his initial contact with the NPS he lent his support
to the Liberal candidate at the next election. (80) In spite of
MacCormick's attempts to clean up the Party's image, including the removal
of the editorship of the Scots Independent from William Gillies, who was
susceptible to the intrigues of Grieve, into the more sober hands of the
Rev. Walter Murray, by the summer of 1930, the NPS was still not
attractive to the establishment nationalists. Although most moderates
were prepared to accept this as a fact of political life, they were shocked
into a dramatic reappraisal of their political strategy when in June, 1932,
the Scottish Party emerged to challenge the National Party for control of
'moderate' nationalist opinion.
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The origins of the Scottish Party can be traced back to 1930, when George
Malcolm Thomson and Andrew Dewar Gibb set in motion a process which aimed
at establishing a right wing nationalist pressure group.(81) Although both
men broadly sympathized with the aim of setting up a Scottish Parliament,
they were alarmed at some of the tendencies evident within sections of the
National Party of Scotland. For them, Scottish nationalism and Scottish
control of Scottish affairs would be an important facet in maintaining and
strengthening the unity of the British state and Empire and as such, they
were totally opposed to the separatist claims of some members of the NPS
Also, they wanted to pose a challenge to the socialist leanings of the
National Party, believing that, as a philosophy, nationalism was the
intellectual property of Conservatism: "Nationalism for Tories, that's
our proposal - a synthesis of Toryism (real Toryism) and nationalism". (82)
Within this loose grouping of individuals, there was a thorough distaste of
the Celticism which was advocated by Erskine of Mar and C.M.Grieve.
"When you utter the name of Erskine of Mar you hit the nail
on its head. This man is mad and bad and dangerous, an
arch intriguer... a Pan Celt, a person who believes in madness
for madness sake... Grieve too is dangerous...After all it is
he and Bell between them who have made Douglasism a strong thing
in the NPS".(83)
Conservative nationalists were alarmed at the prospect of the National
Party adopting Social Creditism as an official economic policy, which they
regarded as a turn towards left wing extremism. They believed that they
had a duty to prevent "certain Douglasites who wish to use nationalism for
their own ends" from taking over the leadership of the Nationalist
Party.(84) Both Dewar Gibb and Thomson were anti-Roman Catholic and
disparaged the people of Irish descent as racially inferior to
Scotsmen.(85) This anti-Irish feeling spilled over onto questions
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concerning Scotland's Celtic past, something which the NPS was actively
supporting. Thomson described the Scots Independent as a vehicle only for
Gaelicism and Douglasism and "To describe it as Scottish Nationalist is a
farce. It should be kept out of the hands of all prospective
Nationalists".(86) Gaelic could be tolerated, however it had to be kept
in its place. (87) Another facet of the NPS which attracted criticism
from the embryonic Scottish Party was its lack of distinguished leadership,
which Thomson described as "those despicable old women... The NPS reminds
me of the British Army - Lions led by donkeys".(88) The impetus towards
the creation of the Scottish Party was largely fuelled by the desire of
some conservative Scottish Nationalists to produce an alternative strategy
which was more in keeping with their other political ideals.
Initially, Dewar Gibb and Thomson wanted to get together a group of
prominent, like minded nationalists to join en bloc the National Party and
in doing so, they would be able to give effective leadership and guidance
to the rank and file, who, they believed, were being led astray by wild
socialist Pan Celts. However, the first task was to seek out the right
sort of people necessary to give a qualified lead to Scottish nationalism.
"Our job is to collect a few men all of whom have a
certain reputation or position and who agree to act
together and, when the time is ripe, to make a
spectacular embarrassment of the NPS...The idea would be to
form a little group which would go over to the NPS or issue a
letter to the press. The group might continue even in the
NPS with the special mission of getting at the universities
and the middle and upper classes".(89)
Once the group had been established, it was decided to approach the Duke of
Montrose with a view to him being the figurehead of the new organisation.
The letter Gibb wrote to Montrose in connection with this enterprise is of
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considerable value in the way it sheds light on the political approach
favoured by this group.
"I have been authorized by a group of some half a
dozen Scotsmen who are seriously interested in Scottish
nationalism to approach you in connection with the following
suggestion, since your interest in the question is well known.
Those for whom I speak are united in feeling that Scotland is
about to launch out upon a course which, properly directed,
will lead her once more to taking the place in the world to
which she is entitled. But in that statement of belief
we lay stress upon the words "properly directed" and we
consider that at the moment there is no proper direction
for the wholesome aspirations which are undoubtedly
latent and widespread in modern Scotland. A true
national movement is one which affects the whole outlook
of the people both spiritually and materially. The propriety
of such a proposition is not self-evident. The rank and
file require to be guided, instructed and shepherded towards
the proper course".(90)
This elitist approach to politics was obviously calculated to make sure
that any populist nationalist movement was led along the right road. Gibb
and others believed that the main British parties were not interested in
Home Rule and that the National Party would become the focal point for
popular support on this issue. However, they were not convinced that the
NPS in its present form was capable of fulfilling the duties and
responsibilities that would fall upon it.
"This Party, ever since its foundation, alternatively
repelled and attracted us. It attracts us by its main
purpose and by the sincerity of its rank and file. It
repels us because it appears to have no properly stateable
or at least properly stated plan...It suffers from divided
councils and certain of these councils (the more extreme)
seem positively objectionable".(91)
In order to assist the healthy development of the National Party it was
proposed that some form of watchdog should be created to ensure that proper
policies were given a good airing and support. At this stage, the
question of joining the NPS was left open and was not a precondition for
membership of the new society. Montrose was favourable to the idea and
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put Gibb in touch with other like minded individuals.(92) In any case,
the majority of those who were attracted to the informal grouping were
repelled by the policies and objectives of the National Party, especially
concerning the thorny question of separation from England. By September,
1930 any impetus to join the NPS had vanished due to both a lack of
interest and a fear of the extremist tendencies of Grieve and others, and
indeed, by June, 1931, Thomson was advocating the Liberal Party as the best
means of attaining Home Rule.(93)
However, the National Party forced itself upon the attention of the
establishment in the Spring of 1932, when both the Daily Record and
Beaverbrook's Daily Express gave fairly extensive coverage to the Party's
campaign in the Dumbartonshire by election. It would appear that the NPS
was the prime beneficiary of a circulation war in which each of the
newspapers tried to out do each other in terms of proving their
Scottishness.(94) Home Rule, especially as Tom Johnston was the Labour
candidate, became a political issue in the press and Beaverbrook gave the
National Party considerable encouragement, although he ultimately backed
his own candidates.(95) Interest in moderate Home Rule was given a
further boost in 1932 when Gibb published his book Scotland in Eclipse,
which outlined nationalist grievances. This was followed up by Sir
Alexander MacEwen's The Thistle and the Rose, which put forward the
moderates' case for self-government. (96)
John MacCormick was in constant touch with such people outside the National
Party. He had established contact with the Duke of Montrose during the
Glasgow University Rectorial campaign in October, 1931, and about the same
time, he moved in the same circles as Sir Alexander MacEwen and Andrew
Dewar Gibb, who both were friendly with Neil Gunn, a NPS activist in
Inverness.(97) The message MacCormick received from all concerned was
that the National Party was far too extreme in its views and policies, and
could not count on their support. Although he did his best to persuade
such people to join the Party by giving them his own moderate
interpretation of his organisation's policy, the inherent degree of
ambiguity and the activities of the Celticists within the National Party
meant that few of these moderates would stomach joining such a group.
This was especially the case after Grieve's Clann Albann fiasco which
sought to create a paramilitary nationalist organisation dedicated to
extra-Parliamentary activities.(98) Although Grieve was expelled from the
Party, the stigma of extremism was not so easily removed. MacCormick
believed that the Party's unruly image and reputation was costing them the
loss of a mass of potential moderate Home Rule support. The trick was, as
he saw it, to remove fears that the National Party was out for complete
separation from England while, at the same time, to ensure that their
policy was not emasculated into some form of devolution. It was to this
end that MacCormick was to spend most of his energies in the period
following the Dumbartonshire by election.
From the outset MacCormick's task was made difficult by the fact that it
was becoming rapidly apparent that the National Party was fundamentally and
irrevocably divided over certain key issues. Tom Gibson was singularly
unimpressed by the devolutionist stirrings and argued that the Party should
take no cognisance of these developments.(99) Others warned that the
devolutionists had the objective of destroying nationalist aspirations.
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The increasing success of the National Party's propaganda
is calling forth many expressions in favour of Home Rule or
devolution from people who formerly manifested little or no
interest in the subject...there are real dangers which
cannot be ignored. The big danger in the immediate future
is that devolution may be used to dish nationalism. Mere
devolution may be presented in such a guise that many
unwary may suppose that it will satisfy the demands of
Scotland and solve all her national problems. But devolution
would leave Scotland in the position of an English province,
unable to move forward in any important way without the consent
of England".(100)
Although MacCormick himself did not believe there was a need for a
devolutionist "stepping stone" policy towards self-government, he was
prepared to try and find some common ground with moderates in spite of the
hostility this would arouse among the more hard line members of his own
party. However, the main area of confrontation was over the
interpretation of the Party's objective with regard to relations with
England and the British Empire. Contradictory views on this issue emerged
with rapid frequency and, for example, in March, 1931 Compton Mackenzie
argued that an independent Scotland would be able to conduct its own
foreign policy without regard to England, while at the same time, Walter
Murray, in an effort to persuade Sir Daniel Stevenson to join the Party,
talked about self government allowing Scots to participate "in her full
natural freedom within the British Commonwealth". (101) The latter view
was, in all probability, the one that most members of the rank and file
agreed with and it was also the one, which was most likely to strike a
resonant chord with the electorate. MacCormick believed that the main
priority was to clear up the ambiguity which surrounded this sensitive
issue.
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This first moves in this direction occurred in February, 1932, when, at the
half yearly annual conference, a short restatement of policy was issued.
This was carried out on the pretext of clarifying certain issues which were
emerging during the campaign at the Dumbartonshire by election. The re¬
statement of policy was the response of the Party to the goading they were
receiving over the question of separation from England. The NPS claimed
that their objective was independence within the context of the British
Commonwealth, and as such, they tried to allay fears that they were out to
destroy the unity of the Empire.(102) Although this provoked some degree
of controversy at the conference, it was accepted without too much
difficulty and illustrates how weak the Fundamentalists were, in a
numerical capacity, among Party members. Also, there was a changing
balance in the make up of the Party leadership, which started to move away
from the preponderance of left of centre ideas and personalities. The
candidates in the 1931 General Election and subsequent by elections
reflected this movement with former Conservatives and Liberals out¬
numbering those with any history of a socialist pedigree and one of those,
John MacCormick, could scarcely be accused of having any overt left wing
tendencies.(103) In an effort to encourage Andrew Dewar Gibb to join the
Party, a member of the National Executive, Charles Black, offered him the
candidature of the Universities' seat. He also claimed that the 'wildmen'
"are in a rapidly diminishing minority, and will become quite ineffective
when broadminded folk like yourself (Gibb) join us".(104) Although the
restatement of policy, which was yet to be enshrined at the proper annual
conference in May, failed to win over the embryonic Scottish Party, it did
not have the effect of throwing down the gauntlet to the Fundamentalists,
who would from now on devote all their energies to forming a strategy of
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opposition to moderatism. As if this was not bad enough, the Party now
faced a challenger for moderate Home Rule support in the shape of the
Scottish Party, which was initiated by a breakaway section of the Cathcart
Unionist Association led by Kevin MacDowall. With its pro Empire
sentiments, the new organisation mopped up all the 'prominent' men who had
been expressing an interest in the National Party.
The first challenge issued to the National Party resulting from this
development was a questionnaire sent out from the Daily Record, which
attempted to establish the notion that the NPS was a separatist group. At
the same time, a conference of Moderates organised by the Daily Record
brought out their own plans, which were then set out against those of the
National Party. The Record's proposals disappointed many, even in the
Scottish Party, which was soon to bring out a set of much further reaching
policies, because they did not go as far as the statute of Westminster and
would have left Scotland with less self-government than most of the
Dominion nations.(105) This worked to the advantage of the National Party
which went on the offensive. In October, 1932, MacCormick denounced the
Scottish Party and claimed that the NPS was the only organisation capable
of representing nationalist aspirations. He attacked the ambiguity of the
Scottish Party's relations with other British political parties and
emphasised that Home Rule was only an issue because of the endeavours of
the National Party.
"I believe that first among the things which has made
our success possible has been our determination to cut
right across the political divide and create a completely
independent party standing for self-government alone...of
no less importance has been our determination to have no
pact or alliance whatever with the older parties. Self-
government can only be won by our independent action. During
the next three years attempts will no doubt be made to persuade
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or drive us from our determination. But if we remember that
this policy alone has been responsible for forcing the
issue of self-government to the forefront of Scottish
politics we shall not be likely to give up this
essential of our faith".(106)
MacCormick astutely recognised this area as the Scottish Party's principal
weakness, because the National Party was the only organisation which was
prepared to fight elections on the self-government issue and until their
nationalist opponents resolved to do otherwise, they could be no more than
impotent vocal detractors; a condition that was not conducive to gaining
mass support. With a recent opinion poll in the Daily Express showing
considerable support for Home Rule, the stakes were high.(107) As the
Scottish Party was unable as yet to challenge the NPS for electoral
support, MacCormick proceeded to then take the wind out of the sails of
their criticisms by arguing that the National Party was in favour of
maintaining the Imperial status quo: "We have always made it clear that
we want complete self-government within the Commonwealth, and that we
insist that only an elected Scottish Assembly will in the long run have any
right to determine how far membership of the Commonwealth shall limit our
exercise of the rights of nationhood".(108) He further strengthened his
case by getting approval from the Party to commit themselves to a policy
which would maintain joint cooperation with England in foreign and defence
matters. Also, it was agreed that there should be no tariff barriers
between the two countries and that the administration of British colonies
should be a joint affair.(109) On the whole, the restatement of policy
should have been enough to quell criticisms from the Scottish Party,
however the battle MacCormick and others had in getting these ideas
accepted by members of their own Party was enough to maintain suspicions
about the integrity of their moderatism. In addition to the hostility of
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the separatists, the restatement of policy caused unease among many
stalwart Party activists who were not altogether convinced of the efficacy
of such a move. Many believed that the restatement would be interpreted
as a concession to the pressure for moderation, which was mounted by the
Scottish Party and, as such, would only encourage them to make more
demands. Tom Gibson believed that if this was to happen it would only
help to give credibility to the devolutionist stategy. Gibson, who at
that time was living in London and often out of the Party's leadership
activities, was afraid that individual members of the Scottish Party were
exerting too great an influence on members of the National Executive. He
cautioned against strenuous efforts being made to win them over to the
National Party's point of view and believed that it was only their
attention which enabled them to keep going. Although Muirhead shared some
of Gibson's unease he did not believe in isolation.
I note that you do not quite know what is taking place
within the Party re policy judged by the newspaper
reports. I believe I am myself no less interested than
you are to see the policies of the National Party of
Scotland are not altered to meet the wishes of those
outside the Party. The constitution of a self-governing
Scotland will be formed along the lines advocated by Sir
Alexander MacEwen, so far as his views are in line with our
policy, but no further...Sir Alexander admits our case to the
hilt but says he believes in devolution as a first step".(110)
Muirhead was in favour of establishing a nationalist consensus and believed
that the Scottish Party members could be won over and could see no harm in
informal contacts between the two groups. Gibson, however, believed there
were inherent dangers in such an approach that could lead to concessions
being given which would undermine the credibility of the National Party.
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MacCormick further increased anxiety in the National Party when he put
forward the idea of launching an all party Scottish Convention.(Ill) The
logic behind this proposal was that it would be a short cut to establishing
popular support for Home Rule without the problems of contesting elections.
MacCormick made approaches to prominent Home Rulers and the Scottish Party
with the aim of drumming up support for the idea. Sir Alexander MacEwen
and Sir Henry Keith were asked to sit on a joint committee which would set
up a Scottish National Covention. They were also to review the present
political situation and consider a short draft bill which would form the
basis of a Parliamentary Bill to be presented at Westminster. MacCormick
was adamant that his involvement with this project in no way contravened
his duties to the National Party.
"This does not in anyway modify our policy. In this
first place, if the non-nationalists persons will not agree
to join the committee unless we modify our position then we
will do without them. Further if the National Convention
will not accept our short draft Bill unless our Policy is
modified, then we shall just refuse to accept. It must be
kept in mind, however, that it will be the business of the
nationalists to see that the convention is composed of a
majority holding the nationalist's outlook. It must be
kept clearly in mind that there is nothing to prevent
devolutionists supporting our draft Bill for a constituent
Assembly to modify the proposed constitution of Scotland
into a devolutionist one, but it will be for the nationalists
to see that this does happen".(112)
MacCormick was a political pragmatist and was willing to face up to the
reality that the NPS did not automatically command the support of all
nationalist sentiment. He was especially concerned to make the National
Party the most credible vehicle for nationalist aspirations and,
consequently, this would involve challenging and converting devolutionists
from their old ideas on Home Rule to the more radical approach favoured by
the NPS. As a political idea, devolution would not go away and MacCormick
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believed the best way to discredit this approach to self-government would
be to show its supporters that among the public, the policies advocated by
the National Party were gaining more and more support. He was hopeful
that the NPS would be able to increase its influence by scoring electoral
successes in local and Parliamentary elections. He argued that:
There is no reason why devolutionists should not be willing
to support our short draft bill in the Convention, unless
they refuse to permit the ultimate decision to the Scottish
people and the MacEwenite type of devolutionist admits
that the Scottish people and not the London Parliament
must have the final decision... Personally I am satisfied
that an attempt should be made to call the convention early
next year. Before that time we hope to have some more of
our members in town, country and district councils and
other administrative bodies".(113)
The proposed Convention never got off the ground. MacCormick did not win
sufficient approval for the project among members of his own Party, and
devolutionists were likewise reluctant to be tied down to a convention.
In any case, the NPS failed to win anything like the electoral support that
would have been necessary to pressurize the moderates into believing that
the National Party had the virtue of public opinion on its side.
Although MacCormick was convinced of the logic behind his proposed
strategy, for many members of the NPS he was moving too far, too fast.
Gibson wrote critically to Muirhead about the idea for a Convention: "You
state that it will be for the nationalists to see that it does not happen
that a modification in policy takes place. But I am afraid that
circumstances will compel you to consider modification and unfortunately
there are people in our Party still willing to modify our policy".(114)
Gibson believed, correctly, that the Convention was not a feasible
alternative to the more mundane policy of contesting elections and that the
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only way that the NPS could claim a mandate for self-government was when it
held a majority of Scottish Parliamentary seats. As far as he was
concerned, the idea of setting up a Convention was merely a dubious
shortcut whose main purpose was to avoid hard work.
I think it is bad tactics and I am opposed to it... ^ own
view is that you should be paying attention to Parliamentary
constituencies with a view to placing the largest number of
candidates in the field and considering ways and means of
raising money".(115)
Gibson and several others linked the Convention idea with the restatement
of policy, which was taken to be firm evidence of a move towards
conciliation and greater cooperation with devolutionists and as such, he
demanded an immediate repudiation by the National Council. MacCormick was
unimpressed and merely informed Gibson that "there is no cause for
alarm".(116) Compton Mackenzie likewise expressed doubts about the
desirability of associating with devolutionists.(117) Although much of
the flak was aimed at MacCormick, the hon. National Secretary was himself
totally opposed to a devolutionist policy.
"For four years the National Party of Scotland had gone up
and down Scotland preaching not devolution, not the erection
of some glorified county council in Edinburgh...Devolutionists,
who argued for what they called a measure of internal Home Rule
- whatever that might be - wanted whatever they wanted, according
to their own declaration, not for Scotland's own sake but
because poor Westminster was congested with work. In order
to relieve the Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland of
this congestion of work let us in Scotland do a little for
ourselves. That was the attitude of nine-tenths of those who
call themselves devolutionists".(118)
At this point in time it is important to emphasize that very few in the NPS
were in favour of devolution as proposed by the Scottish Party. However,
a further area of dispute was developing over the question of how to
approach and diffuse the threat of moderate Home Rule.
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By the time of the half-yearly conference in November, 1932, clear lines of
demarcation had been drawn within the ranks of the NPS. The Funda¬
mentalists, who had begun to organise themselves, were positively aghast at
the apparent collaboration with the devolutionist enemy. MacCormick's
attempt to clarify the Party's position vis a vis the Empire brought stern
condemnation.
"You will probably share with Angus Clark feelings of
disquiet at the Schoolboy tactics of the executive of
the NPS - numbers at any price; please everybody; contempt
of public intelligence; naive assurance of ability to
outmanoeuvre experienced professional politicians; telegrams
to the King; contradictory restatements of policy;
constitution making, indecent galloping at Dalziel".(119)
The recruitment of Lord Dalziel to the ranks of the Party was one indicator
that perhaps MacCormick's drive towards improving the image of his
organisation was beginning to work.(120) However, the divisions, which
had become increasingly bitter, now spilled out into the open and the
public bloodletting undid much of MacCormick's work. The former chairman
of the SNL Hugh Paterson, put forward the case against the restatement,
arguing that with regard to Imperial affairs Scotland was "best left out of
it altogether and should cast herself adrift entirely".(120) In reply,
MacCormick stated that, whether they liked it or not, Scotland had been a
partner with England in building the British Empire and, as a consequence
of this, Scots had certain obligations placed on them. He argued "It was
accordingly necessary to face up to these obligations, and in the
restatement of policy no aspect of sovereignty was given up".(121) Angus
Clark challenged this and demanded that the Scots should have no less
freedom in their foreign policy than was enjoyed by the Dominion states.
MacCormick agreed with this and claimed that the restatement in no way
impeded this , although they would have to face up to the political
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realities of the situation which made such propositions unlikely. He
believed that the antics of the Fundamentalists was mere hairsplitting and
told them to face facts: "The old Home Rule parties never got anywhere
with their theoretical propaganda until the National Party came along with
a realistic aim".(122) MacCormick accused the separatists of advocating
policies which were unrealistic and unlikely to cut any ice with the
electorate, while at the same time, he stressed that the restatement would
rid the Party of the "separation" bogey.
"The moderate Home Rulers are continually protesting that
they don't want separation, but they rarely say what they
mean by separation. Home Rule without separation is
unthinkable; it is a contradiction in terms. It is customary
to condemn the National Party as separatists and therefore
hopelessly impractical people. Separation is the bogeyman
of the Home Rule controversy. The National Party had never
advocated the separation of Scotland from the British
Commonwealth".(123)
MacCormick went on the offensive and advocated ideas that stressed the
similarities in principle among nationalists rather than harping on about
their differences in policy: "The National Party, like all Home Rulers,
believes in separating the affairs of Scotland from those of England, and
placing them under a Scottish government".(124)
The NPS also produced a six point charter for Scotland, which was designed
to present, in simple terms, the basic demands of the Party and put further
pressure on members of the Scottish Party to abandon their futile
gesturing: "Some leading members of the Scottish Party such as Sir
Alexander MacEwen and Andrew Dewar Gibb, if we have not misread their
writings, seem to accept all these points and we wonder why they did not
throw in their lot with the National Party".(125) Although MacCormick had
to face the fact that many in his Party were unhappy at the moderate image
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he was trying to project, he was able to hold the NPS together and further,
he was astute enough to use the restatement of policy to counter claims
made by the Scottish Party and others in the Unionist establishment.(126)
The most significant factor to affect the direction of the National Party's
leadership since the inception of the Scottish Party was their electoral
performance. At the beginning of 1933, the announcement of a by election
in East Fife presented the NPS with the opportunity to convince moderates
that their policies were electorally popular. If they could poll a
significant number of votes, it would undoubtedly strengthen their hand
against the argument for maintaining the Scottish Party as a separate
organisation. However, the choice of candidate and the campaign probably
did more damage to the National Party's credibility than any other event in
its short history.
The novelist Eric Linklater was chosen as the candidate because, according
to R.E. Muirhead:
"after careful consideration I came to the conclusion
that of the possible candidates for the constituency Eric
Linklater was the most likely to do the best for the Party
...First impressions of him make me quite satisfied with
the selection, although of course I do not know how he will
develop in the campaign. There is certainly some risk in
nominating someone who has not been through the rough and
tumble of our movement but I believe that it is worth taking
the risk. Some nationalist friends who know him and whose
judgement I repect spoke well of him. It is likely that
our candidate will get a better press than would have otherwise
been given...He is a writer and that to my mind is perhaps
his weakest point".(127)
It was thought that Linklater with his reputation as a novelist would
attract more attention than an unknown candidate and his undogmatic
approach to politics was likely to appeal to moderates. The National
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Executive was confident that the election would leave the Scottish Party
politically impotent and it was thought that in order to highlight this,
there should be no connections or contacts between the two groups during
the campaign. From the beginning, this line was pushed hardest by Tom
Gibson.
"I suggest strongly that the announcement be made at once
that we are contesting without the Montrose group - we must
act independently of them. I am also - as strongly as I can
be definitely opposed to permitting on our platform any
person belonging to that group".(128)
However, as the NPS campaign began to bog down, it soon became evident that
no one from the Scottish Party had any intention of indentifying themselves
as supporters of Linklater's candidature.
MacCormick gave his verdict on the performance of the Party: "Whatever
Linklater's merit as a novelist, he certainly was no campaigning
politician. From the start of the campaign the Press refused to treat him
seriously and only used him as a source of light relief".(129) Linklater,
who was troubled by what still seemed to be the inherent ambiguities of NPS
policy, answered questions awkwardly and without confidence, and only
helped to add fuel to Scottish Party accusations of separatism. His style
of campaigning at times showed an undisguised contempt of the
electorate.(130) To make matters worse, the Duke of Montrose challenged
Linklater over NPS policy towards the Empire, to which the reply was
lacking in both clarity and confidence.(131) The Party's organisation and
the commitment of some of its members was likewise a factor in producing a
disappointing result. MacCormick's attitude towards electioneering and
his obsession with fraternizing with the well known and powerful was not
one that would engender confidence.
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"Part of our secret was that although we were serious about
our cause we had no political ambitions and did not therefore
need to take ourselves so seriously. Every campaign was to
us a gay affair and where ever we went we were sure to find
some howff where after meetings we could ceilidh till the
small hours".(132)
MacCormick had also, prior to the election, been strung along by
Beaverbrook who had urged him to contest municipal, rather than
parliamentary elections. Beaverbrook revealed his true support of the NPS
at East Fife, where he sponsored his own Agricultural Unionist candidate.
This episode revealed a significant weakness in MacCormick's political
ability. Not only was he guilty of not taking the election seriously, he
also failed to read the opposition's sincerity on certain critical issues.
The result was a humiliating defeat for the National Party with Linklater
coming at the bottom of the poll behind four other candidates.
The most serious effect of the poor showing at East Fife was that, at a
stroke, much of the Party's previous hard work in building up credibility
was wiped out. Questions were raised regarding the validity of their own
strategy, and their previous self-confidence was shattered: "The first and
most obvious lesson of East Fife is that Scotland is still not ready for
national freedom".(133) A further hard lesson was that the Scottish Party
was not an impotent force as was hoped and indeed, it was castigated for
its negative influence: "East Fife should finally destroy the folly of the
Scottish Party with its feeble claims for Scotland.... A party which will
not take an independent stand for Scotland will never do anything
effective."(134) Although many regarded the Scottish Party with nothing
more than contempt, they could not escape the fact that the Liberal Home
Rule candidate, David Kerr, had managed to secure twice as many votes as
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Linklater and, consequently, were forced to come to the uncomfortable
conclusion that a moderate approach to the national question was
electorally more popular than their own more stringent demands for
self-government. At the same time, the result had given both a moral and
intellectual boost to the Scottish Party claims that the NPS was extreme in
its claims for Scottish independence and that such views had no popular
support.
The event was a signal for more polarisation within the rank and file of
the National Party and both sides of the divide claimed that the result
should be interpreted as evidence for a swing to their particular
standpoint. Some members wanted to take the Party back to what they
claimed was its original aim. Arthur Donaldson wrote to Muirhead
complaining of the direction in which the Party was moving.
"It seems to me that since the inception of the Scottish
Party and still more since the statement above mentioned
(the so called 'ragman's roll') our propaganda has lost
punch. Maybe it set in when the movement began
to gain respectability. At any rate, it has seemed to
me that there has been a distinct tendency to depart
from our original creed and try to straddle far enough to
reassure our "respectable critics"...Something of this
seems to come up at Inverness and there are indicators
that it will be the principle issue at the next conference.
I hope so that it will be carried to a conclusion. The
attempt to 'moderate' our policy means emasculation and
failure. There seems to be an impression among some that
the 'Empire' in the English sense of the word is an asset to
which Scotland must not sacrifice its claim. Instead it
is a liability which we should be glad to have got rid of.
I can see no way in which Scotland can assume responsibility
in any measure for the Empire, any more than Canada does,
without sacrificing control of her national policies to
England".(135)
Donaldson's letter captures the mood of discontentment building up among
the Party's Fundamentalists perfectly. It also draws attention to the
140
fact that many of those, who were unimpressed by the arguments for
moderation, were not the 'wild men' as was often portrayed by MacCorrnick.
Donaldson was one of those who believed that the Party should hold out for
complete independence even although, in the short term, this would not
prove electorally popular. He and others argued that the process of
independence might take a long time and that the Party should take the lead
in educating people to the nationalist cause. Donaldson had also put his
finger on the crux of the problem by stating that before the NPS could make
any more progress, it would have to resolve these outstanding issues once
and for all. He was also correct to suspect the Inverness branch was
behind the movement towards a moderate policy, as it was here that the key
figures behind the demands for some kind of rapprochement with the Scottish
Party were to be found. (136) As far as the Fundamentalists were concerned
there could be no compromise.
"The place for moderates and Imperialists is with the
Duke of Montrose and his crew. That kind of stuff has
been tried and proven barren in over 50 years of Home Rule
agitation...1 am for Scottish nationalism without qualification
or impediment of any kind, my support will always be for the
element which seeks independence, with freewill association
with England as a possibility later".(137)
The arena for the forthcoming battle was the annual conference of Inverness
on May 27th, 1933. The moderate element most in favour of cooperation and,
ultimately, some form of union with the Scottish Party were aided by the
fact that Sir Alexander MacEwen's son, Robin, was a close friend of Neil
Gunn. This allowed them to engage in covert discussions without the
knowledge of the rest of the Party, and allowed them a coordination in
their strategy that otherwise they would not have been able to achieve.
Although Muirhead expressed concern over Donaldson's claims, he did not
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suspect anything to be amiss.
"I shall enclose a copy of the resolution proposed by
Inverness branch so that you will see exactly the nature
of the proposals and while a number spoke in favour of the
scheme, I feel we would be quite wrong in adopting it. Since
the East Fife election there has been amongst some of the
members an evident attempt to join with the Montrose moderates.
I account for that through the fact that before the moderate
Party came into existence, practically all those who were in
favour of a national Parliament for Scotland had joined the
National Party, although a proportion of our members would have
preferred something like a devolution scheme. Those members
are now suggesting an amalgamation with the Scottish Party and
I see there is likely to be considerable discussions on the
subject in the near future, probably culminating at the annual
conference".(138)
What Muirhead did not know was that informal discussions had been taking
place since the 10th of December, 1932, before the East Fife by election.
MacCormick had attempted to find a platform which would serve as the basis
for negotiations for amalgamation. Initially his demands were basically
the ones which were already enshrined in NPS policy and his early efforts
were attempts to get the Scottish Party to agree with these, while he would
guarantee a commitment to maintaining connections with the British
Empire.(139)
Before the East Fife by election, MacCormick was hopeful of the NPS
electoral prospects and this in turn helped to determine his unwillingness
to compromise to Scottish Party demands:
"In accordance with circumstances I am prepared to
consider any method, direct action included, of attaining
self-government. But the circumstances of the time seem to
show that straight parliamentary electoral methods have a chance
of being more rapidly successful than any of us would have
believed a year or two ago. If that is true, it is our duty to
concentrate on that method, and do everything we can do in our
ower, constituent with honesty, to strengthen our electoral
position. To that end it is necessary for us to do everything
we can do to get the moderates to join with us (on our essentials)
and bring with them the prestige and the hope of financial support
which undoubtedly they command".(140)
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MacCormick was also keen to rid the Party of those he regarded as extremist
and whose ideas and actions, he believed, were bringing the name of
National Party into disrepute. He also came to the conclusion that he now
had more in common, politically, with those in the Scottish Party than with
some in his own organisation, especially as this group was making more and
more criticisms, often of a personal nature, against MacCormick in the
Social Credit journal, the Freeman.
"We are already being called traitors (Freeman) but I
believe the real treachery at the present time would be to
indulge in the self-gratification of calling ourselves
irreconcilable resolutions something republicans and all the
rest. I am certain we can beat the Grieve MacColl element
and I am certain of it because I believe that it is they
and not us who are ready to betray the cause for their
own self-conceit".(141)
The negotiations were kept secret from other Party members, because it was
known that should they learn about such activities, the Fundamentalists
would gain valuable ammunition to bolster their claims that the leadership
was engaging in a sell out of principles. There is no doubt that
MacCormick was quite unprincipled in his underhand manoeuvrings and he
displayed an arrogant tendency to treat the National Party as if it were
his own private organisation. The following extract is a perfect example
of his ability to disguise his real intentions under a cloak of well
meaningness.
I think you are right about a small preliminary talk with
the Duke and Sir A.M. (Alexander MacEwen) on the 14th but I am
still in doubt about the wisdom of R.E.M. (Roland Muirhead)
being there. He knows that we are keeping in touch with the
Scottish Party and agrees that it is necessary. But in the
meantime it is desirable that these talks should be strictly
private or we'll at once have an idiot like Grieve or MacColl
starting a row in the press and trying to create distrust in
the Party. Now R.E.M. I suspect would immediately want to
report every word of such a conversation to the whole council
(a dangerous thing with N.K.W. and such others there). I
could no doubt persuade R.E. of the unfortunate necessity for
security till further developments but know he would feel
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uncomfortable...I should not dream of taking any step without
his advice and counsel for I have a boundless respect for him,
but you well understand that the position would be a little
awkward. Besides he is our chairman and should be, as he is,
above all the talk of treachery etc. which we can certainly
expect, no matter how completely they accept our terms,
nothing would be more completely a sickener to me than to hear
a fool like McColl accusing Muirhead of fraternising with the
Philistines".(142)
The prime reason for MaCormick wanting to keep Muirhead out of the
discussions was the fact that the latter was not at all keen on encouraging
links between the two groups and indeed, he and others like Tom Gibson
blocked the Inverness motion, which called for a recognition of the fact
that the NPS and the Scottish Party were working for the same objective.
This was replaced by a less accommodating motion, which called for
nationalists to stop stressing their differences and try to concentrate on
the opponents of self-government.(143) Although MacCormick had been
defeated on his original aim he was, however, gauche enough to claim the
credit for this motion which, to his political advantage, helped to isolate
the Fundamentalists who were branded as the most guilty perpetrators of
sectarianism.
The failure of the East Fife by election caused MacCormick to review the
position of the NPS, especially its policies and image:
"Since the East Fife election and its disappointing result,
a few of us here have been talking over our whole position
very seriously...The question that is therefore uppermost
in our minds is whether our whole position as a Party must
be overhauled. Within the Party itself there is no getting
away from the fact that there are many branches which we would
be better without, and a large number of our members are of a
disgruntled type with whom it is very difficult to work. Have
we attracted this disgruntled type because so much of our
propaganda has necessarily been a recital of grievances rather
than concrete constructive proposals? Does our difficulty in
making headway at elections reflect our failure really to appeal
to the imagination and aspirations of the electors?"(143)
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MacCorraick's introspective questioning led him to conclude that the
National Party's first priority was to put its own house in order. Any
further contact with the Scottish Party was unlikely to be productive given
the NPS's disastrous showing at East Fife, which would have weakened
MacCormick's ability to drive a hard bargain. The real crux of the
problem, he believed, was the image of the Party and the influence the
separatists exerted over it in the public's mind. MacCormick had little
sympathy with, nor understanding of, those who wanted to ally social
grievances and political discontent under the banner of nationalist
aspirations and, instead, believed in a more positive Scottish nationalism.
His objective was to try and harness the NPS to what he thought was a
policy which reflected the political consensus of the Scottish people.
MacCormick was not an ideological politician and this was reflected in the
policies he advocated, which were a peculiar mixture of pre-war Liberal
radicalism, romantic nationalism and the more populist objectives of the
Scottish Labour movement. He paid little heed to the more concrete
economic arguments for independence as propounded by Tom Gibson, for
example. MacCormick believed he would win Inverness at the next election:
"Not only because I stand for self-government but also,
whether consciously or not, I have given the impression,
particularly in the West, that I am, as it were, a kind of
crofter's candidate standing for the rights of small holders
and the improvements of his chances in life. As you know
my own outlook in politics is radical, and I know I cannot
help letting that radicalism show through my speeches. Is
it not possible then that we should be more radical as a Party?
Is there not something to be said for the frequent suggestion
that we should boldly proclaim our policy for a self-governing
Scotland and indicate that even before we get self-government
our members in Parliament will be irrespective of Party divisions
unfailing in the progressive side".(144)
It is paradoxical that many of the most committed supporters of the idea
that the Party ought to adopt a more radical stance were the
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Fundamentalists, whom MacCormick was most intent on removing. However,
MacCormick's radicalism was in reality a shallow political concept, which
meant all things to all men and, as such, had little relevance in a society
which was increasingly drawn in to the orbit of class based politics.
"I believe that radicalism is the only political bent of
the Scottish people and that in expressing it, we would only
be expressing our national character...1 know the feeling of
our members pretty well, or those who are worth anything to
us, former Conservatives as well as former Socialists, and I
believe they are all radicals. I mean by radical that they
favour neither capitalism as we now know it, nor socialism
as expressed by the Labour Party. They believe in the
private enterprise of individuals but are suspicious of
monopolies, trusts or combines or anything which, in short,
though still privately owned, has reached dimensions too great
for individual responsibility in ownership. They believe in
small holdings, in small towns, in small independent business,
in everything that is the reverse of either large scale
capitalism or socialism. It would not be difficult to
formulate in actual political proposals what is at present
merely a state of mind, and to do so might be the making of
our Party".(145)
Much of this merely echoed previous ideas, again a lot of it coming from
the Fundamentalists. However, without detailed explanation and in era of
pre-Keynesian economics, such proposals were mere pipe dreams. Although
MacCormick was an able Machiavellian in his political manoeuvring both
inside and outside the National Party, he was badly hindered by
indecisiveness and a tendency to adapt new ideas to a situation and then
just as quickly abandon them as new developments arose. Throughout his
political career, MacCormick consistently wavered in his political
commitments and, more often than not, this was a result of his opportunist
tendencies. After the East Fife election there was a crying need for the
NPS to dramatically improve its political fortunes and MacCormick's
advocacy of radicalism was no more than an opportunist response to this.
"It is possible that a National radical Party might make
a more immediate and wider appeal to the electors than a
National Party which, however positive in its great
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conception of a new Scotland, must, none the less, be
negative in its attitude to the questions which, whether
we like it or not, the ordinary elector is primarily
interested in..."(146)
The reason MacCormick turned his attention towards this new radical image
for the Party was that he was still smarting from the East Fife
humiliation, which closed his preferred avenue for progress - greater
cooperation with the Scottish Party: "We have come to the conclusion that
the time is not ripe for any further approach to the moderates as the East
Fife result would appear to have rather weakened our position in any
negotiations that might take place".(147) Evidence that MacCormick's
radicalism was nothing more than a short term opportunist reaction to
failure was the fact that within one month he had forgotten all about such
notions and was again pressing for further talks with the Scottish Party.
A stimulus for this volte-face can be partially attributed to the noises
being made by the Fundamentalist wing of the Party, which was trying to
pressure the leadership into a more genuinely radical posture.(148)
MacCormick was becoming increasingly bitter with this section of the Party,
which was more and more engaging in outbursts of personal abuse against
him. He was determined to get rid of this group once and for all and set
about organising a campaign to ensure their expulsion.
"I believe therefore that the time has come for decisive
action on our part, and I suggest conversations
regarding the resolution which I sent up last week
should be put to the council at this forthcoming meeting.
I am certain that we can carry practically the whole council
with us, but I feel there is going to be a break with a
certain small minority, and to tell you the truth, I
welcome the prospect. The division of opinion, to my
mind, is not between moderation and extremism at all, it
is between those who want to get somewhere within a
reasonable time and those who don't care what happens
so long as their own vanity is satisfied."(149)
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MacCorralck moved a series of resolutions for the May, 1933, annual
conference which:
"in view of the differences within our own ranks,
it is desirable to set the objectives of the Party as
simply, briefly and as clearly as possible".(150)
The resolutions called for negotiations with the Scottish Party and
accepted the principle that an independent Scotland should cooperate with
England in running the Enpire and also coordinate joint defence and foreign
affairs.(151) The motions moved by MacCormick were devoid of any
ambiguities and consequently produced the showdown which the leadership had
anticipated.
The resolutions were symptomatic of an intensification of the debate
concerning the aims and nature of both nationalist parties and the degree
of common ground between them. George Malcolm Thomson argued that there
were no real differences in the objectives and policies of the two groups
and that the only way forward for Scottish nationalism was through union.
"There has been some misunderstanding of the position of
the Scottish Party. Its members have been called the
'moderates'. It is a title that some of them have possibly
coveted. But if "moderate" is taken to be synonymous with
devolutionist, then members of the Scottish Party have certainly
no right to it. In that respect - and it is the fundamental
respect - they are extremists".(152)
Thomson tried to persuade members of the NPS that the Scottish Party was
not devolutionist while, at the same time, he endeavoured to allay moderate
fears about the National Party's commitment to the British Empire. He
pointed out the fact that both parties were committed to the principle of
the Scottish Parliament having full control over finances and argued that
given this area of mutual agreement, all other differences between them
were of only minor importance. He concluded that "There are in Scotland
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two parties pursuing what is fundamentally the same object".(153) This
view was heartily opposed by the Fundamentalists and many others who
believed themselves to be poles apart from the Scottish Party. Claims
that the two parties shared the same objectives were dismissed as a
fraudulent attempt to lead the Party astray from its original aims.
"That a confusion of thought exists may be seen from
the view which has been frequently expressed that the
devolutionary proposals of the Duke of Montrose and his
followers do not constitute such a fundamental difference
between us that they need to be stressed, but like our own
proposals, aim at Scottish self-government and Scotland
reaffirming her nationhood". We believe this view to be
wrong and subversive of our constitutional position and
therefore bound to confuse the public and mislead our own
mind.(154)
As far as Fundamentalists were concerned, the Scottish Party was a bulwark
of British imperialism which was out to circumvent true national
independence. They argued that the devolutionist proposals would leave
Scotland with a political status similar to that of Ulster and as such,
they believed, was incompatible with the Party's objective to secure
"independent national status within the British group of nations". They
were especially angry with MacCormick, who redefined, or restated Party
policy with regard to the British Empire, which had been left out of the
original draft. The notion that there should be joint executive control
and coordination of defence and foreign policy was, they argued, "a clear
breach of the objectives and spirit for which the National Party had been
created".(155) It was claimed that these proposals were nothing short of a
sell-out to the devolutionists and were incompatible with both nationalist
aspirations and even fell short of the Commonwealth ideal.
"The important element which all these proposals overlook
is that they do not correspond to the British Commonwealth
constitution. It is precisely for this reason that they
have long since been unequivocally rejected by the free
democracies of the British Commonwealth themselves".(156)
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The Fundamentalists were unhappy with any imperial connections.
MacCormick's manoeuvrings in May, 1933, had two objectives. The first of
these was to remove those from the Party who he regarded as 'republican'.
Having done this the way would be open for the attainment of his second
objective, which was to take the wind out of the sails of moderate
criticism. MacCormick was hopeful that once the Fundamentalists were
silenced, Scottish Party members would join the National Party, or remain
in poltical oblivion.
"There are today two parties in Scotland each working for
self-government. However much we dislike it, that is a fact
and we must face it; we cannot shut our eyes to the existence
of the Scottish Party nor refuse to admit that its appearance
will affect the progress of our work...We must examine our
position, get right down to the fundamentals of our cause,
and, for the purposes of clarifying our own minds, clear
away anything that is not essential from our dogma. We must
look at realities not phrases...We must learn anew what it is
that unites us in spite of our differences of temperament
and political sympathies. And having done that, we must use
our privilege as the older and stronger Party and say to the
new Party "Here is our aim, here is our policy. We have shorn
it of everything that concerns mere detail. By this we stand
or fall. We cannot depart from it. But we believe if you
examine it in the spirit in which it is prepared, you will
find it logical and reasonable, that it seeks to afford
Scotland power to set her own house in order, essentially
regeneration of our country".(157)
Such blatant overtures to the Scottish Party alarmed many in the NPS, who
were not necessarily associated with the Fundamentalists. MacCormick also
had a tendency to categorise too readily those who disagreed with him on
policy matters as being against him and his position in the Party.
Although he was convinced he could carry the majority of the rank and file
with him, many were undoubtedly uneasy about the political implications of
such moves towards the Scottish Party. There was criticism of
MacCormick's action and it was not all delivered from the Celtic
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Fundamentalists as he frequently asserted. For example, Arthur Donaldson
believed the Party faced two choices.
"Either the Party will come out definitely for Scottish
independence, adopt a definite political programme for
political, economic and social organisation of Scotland,
not omitting a definite cultural side, accepting the loss
of its "cannier" members to the Scottish Party; or it will
continue at present, becoming more and more emasculated and
see its most desirable and vigorous elements break away to
form a new and independent group carrying the standard which
the National Party will have let fall..."(158)
Donaldson tried to emphasize that the Party was facing a choice over its
future political direction and this was being denigrated in a competition
which had increasingly been about personalities and tirades of personal
abuse. In the April edition of the Freeman harsh things were said about
the National Council and MacCormick was branded as a careerist and a liar.
The London Fundamentalists abandoned political argument and used a host of
strong arm tactics to convince others about the merits of their case. One
potential ally who was largely sympathetic to much of their claims and who
received this treatment was Tom Gibson.
"For some time now I have been subjected to strong pressure
from Angus Clark and Iain Gillies to throw my lot in with
them, and been, by the pair of them, inundated with lies
and misrepresentations of what has been happening in Scotland.
At the same time, with their support and approval, I have
been subjected to a perfect stream of abuse from McColl
because I refused to believe these lies and did not approve
of either their tactics or policy".(159)
This policy failed to impress Gibson, who previously had expressed concern
at the activities of MacCormick's dealings with the Scottish Party.(160)
The strong arm tactics of the London Fundamentalists swayed away moderates
not so much in favour of a rapprochement with the Montrose Party, but
against the activities of the extremists. Gibson, who was very uneasy at
the drift to moderation, felt that it was the lesser of two evils and was
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resolved to back MacCormick's policy of expulsions.
"I do feel that it is essential that this crew should
be severely defeated at conference, as apart from
differences in policy, if people have to reinforce
their muddle headed thinking with lies and abuse
and misrepresentation, then sooner we get rid of
such people the better for the whole movement".(161)
The Fundamentalists' campaign failed in its objective, and merely drew
attention away from the activities of MacCormick, who was conducting
illicit negotiations with the Scottish Party. However, it is important to
emphasise that many in the National Party did not link the attack on the
Fundamentalists with overtures of moderation to other groups. For Gibson,
the defeat of this group was only the first part of a campaign against
fringe elements within the Nationalist movement and part of a long term
strategy to put the National Party in better shape to defeat the Scottish
Party as the champion of nationalist aspirations. It was not, he argued,
a way to secure greater cooperation with devolutionists.
The constant internal bickering within the ranks of the National Party led
many to believe that there was a crying need for a consensus on the
self-government issue. One example of this phenomemom was Neil Gunn, who,
although initially sympathetic to the Fundamentalist wing of the Party,
soon came to accept the efficacy of MacCormick's claims, especially when
the NPS became electorally bogged down. For Gunn, the fundamental issue
was the need for unity among nationalists from all persuasions and until
this had been achieved there would be no progress. He believed that
pragmatism would have to take precedence over ideological considerations
and this led him to conclude against the claims of the Fundamentalists.
"That extremism in general stands for purity and
courage and is a species of self deception practised
by the ego on itself all for its glory. Division has
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been Scotland's arch fiend and has always stood on
"doctrinal purity"... At any rate we should by this
time have learned from our history that if we are ever
going to achieve a national aim it can only be by a major
harmony that refuses to be wrecked by a minority discord.
Now I maintain that this major harmony can be achieved in
Scotland today, but it can be achieved only on a basis of
broad principle and will inevitably be wrecked by over
early definition of detailormachinery underlying the
principle... such a broad attitude has nothing to do with
compromise".(162)
Gunn argued that the Nationalist movement ought to go back to basics and
establish a solid foundation which was built from the minimum amount of
policies and objectives. This could then be used as the platform from
which a substantial political party could erect itself. Obviously such an
achievement would only be possible if members could subordinate personal
ideals and dogma to the longterm strategy and objective.
"First of all, then, establish points of contact.
And apart from that, work out to the solution of
disagreements...Presumably our prime concern in the
whole affair is to see Scotland get self-government.
Anything that stands in the way of that realisation,
whether doctrinal purity or canting heresy, must be
damned. If e.g. it could be proved that insistence
on such words as "republicanism" or "Sovereign independence"
would result in our never rousing the Scottish people to
take control of their own country, whereas some such
word as self-government would so result, then it strikes
me that our duty is plain".(163)
Gunn's pragmatic approach was indicative of a new mood of realism that was
beginning to ripple through the ranks of the National Party. Although
many of the problems were oversimplified, his analysis of the political
situation was commendable for its logic. The real problem, according to
Gunn, lay with the nationalists themselves and those who were dogmatic were
the real barriers to progress. Any member who was unable to face facts
and respond to new political realities was best left out of the Party.
"It is rather disheartening to think of our efforts
resulting than giving satisfaction to extremists a
century hence as they proceed, complete with sporran,
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to lay wreaths on Scotland's final Culloden. And in
saying so I am not considering England at all. England
has nothing to do with this affair. The idea of England
trying to prevent us realizing a united aim is merely
amusing".(164)
Gunn formulated a plan of strategy for the National movement as a whole,
which contained two fundamental aspects. The first was to 'give us
national status' and the second was to gain 'maximum appeal' to our people
'now'. Gunn rejected any idea of advocating a Scottish Republic and
believed that Scotland ought to remain part of the British Empire.
"I say straight away that Republicanism (or similar
separation) is antipathetic to the overwhelming
majority of the Scottish people and cannot today
be realised either by forceful or peaceful methods.
Whether Republicanism is good or bad I am not
discussing. I merely know that Scotland will not
have it now - and less and less as time goes on with
anglicising influences. (What she might ultimately
do as an individual member of the Empire is another
matter for then her national consciousness would have
been awakened and if she thought Republicanism good;
she'd simply adopt it)".(165)
Gunn believed that the Party would have to accept that the majority of
Scots wished to remain a part of the British Commonwealth and that
cooperation with moderates and devolutionists, no matter how unpalatable
that might seem, was a necessary fact of political life if the nationalist
cause was to make any progress.
The inevitable showdown came at the annual conference of May, 1933, which
was by all accounts a noisy and chaotic affair.(166) The Fundamentalists
had mustered all their supporters and engaged in a campaign of rowdyism and
heckling opposing speakers. Despite the disorganisation, the conference
approved the restatement of policy concerning remaining part of the British
Empire, however they narrowly threw out MacCormick's resolution calling for
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negotiations with the Scottish Party. This illustrates the fact that
although a majority of members disapproved of the Fundamentalist position,
they were not yet prepared to go the whole way with MacCormick, and still
remained suspicious of the Scottish Party. However, the scenes at the
conference gave the leadership an opportunity to begin a campaign of
expulsions against the Fundamentalists who were accused of organising
"obstructionist" policies within the Party. A special meeting was called
by the National Council to discuss the question of Party discipline.
MacCormick read a letter from a "prominent official", who wanted the
expulsion of the South East Area chairman and secretary for obstructionist
behaviour and Angus Clark and W.M.McColl from the London branch for letters
and articles containing personal abuse of office bearers of the Party.
The meeting approved of such action because "There could be no progress
while Clark and McColl were at liberty to call the Hon. Secretary a liar
and a careerist"(167) The council authorised immediate action to be taken
against these people and any others deemed to be obstructionist. Neil
Gurm was also of the same opinion.
"The Freeman has just ccmie in with Clark and McColl's
attack on MacCormick and the Executive. This is really
damned bad. If the Party has any guts at all surely it
will hit out at this sort of thing. If we cannot support
our men - while admitting their weakness and errors in
judgement and anything you like - from this sort of
slander, then the game is pretty miserable".(168)
Muirhead and the National Executive were convinced that the disruptive
scenes were a premeditated attempt to prevent the passing of the resolution
on the restatement of policy: "By organised obstructionism and rowdyism,
the proceedings degenerated into a fiasco, and many delegates became so
disgusted that they left the meeting long before its close".(169) The
subjection of members to abuse and insults would not be tolerated.
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"Such behaviour, on the part of a minority, unless
effectively challenged will, if it has not already
done so, be bound to have a serious effect on the
standing of the Party, and do untold damage to the
general cause of Scottish nationalism. In addition,
an impossible strain will be put on the loyalty of
members and on intolerable burden placed upon
the shoulders of officials, Council members,
Propagandists and other workers in the Party".(170)
Muirhead then asked members to support the expulsion of "undesirable
elements", who were in the process of being thrown out of the Party. The
mechanism for this was a special conference which was to be held on the 1st
of July to sanction the procedures taken by the leadership. MacCormick
and J.M. McNicol wrote to all the members urging them to support the
disciplinary action which, they claimed, was not the result of a personal
vendetta, but in the interests of the Party. The problem arose, they
stated, because certain elements:
"have shown that they are not prepared to accept
or respect the elected officials of the Party
as their leaders. They appear to both despise
and distrust us and to view with the utmost suspicion
any proposal emanating from official quarters in the
Party. That being so, it is perfectly obvious that we
should find it impossible to carry on with any useful
work in the Party so long as they are able to stir all
kinds of suspicions against us...What you are to choose
between on the 1st of July is not whether you are going
to expel certain members or allow them to remain in the
Party. Rather you are to choose which set of members
you intend to expel, for our position is such that if
you decide to retain the members impeached by the National
Council, by that very act you expel us, together with
nearly all the officials and active propagandists of the
Party. We have irrevocably, though regretfully determined
to resign from office and membership of the Party unless
once and for all freed from the constant unjust criticism
and suspicion which the gentlemen named have engaged".(171)
This was a masterpiece of political manouevring by MacCormick, who
channelled attention away from the political content of the dispute and
turned the issue of expulsions into one of Party discipline, against which
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the Fundamentalists had no defence. Also by threatening resignation, the
whole question was given a gravity that it might not have otherwise
merited.
Against these charges there was little defence. Iain Gillies, with a
considerable degree of truth, claimed that the only offence McColl and
Clark had committed was "to maintain the original aim and policy of the
Party against attacks by a section of the National Council. We consider
the article written by these two men (Freeman 1.4.33.) is a fair and just
criticism of those members of Council who have sought to emasculate the
Party's policy and effect a compromise with the devolutionist groups".(172)
Embarrassingly for the leadership, Gillies blew the whistle on the fact
that Tom Gibson, one of the signatories to the demand for expulsions, had
informed them of the unauthorised discussions between certain members of
the council and the Scottish Party. However, it was not enough to prevent
McColl and Clark from being thrown out of the National Party. With this
thorn removed from his side, MacCormick was able to make more strident
overtures to the Scottish Party while, at the same time, other
"obstructionists" were systematically purged from the Party's membership.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Formation of the SNP 1933 - 1934
The removal of the Fundamentalist wing from the National Party was a great
personal victory for MacCormick. In many ways, it vindicated the
direction in which he had been moving the organisation and it can also be
seen as a vote of confidence in his own abilities by the Party members.
However, as was explained in the previous chapter, the rank and file did
not necessarily regard the impetus for the expulsions as being a method for
obtaining a rapprochement with the Scottish Party which, in time, would
lead to the creation of a new united nationalist movement. Rather, it was
seen as an unfortunate, but necessary, method of improving Party discipline
and removing a rather unsavoury bunch of undesirables. Evidence that
there was an ambivalence over the connection of the two issues is to be
found at the May conference of 1933, where the Party voted for a resolution
in favour of a restatement of policy, which went against the claims of the
Fundamentalist position, but narrowly rejected a proposal for greater
co-operation with the Scottish Party.(1) A special disciplinary
conference was held the following month, which was carefully loaded against
the Fundamentalists and was the mechanism by which the expulsions were to
be secured. MacCormick effectively tied the two issues together by
obtaining the passage of his resolution which called for all nationalist
bodies to increasingly combine their efforts.
The first action taken by the disciplinary conference was to dismiss
prominent Fundamentalists such as William Gillies and his son, Iain, Hugh
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Paterson and Angus Clark for "obstructionist" behaviour.(2) Many of their
supporters resigned from the Party in protest at the leadership's
activities before the disciplinary axe had a chance to fall. Although no
precise records exist to the exact number of people who were expelled, the
effect was considerable enough to close down the London Branch, which was,
ironically, one of the largest, and also to suspend the activities of the
South East Area organisation. The latter incident was particularly bitter
with recriminations abounding over financial misdemeanours.(3) The powers
granted to the special disciplinary committee, which was set up after the
conference in June, were considerable and they did not hesitate to use
them, as Miss C.B. Cameron, Secretary of the Wallace Day Commemoration
Committee, was to find out:
"...in view of the nature of her letter and the open
antagonism of Miss Cameron to the elected representatives
of the Party for some time past, it was decided to suspend
Miss C.B. Cameron from membership of the Party."(4)
The process of expelling "obstructionists" was an ongoing one and it
produced a series of resignations from many members, not all of whom could
be described as Fundamentalists.(5) The purges were condemned as
anti-democratic and were certainly not conducive to open debate with regard
to the future development of the Party's political strategy. Most of the
resignations were a result of people believing that the National Party had
departed from its original objectives and principles.(6) However, perhaps
the greatest effect of the intrigues was to demoralise many of the most
ardent and gifted members of the NPS.
With the removal of the Fundamentalists and, more importantly, the
authority from the Party to step up negotiations with the Scottish Party,
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MacCormick now believed the way was open for a unification between the two
organisations. However, although many were unhappy about the activities
of the Fundamentalists, they were likewise concerned about the leadership's
uncritical flirtation with the Home Rule establishment. Even before May,
1933, Tom Gibson was pointing out the anxieties that were now abounding in
a Party which was both demoralised and divided.
"I note that the Executive have been aware of
disturbing rumours circulating throughout the Party.
I should state that I have been aware for sometime of
such rumours not only within the Party, but also outside
the Party. It appears that many are aware of conversations
between some members of our Executive and one or other of the
so called Scottish Party leaders or officials, and whether
such conversations are official or unofficial, is not taken
into account by the rank and file of the Party and the
general public, all that matters to them is that conversations
are carried out. A rumour had reached me that members of
the Executive have been heard to say that an amalgamation
with the Scottish Party was now inevitable...I had,
however, a conversation with a member of the Council who
indicated to me that feelers had been put out to the
Scottish Party and that indeed, one member of the National
Executive had actually written in suggesting that such
conversations with the Scottish Party had been
discussed by the National Council, although it was not
definitely stated that such conversations had actually
taken place in an official meeting of the Council."(7)
Gibson's fear that the National Party might be sold out to moderate Home
Rule interests intensified after the expulsions, although the leadership
dismissed such concerns as the result of Fundamentalist scare-mongering.
He was convinced that it was of utmost importance that the purges should
not be interpreted as a sop to Scottish Party opinion and it was precisely
for this reason that he opposed MacCormick's resolution in favour of
greater co-operation with other nationalist groups.
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"I am not at all keen to push the resolution through
and I think that it could quite well be dropped...to
press it would give that crowd (the Scottish Party)
more importance than they would perhaps have. If
the Party and the Council discipline themselves as
proposed by us, from the tactical point of
view it would be desirable...Our opponents
will seize on this resolution, incorrectly state,
as Dott stated, that we are going to give up a
lot, and probably get support they otherwise would
not get."(8)
Gibson argued that having removed their extremist wing, those in the
Scottish Party who had feared the Fundamentalists could now safely join the
National Party. Those who would not, he believed, were not worth
bothering about and the NPS should not make any concessions in order to
attract them.
However, what Gibson did not know was that MacCormick, Neil Gunn and D.H.
MacNeil had since February, 1933, well before the expulsions, been engaging
in establishing points of contact with members of the Scottish Party.
They had given assurances to Gibb that they were prepared to modify the
National Party's policy and expel the Fundamentalists in order to attract
defections from the Scottish Party. From the outset, MacCormick had
regarded the removal of the Fundamentalist wing as part and parcel of a
package designed to create a more moderate nationalist movement which was
attractive to the establishment. In March, 1933, Gunn was engaged in a
dialogue concerning these issues with Gibb.
"...let me confidently give you an idea of the position.
You may see the statement is a statement of general
principles (the proposed restatement of policy)
that only once mentions, but does not qualify, the
word machinery. One qualifying phrase, explaining
or limiting, can damn the whole effort. That is the
position of anyone anxious for union. That is what I
argued. The whole cause will be lost if we cannot
surmount the Scottish failing for discussions in
detail...and of course there will be heavy weather with
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the extremists at either end. I make no doubt. But
surely there is a sufficiently strong body of realists
capable of realising the situation in all its aspects
...Remember a short statement on policy giving general
principles I showed you. If we carried out these,
then it would be up to you to work for agreement on
your side."(9)
Gunn believed in establishing a minimalist framework around which
nationalists of all shades of opinion would agree to work together in order
to achieve a basic set of political objectives. In order to make this
possible, he argued that it was necessary to remove all areas of potential
dispute and, in the case of the NPS, this meant the removal of the
Fundamentalist wing and the tapering of policy in order to narrow the
differences between the National and Scottish parties. Gunn had a
pragmatic approach to politics and believed that moderates such as Sir
Alexander MacEwen and Andrew Dewar Gibb would attract more support to the
nationalist cause than the "republicans" in his own party. From his, and
a covert group within the NPS, point of view, the restatement of policy and
the expulsion of the Fundamentalists were an attempt to secure the approval
of the Scottish Party, which had the ultimate aim of establishing a
political unification. However, the success of such manoeuvres were very
much dependent on Gibb's ability to secure a similar compromise within the
Scottish Party.
The initial reluctance of members of the right wing nationalist camp to
support the NPS was a result of their concern at the separatist and
anti-British Empire tendencies expressed by the Fundamentalist wing of the
National Party. However, such a loose sense of identity of interests
meant that the Scottish Party displayed a whole series of ambivalent
attitudes when it came to offering themselves as the alternative, moderate
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nationalist party. Indeed, most of their political ideas were delivered
purely as an expression of individual opinion and most of what was stated
was usually a negative critique of the National Party.(10) Alexander
MacEwan saw little value in what was on offer from the NPS and highlighted
the fact that the Fundamentalists and C.M. Grieve were, more often than
not, seen as representing the real character of the National Party. The
Scottish Party reinforced their criticisms by giving the Fundamentalists
more prominence than was really the case. This included ignoring the fact
that C.M. Grieve had been expelled from the Party for sometime prior to the
main purges in June, 1933. MacEwen tried to emphasise the confusion that
emanated from the National Party in the public's mind and pin it on a
supposed lack of direction.
"It is a little difficult to ascertain the real aim of
the National Party and their literary wing. When one
seizes on some passage in the writings of an author,
avowedly nationalist, and proceeds to discuss it, one
gets the disconcerting reply that either the author is
not a member of the Party or that he represents no
one but himself...I can only plead that I have made every
possible endeavour to ascertain the official programme of
the Party. But I am yet without the inner light."(11)
Moderates largely ignored official National Party policy and instead,
turned the spotlight on maverick elements, which made intelligent dialogue
between the two camps impossible. MacEwen initially wanted to ignore the
NPS's social and economic policies and did not consider the respective
strengths and weaknesses of their electoral strategy which were both key
areas of political life in which the Scottish Party had little to offer.
The fact that the Scottish Party was primarily a loose collection of
individuals, whose only cohesive raison d'etre was the vague idea of some
form of Home Rule which would not impair the unity of the British Empire,
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meant that, in many ways, they were a hopelessly inconsistent group.
Indeed, at the outset of the Scottish Party's history, there were at least
three key versions of what was meant by moderate Home Rule, and they were
by no means all totally compatible with each other.(12) On the one hand,
Andrew Dewar Gibb and George Malcolm Thomson advocated a strident, racially
oriented nationalism which was politically to the far right and had
quasi-fascist tendencies.(13) This contrasted heavily with the pre-war
Liberal Home Rule ideas held by both MacEwen and the Duke of Montrose, who
were both very enthusiastic about the Gaelic contribution towards the
Scottish identity and were more to the centre of mainstream political
ideology. However, both of these men differed in their ideas of how far
Home Rule should be taken.(14) Yet, this was an area that the shell-
shocked National Party failed to exploit, principally because, as the
Scottish Party was propelled more by personalities than policies, few in
the NPS sought to challenge their intellectual validity. One of the main
component parts of the Scottish Party was the frustration that neither the
Liberal not the Tory party was giving sufficient attention to the
devolutionist argument. Although the National Party believed them to have
a significant political pedigree, most members of the Scottish Party were
on the periphery of Scottish politics and it may be the case that Home Rule
was seen by some ambitious men as the ticket which would catapault them
into political prominence. Andrew Dewar Gibb had been for some time fed up
with contesting seats for the Tory Party in which he had little chance of
winning and was only driven on in the hope that one day he would receive a
safe seat for loyal service.(15) However, an apparent lack of progress
in that direction and the fact that the nationalists had been doing well in
the Glasgow University Rectorial elections may well have prompted him to
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believe that his combination of nationalism and Toryism would stand him in
better stead in contesting a seat of his own choosing for the nationalists,
rather than representing the Conservative cause in Red Clydeside.(16)
Alexander MacEwen belonged to the paternalistic, socially aware wing of the
Liberal Party and was, in many ways, the living embodiment of the pre-war
"new Liberalism".(17) His ideas on public service and co-operative
democracy tied in with his belief that the issue of Home Rule was a strong
enough cohesive element, which would unite all like-minded politicians and
public figures in pursuit of the self-government goal. However, MacEwen
was a notary and a committee man rather than a high ranking political
figure who could command the respect of the establishment. His role in
the Scottish Party, should Home Rule crystalise into the fundamental
political issue in Scotland, would give him a prominence that he was unable
to attain in the Liberal Party. The Duke of Montrose was likewise an
unimportant figure who, although holding the Tory whip in the House of
Lords, played no active role in political life. If the self-government
cause took off, his stature would be enhanced, in spite of the fact that
according to George Malcolm Thomson "his name is of greater importance to
the cause than his abilities."(18)
The Scottish Party offered little in the way of a clearly defined set of
objectives and no effort was made to differentiate the Home Rule ideas in
circulation from devolution. Indeed, there was an apparent consensus that
devolution was a necessary first step for the subsequent achievement of
Home Rule. Unlike the National Party, the issue was not considered to be
important, with principle, rather than method, being what counted the most.
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According to Gibb:
"I believe in our camp, as in yours (the NPS) there
are different shades of opinion as to what we primarily
want for Scotland. In our lot there is a group who, as
it were, are devolutionist by nature - but there are others
...I don't care how it comes: whether in a leap or in a
series of steps. They are at least all in the same
direction."(19)
MacEwen believed that a "stepping stone" policy was essential to secure the
necessary stability and ensure a peaceful transformation to Home Rule.(20)
Both he and Gibb believed that a "Scottish Parliament" should not
interfere with the existing British procedures for foreign policy and
Imperial and defence matters.
"As regards Foreign Policy, Defence, etc., it was proposed
that these should be reserved matters to be dealt with by
the present Parliament until such time as a United Kingdom
or Empire Council was created...The Nationalist view is,
or was, that first of all Scotland must be given her full
independent status, and then negotiate a treaty with England
for the regulation of these things."(21)
However, they disagreed with Montrose in arguing that the Scottish
Parliament ought to have final sovereignty over all issues. As far as the
Duke was concerned, this smacked too much of separatism and in any case, it
was not necessary as the Scottish Government could exercise control in
those areas by virtue of their command of Scottish finances, although he
gave no indication as to how potential disputes could be resolved.
Montrose was especially sensitive on the issue of separation from England
and was distrustful of the National Party, which he regarded as extremist.
His description of the NPS was hardly flattering.
"It happened that about four years ago a small body of
enthusiasts decided to form a new party - or rather, an
amalgamation of small existing groups - into the Scottish
National Party (sic). In their early days, the Nationalists
were largely swayed by idealism. Novelists, essayists and
poets, rather than businessmen, were found in their ranks.
Hence the insistence on such terms as "sovereign
power and independence", without much consideration as to
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what these ideals meant or how they were to be attained.
Other extravagances, such as "separation from England",
"kilted sailors in Scottish ships", and "Gaelic speaking
ambassadors", got mixed up with their Utopian ideals, and
certainly put off much support which the Party's energy and
enterprise would have otherwise obtained. Today the
national spirit is sponsored by another "Scottish Party",
based on principles moderate, reasonable and free from
all hatred of England."(22)
The Scottish Party, in the final analysis, was united more by what it did
not want pertaining to Scottish nationalism, rather than existing as an
organisation propounding concrete proposals. They flatly rejected
diplomatic separation, although MacEwen argued that Scottish commercial
attaches in British Embassies would be a way of bolstering economic
interests.(23) In this respect, they were at complete odds with the NPS,
which advocated a diplomatic status similar to the Commonwealth nations.
The Scottish Party rejected this idea on the grounds that as Scotland was a
mother nation of the Empire, they would not be downgraded to a "colonial
state". They argued that as Scotland had played such an important role in
the creation of the Empire they would have to accept joint responsibility
with England for its administration. Indeed, members of the Scottish
Party were fervent admirers and supporters of the British Empire ideal.
Montrose believed that self-government would help maintain the Scottish
contribution to imperial affairs.
"If Scotland obtains self-government, and has the three
estates of the realm set up once again within her borders,
then for the first time in modern history she would be able
to play her part with pride as an Empire builder enveloped
in the robe of nationality. The step would not be retrograde:
it will be an advance. As self-government would apply purely
to domestic affairs, it would not weaken the United Kingdom.
It would strengthen it. Out of plurality will come a greater
unity than ever before, and the freedom given for self-
expression will be in keeping with the spirit which has
proved so successful and binding throughout the whole
British Bnpire."(24)
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This quote illustrates how clearly their Scottish nationalism was a sub -
section of a wider, and more dominating, British nationalism. Gibb saw
the link in racial terms, believing that the Scots, as a race, complemented
the English in the task of "Empire building".(25) He also argued that
imperial connections would have to be maintained for practical purposes.
"Scotsmen today are occupying positions both eminent
and humble throughout that Empire, and Scottish interests
are bound up with every colony in it. It is necessary
that Scotland should continue to assert her unique status,
side by side with England. That unique position cannot
be maintained by her assumption of what is called Dominion
Status: an unthinkable decline."(26)
The predominant ethos behind much of their Home Rule demands was the desire
to strengthen the British Empire by highlighting the Scottish contribution
to its creation and administration.
However, MacCormick was not so much interested in the policies of the
Scottish Party, but rather, its personalities and was quite often willing
to turn a blind eye to the political differences between the two
organisations. He was convinced that his nationalist opponents were after
the same goals as himself.
"The confusion of issues which has lately hampered us in
our progress will disappear when the National Party becomes
sufficiently conscious of its own strengths to hold out a
welcome hand to all others who are groping their way towards
the same goal as ourselves."(27)
MacCormick's conciliatory approach to the Scottish Party failed to
appreciate the significant political differences that existed and even
while writing in the 1950s, he seemed to show little understanding of the
nature of the debate. In a significant passage from the partially
auto-biographical Flag in the Wind, he attached more importance to
psychological factors, rather than identifying the nature of the political
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divide that existed between moderate Home Rulers and full blown
nationalists.
"There was, in fact, a subtle and scarcely definable
dividing line which separated one section of the nationalists
from another...it had little to do with moderatism or extremism
or with statements of policy. It was rather a difference in
mental approach which made itself felt in discussion of any
kind. On the one hand, there was what I call a kind
of cantankerousness, as though those who displayed it felt
themselves, however unconsciously, to belong to a defeated
and conquered nation and must therefore always stand on their
dignity and look for every slight. They seemed to me to look
at Scotland through green spectacles and despite complete lack
of historical parallel, to identify the Irish struggle with
their own. On the other hand, there were those whose
nationalism was a perfectly healthy and normal desire for a
better form of Union with England than that which had been
freely negotiated in 1707, and who never, either consciously
or unconsciously, thought of Scotland as having anything other
than equal status with England, however unfortunate the
incorporating Union of Parliaments might reflect itself in
modern Scottish life."(28)
Although MacCormick was writing at a stage in his political career which
placed him poles apart from his previous position in the National Party, a
number of interesting consistencies remained. He was always most
comfortable with, and most impressed by, sympathetic elements in the
Scottish establishment and, as his subsequent career was to show, the
thought of being a member of a rogue political party was not one that he
would have found appealing. Indeed, when it became apparent that the SNP
could not be tamed into holding the establishment values forced upon it by
MacCormick, he left, believing that his position was untenable.(29) The
passage is also interesting in the way it highlights MacCormick's
reluctance to accept that within the nationalist movement there were
legitimate arguments about strategy and policy. It was a trait of his to
simplify disputes into ones revolving around personalities rather than
politics. MacCormick was only too ready to castigate those who disagreed
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with his version of events as belonging to "the defeated and conquered
nation".
He ignored the protestations of members of his own Party and left a rather
confused and confidence-shaken R.E. Muirhead to defend the recent events to
Arthur Donaldson, who had resigned in protest at the expulsions.
"You (Donaldson) say the Party has gone back to the
exploded Home Rule programme. If that means it has
departed from the claim for independent national status:
it is not true. The new policy does not commit us to, as
the Union now does, the sacrifice of freedom of action on
the most important aspects of national sovereignty. There
is no reason why modification or revision which Scotland
might insist upon the Act of Union, though superficially
more drastic, is not essential, as there is no limit on
the amount of revision that might be insisted upon... The
statement that tariff barriers are undesirable and that
Foreign policy etc., should remain matters of joint concern
between England and Scotland is certainly new but it does
not commit us to anything definite and was adopted merely to
satisfy the Scottish Party leaders that antagonism to England,
and refusal to recognise the desire for co-operation with
England in matters of joint concern are not objects of the
National Party of Scotland. It does not mean that Scotland
is not to be independent,"(30)
Muirhead could not disguise the fact that the expulsions and changes in
policy over the last few months, whether he realised this at the time or
not is another matter, were part and parcel of a policy of appeasement
towards the Scottish Party. What were once tenets of the National Party's
faith were now only matters of interpretation and wishful conjecture.
However, the most significant feature about these political manoeuvres was
the fact that the NPS sacrificed a lot in terms of policy and internal
harmony without achieving any guarantees that it would produce a positive
response from the Scottish Party. Indeed, the leadership displayed a
culpable weakness in bending to pressure from a group which had, if any,
even less influence in Scottish politics than the NPS.
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MacCormick was the weak link in the chain and the Scottish Party targeted
him from an early date as the most suitable candidate to steer the NPS in
the direction which best served their ends. A.D. Gibb felt that the more
pressure they were able to put on the National Party, the more pliable they
would be to the Scottish Party demands. It was for this reason that they
pursued a wrecking policy in the East Fife by-election against the National
Party and Gibb and Thomson were not slow in realising the opportunities
that were afforded to the Scottish Party should the NPS run into
difficulties.(31)
"I think we must get MacCormick into our ambit. Can you
do anything to get in touch with him. He is under Gunn's
influence now. But he is susceptible to the ideas of others
...The NPS have run into heavy weather in East Fife. They
will be ridiculed and maybe open to more reason."(32)
The poor showing of the National Party in the East Fife by-election meant
that they would have to use the first opportunity to redeem their electoral
standing. It was hoped that their blatant, moderate image would pay off
dividends and, in any case, this would be essential in order to justify the
recent traumas and raise morale in an organisation which had just completed
a punishing course of self-inflicted wounds. Such an opportunity presented
itself with the announcement of a by-election in Kilmarnock in the Autumn
of 1933. However, the National Party's chances of political redemption
were wrecked by the appearance of a Scottish Party challenge in the shape
of their intended candidate Andrew Dewar Gibb. Such a clash of rival
nationalist bodies would, in all probability, cancel out any improvement in
the National Party's share of the vote that might have been won as a result
of their recent modifications. However, because they were operating
against a party which was starting from a base line of zero and,
consequently, had little to lose, the NPS could have found their share of
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the vote reduced significantly by the split in the self-government support.
Also, the resulting confusion that would have ensued from the fact that
there were two candidates representing the Home Rule cause was more than
likely to have an adverse effect on the nationalist movement as a whole.
Although there was now the possibility of an outright electoral
confrontation with their principal nationalist opponent, which could have
given the NPS an opportunity to inflict a heavy defeat on the Scottish
Party and establish themselves as the main bearers of the Home Rule
standard, few had any stomach for a fight which, it was believed, would
only lead to further disunity in the self-government cause. The Scottish
Party had chosen its moment well and was acutely aware of the fact that the
NPS was at the weakest point in its short history. The application of
such pressure at this critical juncture meant that the National Party was
even more desperate to reach an accommodation with their rivals. In
short, the "appeasers" had been well and truly outmanoeuvred.
Neil Gunn, who had acted as the principal go-between, could not contain his
dismay when he heard about the Scottish Party decision to contest the
Kilmarnock election, especially as Gibb had been his closest confidant.
He wrote to him pointing out what a fragile position he and his fellow
moderates must now occupy within the NPS.
"I hope to lay certain matters before you in their final
aspect, when the (Daily) Record came in with the announcement
of you as a Scottish Party candidate for Kilmarnock. This
is certainly a severe shock The National Party decision to
fight Kilmarnock is months old and weeks ago schemes were
drawn up. In view of recent troubles, never has it been so
essential for the NPS to fight an election, and not for any
tactical good in itself but for the advancement of the cause
for which it has so strenuously fought. The NPS has been
accused by many of its followers in recent days of watering
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down its policy, of making overtures to the SP, in short
of stultifying its essential being in order to achieve
harmony in the fight for self-government. If it has done
so then manifestly it has not been very successful and
those concerned must feel rather foolish."(32)
For those in the NPS who advocated a policy of moderation and accommodation
with the Scottish Party, their humiliation must have been quite
considerable. However, the principal question which must be raised
concerning this sorry episode is not about the strategy MacCormick and
others pursued, but rather its execution and the implementation of the
"grand plan". They had totally underestimated what would be necessary to
bring the Scottish Party into a united movement, while at the same time,
they committed themselves to a policy of unilateral appeasement without
firstly establishing safeguards to protect their own political interests.
The net result of this process, which it has to be remembered was largely
established without the knowledge of the membership of the NPS, was that
they were left hopelessly exposed and had to face the option of further
sell-outs to achieve the unity they originally had envisaged or back-pedal
and lose credibility with their own Party. In either case their position
was a weak one.
The NPS announced that they would fight the election and in contrast to
Gunn's disillusionment, MacCormick was strangely optimistic about the whole
affair, which smacked of a total lack of realism.
"I rather think the outcome will be that the Scottish
Party will now approach us in order to make a bargain
but I think their action has put us in a position of
good advantage if they want us to do a bargain. One
thing I am determined about is that we must not waver
or show any unwillingness to withdraw McNicol's candidature.
The only bargain we can make is for them to withdraw
their candidate."(33)
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As always MacCormick was the eternal optimist and looked forward to the
event as a means for securing the unification of the two parties.
However, he was oblivious to the political realities of the situation and
showed no evidence that he was aware of the tight rope he and his Party
were walking. MacCormick believed that if the NPS stuck to its guns they
would be able to force the Scottish Party to withdraw for fear of the
intensive campaign that would be waged against them. His assessment of
the situation was hopelessly out of focus because he believed that the
Scottish Party would consent to stand down, not because they lacked the
organisation necessary to fight an election, but rather, as they were
gentlemen and the National Party had made all the concessions to date, they
would be under a moral obligation to make the next move.(34) The naive
belief that a party of "gentlemen" would act in the correct manner, coupled
with their refusal to come to terms with the complex political problems and
differences which existed between both organisations, reveals exactly how
inexperienced the NPS leadership was in the world of realpolitik.
It was a gap in MacCormick's planning which gave the Scottish Party a
legitimate opportunity to field a candidate in Kilmarnock as he had failed
to notify them of the National Party's intentions.(35) He, along with the
rest of the leadership, had underestimated the Scottish Party, believing
them to be a pressure group which would not contest elections. After all,
the SP did not prevent its members from belonging to another party and in
their literature and political programme they gave no indication that they
would enter the electoral fray.
"One other point of difference between the Nationalist
and Scottish Parties requires to be mentioned. The
National Party claims that it is "entirely independent of
the London controlled parties". The Scottish Party
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are (sic) willing to co-operate with members of any other
Party who are prepared to accept their policy. This is
not a matter of principle but of election policy."(36)
Whereas MacCormick and others believed the Scottish Party was composed of
nationalist bedfellows, Alexander MacEwen argued that there were enough
significant differences between the two organisations to justify putting up
their own candidate. In many ways, he was the principal architect behind
the decision to contest Kilmarnock. His objectives were to strengthen his
hand in any negotiations with the National Party and also to render
ineffective what he saw as the more dangerous aspects of the NPS's advocacy
of Scottish nationalism. At this point in time MacEwen was not yet
convinced that a fusion of the two parties was inevitable and the election
in Kilmarnock was for him as much about establishing the Scottish Party as
a credible political force as it was about pressurising the National Party.
"They cannot have it all their own way and must not
be allowed to think that we can stand aside whenever
we had decided to fight this election."(37)
Unlike Gibb, who was working with Gunn to establish a nationalist consensus
around which unity could be forged, MacEwen wanted to keep the Scottish
Party as a right wing counter-part to the NPS. Initially his objective was
to secure an electoral pact with the National Party which would prevent
Scottish nationalist claims from being represented solely by the left of
centre. Indeed, MacEwen had toyed with the idea of undertaking similar
consultations with the Liberal Party. G.M. Thomson was in no doubt about
the forceful role MacEwen played in the organisation.
"I am certain that he is an ambitious man who is determined
that the Scottish Party shall be his Party and nobody else's."(38)
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Gibb and Thomson blamed MacEwen from keeping the Scottish Party from moving
over to a full-blooded nationalist programme and consequently, of holding
back a union with the National Party.(39)
However, MacEwen was not prepared to fuse with a party of which he was
still suspicious. Although he took comfort from the fact that the
Fundamentalists had been expelled, he was not yet convinced at the
sincerity of the National Party's new found moderation and he still
harboured fears that a unification would simply be a way of smothering the
Scottish Party's "saner" nationalist aspirations. He was not impressed by
the way in which Tom Gibson had secured a boycott on assisting Scottish
Party activities, especially their projected Summer school.
"Some months ago MacCormick, Neil Gunn and MacNeil
came to lunch here. We had a friendly talk and they
were all for co-operation. They were anxious to help
in the Summer school. Since their last conference their
attitude has changed and hardened. Nearly all of
them cold shouldered the Summer school and showed no
desire for future co-operation."(40)
MacEwen was aware of the latent hostility towards the Scottish Party among
sections of the NPS and he was determined that his organisation would
command some respect. He had little time for Gunn's argument that the
National Party leadership had to ensure some distance from the Scottish
Party in order to calm fears about a sell-out of principles. As far as
MacEwen was concerned, the NPS no longer had a monopoly of nationalist
aspirations. He was out to secure the best deal for his type of
nationalist philosophy and was aided by the fact that his son, Robin, was a
member of MacCormick's inner circle and was able to supply him with the
relevant information necessary to keep his finger on the pulse of both
parties. He knew the National Party was in a difficult situation and he
176
kept the pressure on.
"I agree with you that it would be unfortunate if we
were to end up fighting each other. I have inferred
to Gunn, through my son, that we will only withdraw from
Kilmarnock on condition that this is part of a general
agreement as to future association of constituencies
to be contested."(41)
It is difficult to ascertain MacEwen's intentions as to the prospect of a
union of the two parties and how genuine his threats really were.
However, he was prepared to give the National Party a run for its money so
long as it suited his own political ends. It is also clear that he was
playing with the idea of leading a new nationalist party which might emerge
from the ashes of the Kilmarnock "Gotterdammerung".
"While I have been working all along for ultimate fusion,
I am not sure that a straight fight might not clear the air.
It would make extremists on both sides see how futile it was.
If we made a good show our Nationalist friends would treat us
with more respect and would not expect us to follow their
trail on all occasions."(42)
However, as the difficulties of contesting an election with limited
resources and a mockery of an organisation became more apparent, MacEwen
was forced to preserve the National Party in order to achieve his own
political ambitions.(43)
This process became more pronounced when it started to appear as if the
National Party was willing to accommodate MacEwen's concerns. Space was
made available for him to air his views in the Scots Independent while, at
the same time, George Malcolm Thomson wrote a series of articles which
claimed that the differences between the two parties were more cosmetic
than real.(44) Although the NPS was on a sticky wicket, MacCormick was
unrepentant about the situation and became more and more convinced that
their actions were justified. The main theme of his argument was that had
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the National Party followed his advice earlier then the moderates would not
have felt the need to form their own Party.
"A lot of trouble appears to have been caused by the
Scottish Party. Well I have never disguised my attitude
towards it. In the first place I did my best to prevent
its formation at all, if it had not been for R.D. Anderson
I would have succeeded. Knowing that I had failed in that,
I did my best to secure that their statements on policy would
be as advanced as possible at the time, and I had
considerable success in that I have kept as friendly as
possible with several of its members as I know, with the
result that I generally know what they are going to do before
they do it...to my mind our policy must be to do our utmost to
bring the Scottish Party along with us, consistent with
maintaining the realities of our own policy.(45)
MacCormick, who was never one for pedantry, believed that there was a
parallel with the situation which led to the creation of the NPS in 1928.
He believed that dogmatism had been the principal barrier to the formation
of an independent nationalist party and that important figures like R.E.
Mnirhead were brought along more by gentle persuasion rather than naked
aggression. He argued, consequently, that the National Party would have
to operate the same "give and take" policy with the Scottish Party.
If during this year we can get the Scottish Party to
dissolve and its leading members to join with us, without
cutting away from our fundamentals, we shall have brought
self-government visibly nearer."(46)
However, the problem facing MacCormick was that in order to recruit members
of the Scottish Party to his movement he would have to depart from some of
the National Party's "fundamentals". Enough of the SP luminaries had made
this plain from the start. Also, he grossly over-estimated the value of
his cordial relations with the moderate opposition. As the Kilmarnock
by-election clearly illustrated, the Scottish Party only told him what they
wanted him to know, which, more often than not, left him at a distinct
disadvantage.
178
The ambitions of Alexander MacEwen were much aided and abetted by the fact
that he was greatly admired by many in the National Party, who did not
realise the pivotal role he played in the running of the Scottish Party.
Tom Gibson, who was one of the stalwart opponents of any form of
accommodation, was especially impressed by his qualities.
"Sir Alexander MacEwen would be a most valuable asset to
the National Party. Indeed, I would not offer any objection
if, after joining, he was to become Chairman."(47)
It was MacEwen1s reasonableness which tended to single him out from others
in the Scottish Party and this was an advantage of considerable importance
because MacCormick had to work in a climate in which many members of his
own party could not stomach any relationships with the opposition. In
spite of this admiration for MacEwen, Tan Gibson was vehemently against his
Party. As far as he was concerned, there could be no unity or compromises
with the Scottish Party, only a long drawn out campaign of attrition which
would force those worthy elements to join the NPS.
"There was no need for the Scottish Party. It created
disunity and pursued a wrecking policy preventing people
from joining the National movement."(48)
So long as people such as Gibson accepted that there were capable members
within the ranks of the Scottish Party, MacCormick was free to follow his
plans under the guise of attempting to recruit them for the NPS. However,
the real barrier to unity was that there were many in the National Party,
like Gibson, who recognised the fundamental political differences between
the two organisations. The principal problem with the Scottish Party,
they argued, was that it was not completely independent from other
political groups in the same way as the NPS was. Also, it was pointed out
that the SP had yet to give a united statement as to the status a future
Scottish Parliament would have in relation to Westminster and Gibson was
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suspicious that it would not have the same powers as the one advocated by
the National Party. While most critics could agree with MacCormick on the
need for unity, it was believed by many that if they joined with the
Scottish Party, they would simply take on board another extremist wing
which would replace the Fundamentalists as the political thorn in their
side. According to Gibson:
"Their tactics were as bad as the tactics of the
self-styled extremists in our own mob. When the opposing
factions, as I sincerely hope they will do, decide to unite
(and I am not only referring to the Scottish Party) let us
hope that it will be real unity. I do not think that the
Scottish Party realise that we took a big risk in endeavouring
to make our position more clear, and there has been no
appreciation of our work...after all, if they ask us, as they
do to restrain our extremists, then we have a perfect right
to ask them, in return, to restrain the muddleheadedness of
such as Kevin McDowall...I am fighting for unity - but to
attain this I am hoping for real co-operation from the
reasonable faction in the Scottish Party. There has been,
as I think you will admit, no sign that this co-operation
is to be forthcoming. The final question is whether the
Scottish Party would declare themselves on the issue of English
parties, and as you say the majority of members of this party
are prepared to bargain with these parties...if they give up
this silly English Party idea, we will modify our attitude."(49)
As far as Tom Gibson was concerned, until the Scottish Party could present
a political programme which clarified these sensitive issues, there could
be no progress towards unity.
With regard to the by-election in Kilmarnock, the initial response of the
Scottish Party was to request that joint negotiations take place in order
to secure some degree of co-operation. To a large extent, the hardline
response of the NPS towards the candidature of Gibb paid off because they
were able to impose a number of conditions on the talks from the outset.
Firstly, it was pointed out that as they had a branch organisation in
Kilmarnock, there could be no question of them standing down. Also, as it
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had always been National Party policy to contest elections, they could not
withdraw favour of a body which had yet to give a firm commitment to the
efficacy of such a strategy. In addition to these conditions, they had to
take account of internal Party pressures which could not permit a climbdown
from the challenge posed by the new comer. The Scottish Party appeared to
accept these conditions and at a meeting of representatives from both
organisations held on the 5th of September, 1933, Montrose gave assurances
that they would accept the four point policy of the NPS, with only a few
minor additional safeguards.(50) They also accepted in principle that
local nationalists ought to choose their own candidate, which, in all
probability given the numerical superiority, would have been the NPS
candidate, J.M. McNicol.(51)
Perhaps the principal reason for the Scottish Party's pliability can be
traced to the fact that they had little or no organisation and their
initial attempts to formulate a campaign ended in chaos. With few or no
members in the constituency, the Scottish Party could not undertake any of
the conventional fieldwork normally associated with electoral politics.
Evidence of their total lack of any kind of order is to be found in the
fact that one of their members claimed to be the local candidate and set
about campaigning on this premise. This was done without the authority of
the SP's Executive and the correspondence reveals an organisation which was
totally at sea as to what was going on. (52) Further evidence that the
Scottish Party was in a state of utter confusion was that within a week of
the negotiations, they had a volte-face and completely rejected the
National Party's demands and instead put forward their own statement which,
as it stood, was deemed unacceptable by the NPS. This was a severe shock
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to MacCormick and the talks seemed to be disintegrating into a shambles.
"We started today at 3 p.m. and were at once confronted
with Sir Alex's report that their Executive had met this
morning and turned the whole thing down. In its place
they suggested a short statement which was totally
unacceptable to us. Our representatives at once
withdrew to see whether we could again save the day
and win them over."(53)
MacCormick believed that a short simple statement upon which both parties
could agree was the only way out of the impasse. As he had advocated
before, this had to be stripped of all frippery and contain only "absolute
essentials" which according to MacCormick were "the right of the Scottish
people to determine Scotland's status" and "the right to control taxation
and finance".(54) The Scottish Party accepted this streamlining and
secured, by way of a compromise, a section which advocated the reform of
the Treaty of Union, instead of its abolition, in order to achieve the
objectives of the nationalists. Both MacCormick and Muirhead concluded
that this was a safer and better agreement than the one initially proposed
by the NPS.(55)
However, not all members of the National Party were happy with the way the
negotiations were going, especially Tom Gibson, who accused them of a
sell-out of principles in accepting the agreed statement.(56) Further
problems were to arise concerning the thorny question of a joint
candidate. Initially, MacEwen put forward the suggestion that both
existing candidates should withdraw and that a neutral person acceptable to
both parties should be put forward. He strongly suggested J.M.Bannerman,
who had apparently been vetted by the Scottish Party in advance.
Bannerman, who had strong connections with the Duke of Montrose and a long
standing family commitment to Home Rule, was thought to be sufficiently
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"safe" and an ideal candidate to unite both parties. Unfortunately his
obvious Scottish Party connections blinded members of the NPS to his
abilities to stand as an able candidate who had taken on board the task of
representing the nationalist cause in good faith.(57)
The National Party put forward an alternative proposal which was finally
agreed. A sub-committee consisting of MacCormick and Muirhead from the
National Party, together with MacEwen and McDowall, was formed to attend a
meeting with the Ayrshire Nationalist Association and submit a short leet
of three candidates: A.D. Gibb, McNicol and Bannerman. The local
nationalists were to choose a candidate from the three and this would
subsequently be endorsed by the executives of both parties. In spite of
the fact that the Scottish Party was represented by two candidates, the NPS
man, McNicol, won easily.
"Sir Alexander MacEwen and McDowell spoke very strongly
for the adoption of Bannerman. I knew our folks were
sound so I got up and made a completely impartial speech
saying choose which ever you like and all agree. A vote
was taken and by a large majority McNicol was chosen."(58)
However, in spite of the agreement, the Duke of Montrose was not happy with
the result, much to the chagrin of MacCormick. They believed that by
proposing Bannerman they were attempting to make a genuine compromise and
McNicol's candidature was, they argued, not representative of both parties.
However, MacCormick was not impressed by their meanderings.
"Had McDowall on the phone. Duke of M. not satisfied
with the choice of candidate. I am getting fed up.
They are worse than a lot of fussy women and only is Sir
Alexander MacEwen, Gibb and McDowall of any use to us.
If they fib again we must go ahead and fight them. Perhaps
between Sir A.M. and yourself (Neil Gunn) you could think
of something over the week which would avoid impasse. You
see, if we can actually get them supporting an out and out
nationalist candidate in Kilmarnock then that will be the
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most effective way to put an end to them as a separate
force,"(59)
MacCormick was aided in his plans to secure a joint candidate by the fact
that MacEwen and Gibb were becoming impatient with the Scottish Party's
lack of realistic proposals. Indeed, they made plain their frustrations
with Montrose and gave further indication how disorganised and incoherent
their strategy was. MacCormick took their internal disharmony to be a
good sign.
"I have learned authoritatively, through a confidential
source, that at the Scottish Party Executive yesterday,
Dewar Gibb had a pretty serious row with the Duke. I
believe that the Duke had been saying something in the
usual vein about no separation when Dewar Gibb asked him
for heaven's sake to stop all that blarney and get down
to hard facts"(60)
Initially, MacCormick believed the solution to the problem was to try and
wean those elements in the Scottish Party with whom he felt a political
affinity over to the ranks of the NPS. He was convinced that during the
negotiations he had shown enough good faith to induce MacEwen and others
into believing that the National Party was a mature enough organisation to
represent their own political views and aspirations. According to
MacCormick:
"The view of all was that breakdown would mean a setback
for years if not the end of the National Party...I still
think we can snatch good out of it and use the association
to compel Sir A.M. to leave his doubting Thomases behind
and lead the worthwhile elements into our own ranks."(61)
While MacCormick was fighting for his political life, he still failed to
appreciate that MacEwen was not always acting for the same objectives as he
himself sought, but was, first and foremost, furthering his own political
priorities which were often inimical to that of the NPS.
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The candidature of McNicol was most firmly opposed by Montrose, Sir Daniel
Stevenson and Rosslyn Mitchell. Mitchell had indicated that he would
leave the Labour Party and help the nationalist cause if the two parties
could get their act together and put up an "outstanding and able
candidate".(62) Not surprisingly, this was used to try and invalidate
McNicol's candidature. Further pressure was added by the fact that one of
the National Party's most eminent supporters, Lord Dalziel of Kirkcaldy,
was prepared to contribute financially on the condition that the two
organisations settle their differences.(63) However, the problem facing
the National Party, as Archie Lamont pointed out, was that McNicol was a
"bona fide" nationalist and if he came out against a Scottish Party
opponent, it would help silence the mounting criticism from within the rank
and file that the NPS had turned its back on its original objectives.(64)
As the Scottish Party was not a conventional political organisation, its
members were not rigid in their support for their own group. Their
flexibility in the political sphere was used to blackmail the National
Party with Daniel Stevenson and other prominent members of the SP Executive
threatening to support the Free Trade candidate unless the NPS agreed to
compromise. The crisis was exacerbated by the fact that the
pro-mergerites in both parties had gone so far down the unification trail
that a failure to secure a compromise at the Kilmarnock by election would
lead to a real danger of the two organisations disintegrating and with them
the Home Rule cause. It soon became apparent that the only real
alternative for the mergerites was to produce a suitable candidate from the
Scottish Party because it was unlikely that anyone from the NPS would be
acceptable. The key to success would be to find someone who could be
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trusted by the members of the National Party. The ideal person, in all
probability, was MacEwen and although McNicol was himself in favour of
this, MacCormick and Muirhead were uneasy about such a solution. However,
the impasse was breached by the members of the Kilmarnock NPS who suggested
that MacEwen should go forward as the candidate. MacCormick explained how
this situation arose.
"...when Sir Alexander MacEwen was down in Kilmarnock
with Muirhead and myself ten days ago, at the time the
Kilmarnock Association had adopted McNicol, the Chairman
had said, quite off his own bat, that it would be a splendid
way out of all the difficulties if Sir A. himself would
stand. Sir A. had replied that it was impossible for
him to stand..."(65)
However as the situation became more exacerbated and after giving the
matter some thought, he decided that he had an obligation to do his utmost
to secure a compromise by using his personal standing with both
organisations. In many ways MacEwen was uniquely positioned to be an
ideal candidate and he was quite aware of this. MacCormick continues the
story.
"...he told me he had been taking everything into
consideration and had decided that he would allow his
own name to go forward if that was mutually acceptable.
I told him that I had no personal objections to him. I
did not like the solution and was afraid of the effect on
the National Party. He was then undecided, but when the
Scottish Party Executive met he seems to have thought that
itr was the only way to prevent a premature split and the
appearance of an independent Liberal and he offered his
name accordingly."(66)
Although MacCormick was not exactly pleased with the situation there was
little he could do as events had overtaken him. If he wanted
co-operation, and he was convinced that they could not survive without it,
he more or less had to accept MacEwen's coup d'etat. MacEwen was the most
respected of the Scottish Party members in the eyes of the NPS and he was
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seen to be the keenest pro-mergerite. However, and this was probably what
made MacCormick nervous, no one could ascertain the degree of Scottish
Party complicity in securing his nomination. In any case, it was the only
realistic way out of the impasse that MacCormick had, albeit inadvertently,
created for himself.
MacEwen was adopted as the Honorary President of the Kilmarnock branch of
the NPS while still retaining his membership of the Scottish Party
Executive. A set of proposals were quickly drawn together upon which the
joint election campaign would be fought. The National Party was careful
to stress that they had not departed from their original objectives (as
defined in the restatement of policy in 1933), but, in the interest of
maintaining unity, things had to be kept to a minimum of detail. The
guiding principle for co-operation was that both parties agreed that a
future Scottish Parliament would be the final arbiter on all Scottish
affairs.
"As both parties believe in the right of the Scottish
people to determine the future status of Scotland, it
has been found possible to agree upon a joint candidate
going forward with the following aim:
The establishment in Scotland of a Parliament which shall
be the final authority on all Scottish affairs, including
taxation and finance.
Both parties are agreed that the institution of tariff
barriers between England and Scotland is undesirable and
that Imperial matters, Defence and Foreign Policy should
remain matters of joint concern between Scotland and England.
There shall only be such future modification or revision
of the Act of Uhion as is necessary to obtain the foregoing
objects."(67)
The joint election statement rode roughshod over many difficulties and the
speed with which it was concluded, and the consequent lack of consultation
with the rank and file, caused a great deal of resentment among several
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members. The point concerning the "Act of Union" was considered to be
particularly insensitive because this was not part of the NPS's policy.
Tom Gibson and his wife, Elma, both announced that after the election they
would be resigning from the Executive. They objected to what they saw as
the undue influence of the Scottish Party and pointed out that there was
little point in fighting off the Fundamentalist challenge only to hand
control of the Party to the "extremists" on the other wing of the national
movement.
"I am not going to allow myself to be dictated to by
any group of self-appointed dictators as the Scottish
group - I refused and fought Grieve's attempt - I did
the same with Clann MacColl and Gillies' people and I
most decidedly object to the decision of the National
Council to permit this latest group: the Scottish Party
..tfy resignation is a definite protest against the silly
childishness of the Scottish Party and any recognition
of it."(68)
Elma Gibson echoed the fears of many by protesting that the merger issue
was going all the one way and she doubted the sincerity of the motives
behind the proposals because of the intransigence of the Scottish Party.
In short, the National Party was being used.
"I won't be surprised if you get your man into Westminster.
On the same policy you would get other members into Westminster
too, but you will not get them out...You say that we have been
making no progress for two years. I say that we have been
going back. Don't you think that it is significant that
our progress came to an end when our original policy became
something to be explained away and not something to be upheld
and expounded. I welcomed the hope of unity between the SP
and the NPS and quite recognised the need for concessions on
both sides. I was quite prepared to swallow that childish
nonsense about the Treaty of Union: but have the SP made any
concession whatsoever? They even abandoned their agreement
to accept the local candidate. They have simply taken over
our organisation and forced their policy on us. God knows
what further watering down we will be expected to accept
meekly in another six months."(69)
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Elma Gibson's analysis of the situation and her reservations were shared by
others in the Party, of whom the most important were Robert and Roland
Muirhead. The brothers were uneasy about the drift towards moderation and
they did as much as they could at the National Council meetings to stall
the accommodation process. This antagonism was noted by MacCormick who
observed that "they regard the whole approach to the Scottish Party with
regret and are looking for loopholes to escape from it".(70) In many ways
MacCormick was right. However, the number of loopholes available for
escape was diminishing rapidly. The opposition within the National
Council was weak regarding the agreement to fight a joint election campaign
and whatever acquiescence existed was reinforced by the necessity of
preserving the fragile unity in the national movement after the manoeuvring
which had led them into such a tight corner.
MacEwen's appearance on the scene as a political knight in shining armour
was not as entirely fortuitous as it would have perhaps seemed. He was
noted for his ambition and was, conveniently, in the right place at the
right time. His correspondence with other members of the Scottish Party
Executive reveals a hard and businesslike approach to dealings with the NPS
and he was never afraid to turn the screws tight to get what he wanted.(71)
MacEwen's experience in local government and public life meant that he was
the most skillful and able negotiator in the Scottish Party and he was
likewise the best informed member concerning the current National Party
strategy. Of all the people in the national movement, he more than
anybody, was in the best position to act as a pivot between both
organisations. Together with these advantages, the two parties had, for
once, found an able candidate who was able to use his experience in
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political life and his excellent track record in public service to maximum
effect. MacEwen campaigned with great energy and was better able to face
questions than some of the previous National Party candidates who scored
quite badly on this front. His political stature and the novelty effect
of a united nationalist movement candidate meant that MacEwen received
considerable press coverage and his meetings were well stocked with a
variety of speakers from both parties. The campaign was, in essence, an
exercise in cross-party co-operation which, if it was successful, would
demonstrate the feasibility of unity. The election was not only a contest
for votes but also the test bed to prove the credibility of an united party
and as such, it was important that MacEwen achieved a good showing.
The Nationalists started off at a disadvantage by only getting their
campaign running three weeks before polling day. They also did not have
an effective enough organisation on the ground and many parts of the
constituency went uncanvassed.(72) However, in spite of these problems,
most of those involved believed that things were going well enough to be
confident about the prospects for union. During the campaign MacEwen more
firmly than ever before advocated a fusion of the two parties.
"Whatever the result of this election, it is already
proving an important step in the history of the Nationalist
ovement. The wisdom of the National and Scottish Parties
joining forces is abundantly justified, and, to me, it is
almost unthinkable that those who have worked together so
loyally and earnestly in this election together should ever
be divided until their task is accomplished."(73)
One of the reasons for MacEwen's acceptability as a serious political
contender in the election can be explained by his impeccable Liberal
credentials, which, more often than not, crept into the campaign, much to
the chagrin of some members of the NPS who felt that he was too closely
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identified with his former British party. A lot of his canvassing was
done by the Young Glasgow Liberals and, at the same time, Sir Daniel
Stevenson claimed that if MacEwen was returned he would pursue a Liberal
policy at Westminster. (74) While this may have gained him some Liberal
votes, it did not endear him to those in the National Party who were still
suspicious of his motives.
The mergerites, however, turned a blind eye to these minor indiscretions
and argued that the fact that the two parties were able to co-operate in an
election campaign was evidence of the efficacy of a merger. Walter
Murray, the editor of the Scots Independent, reviewed the situation.
"The agreement negotiated between the National Party
of Scotland and the Scottish Party is for the by-election
in the Kilmarnock division only, but in principle it
obviously goes much further. If the two self-government
parties have been able to find a common platform for the
one by-election it is hardly possible for them to remain
separate indefinitely, and the basis of co-operation may
therefore have to be regarded as preparing the way for
ultimate fusion."(75)
For many nationalists it was a welcome change to place the emphasis on
unity rather than division and this allowed MacEwen to expound the
practical and positive aspects of self-government, instead of fighting a
rearguard action against inter-nationalist intrigues. Also, because of
his membership of the Scottish Party, the separatist bogey was not so
readily raised by the press and in some quarters he was accorded respect
for being a non socialist candidate.(76) In any case, it must have come
as a welcome relief to the mergerites to find that MacEwen had polled just
over 17% of the votes cast, to date the best showing yet made by a
nationalist candidate.(77)
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For many in the National Party the result was a vindication of the change
in policy towards a more moderate, or as it was preferred to be known,
"common sense" nationalism. On the surface it appeared that by combining
forces, the two parties could achieve greater electoral support than either
could attain on their own. As the leader in the Scots Independent put it:
"The programme adopted by the National Party at the
annual conference in May has been triumphantly vindicated
on the field of electoral battle and it must now be pursued
to its logical conclusion."(78)
However, in spite of their elation, the result was in many ways misleading.
MacEwen was undoubtedly the prime beneficiary of the fact that there was no
Tory candidate as a result of the electoral pact formed by the National
Government. Many Conservative voters would obviously feel easier casting
their votes for MacEwen rather than the socialist tainted National Labour
candidate. Evidence for this can be found in the press reports of the
campaign in which there are several references to Tory supporters
applauding his nationalist, but non-separatist, non-socialist
philosophy. (79) It may have been this factor which accounted for their
good showing rather than the fact that the two nationalist parties had at
last combined their efforts. In any case, this was not taken into account
at the time by those involved who believed that finally the self-government
cause was getting underway.
Yet in order to achieve a unification there would have to be a meaningful
compromise from both groups. In essence, the bottom line for this would
be a trade-off in which the NPS would concede to moderate their
self-government aspirations while the Scottish Party would accept the
principle of belonging to only the new nationalist body. Although members
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of the National Party were prepared to tone down their self-government
demands, they were adamant that there could be no commitment to a
devolutionist or "stepping stone" policy. As far as they were concerned,
they had given away as many concessions as they could and that the final
arbiter on Scottish affairs would have to be the Scottish Parliament. The
new proposals which were put forward among members of the National Party
were weak and lacked the detail and structure which had been built into
their previous policies. However, such pedantry was not thought to be
important because according to MacCormick:
"There were as many opinions as members of the movement:
no constitutional objective was immutable, we were in a
position to make big advances by gaining valuable recruits
and we ought to take it."(80)
For MacCormick the issue of personalities was more important than policies.
The majority of members of the NPS Executive were coming to accept this
view and although many believed that the proposals for the constitution of
the new party could have been worded better or differently, the most
important thing was that, in spirit, it was acceptable. However, not
everybody was happy about the situation and doubts still lingered. This
was especially true of those "grey areas" such as defence and foreign
policy and imperial matters, which did not fall into the remit of belonging
to Scottish affairs. R.F. Muirhead argued that if the Scottish Party
could not accept that, in principle, the final authority on all these
issues had to be the Scottish Parliament, then:
"It may be that the NPS will have to choose between
giving up the principle in order thereby to include
a larger following, or, on the other hand, holding
fast to the principle though it may involve slower
growth."(81)
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However, MacCormick had little time for Muirhead's arguments, neither did
the majority of the National Executive. The case was put that when the
National Party had stuck to its "principles", its growth was slow and
erratic and had seemed to peak and peter out. According to MacCormick the
time was now over for hair-splitting and theoretical argument. He wanted
action and claimed that the way for nationalists to solve their problems
was by "putting our faith in our convictions rather than written
statements".(82)
Once the National Executive decided to embark on a policy of fusion with
the Scottish Party a select group was formed to pave the way and conduct
the official negotiations. This body was called the Reconstruction
Committee and was set up in December, 1933. This group operated in
conjunction with a similar organisation from the Scottish Party and they
were given the remit of hammering out proposals which would form the
foundations of any merger. (83) However, as most of the process towards
unification was handled by informal talks between key people in both
organisations, the Reconstruction Committee was little more than an
official rubber stamp. Both committees merely reported back to their
respective National Executives what had already been decided by those
conducting the informal discussions. However, before any action could be
authorised it had to have approval from the National Executive.
The first stumbling block to hit the nationalists was the issue of the
proposed objective of the new party and, in many ways, it was simply a re¬
run of the argument concerning the correct terminology. One group wanted
to use the phrase "the British group of nations", while the other preferred
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"the British Empire" when talking about the status of an independent
Scotland.(83) The proposed objective which caused the problem went as
follows:
"The objective of the Party is self-government for
Scotland on a basis which will enable Scotland as a
partner in the British Empire with the same status as
England to develop its National Life to the fullest
advantage."(84)
Many in the NPS preferred their original objective because it did not
firmly intertwine Scotland within the context of a form of British
government. The more progressive nationalists, such as Archie Lamont,
were not in favour of tying the new party to an imperialist system.
"Mr Lamont took exception to the proposed new objective
on the grounds that it implied approval of the British
Empire as presently constituted with subject as well as
free nations. Scottish Nationalists must be prepared to
take a wide view and seek to do as they would be done by,
with reference to India, for example."(85)
However, he received little support from the majority in the National
Executive with most favouring Charles Stewart Black's assertion that "we
should be proud of the British Empire".(86) This was yet another
indication of the National Party's gradual shift towards a more right wing
political stance.(87)
Roland Muirhead was also uneasy about redrafting the four point policy of
the NPS because, he argued, the Scottish Party had always engaged in a
constant wavering of interpretations to suit their own ends. As time went
on he became less convinced of the efficacy of the redrafting of policy
which had led to the expulsion of the Fundamentalists. Although Muirhead
at the time believed the restatement of policy in May, 1933 was not
connected with the Scottish Party, he became more and more convinced that
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the whole thing had been arranged to suit the accommodationists in both
parties. He was soon airing these views and claimed that the restatement
of policy was "drafted with one of our men in touch with the Scottish
Party."(88) He went on to elaborate:
"It was not our own spontaneous idea of a policy. Neither
was the new object. To many nationalists the idea of a
glorified Empire was not acceptable at all. He knew no
reason why the Scottish Party wished to alter the object.
If we were all firm on the matter, we might be able to
keep our object as before."(89)
Muirhead found it difficult to accept that his Party had changed into a
more establishment minded organisation and although he blamed the Scottish
Party, he could not avoid the conclusion that many senior members of the
NPS were just as keen to alter the nationalists' objective. When the
issue came to a vote in the National Council, 14 supported the redraft with
only the Muirhead brothers and Archie Lamont objecting, preferring instead
the old policies and objective.(90) With this major stumbling block
removed, the next stage was for each party to pass the following
resolutions at their respective annual conferences.
"1) The establishment of a Parliament in Scotland which
shall be the final authority on all Scottish affairs including
taxation.
2) Scotland shall share with England the rights and respon¬
sibilities they, as mother nations, have jointly created and
incurred within the British Empire
3) In a manner representing the will of her people, Scotland
should set up jointly with England, machinery to deal with
these responsibilities and in particular with such matters as
Defence, Foreign Policy and the creation of a customs union.
4) It is believed that these principles can be realized only
by an independent political party which has no connection or
alliance with an English controlled party."(91)
The resolutions were to form the basis of the new party's political
programme and as such were conceived so that:
"...all the essentials of a self-government policy are
contained in the foregoing statement, and it is believed
that the achievement of self-government on that basis will
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enable the Scottish people as partners in the British Enpire
to be the final arbiters of their own destiny."(92)
Once the resolutions were passed the following subsidiary resolutions were
also framed for submission, the first to the Scottish Party and the second
to the NPS.
"A) This Conference of the Scottish Party, following upon the
acceptance of resolution I, both by this Conference and by
the Conference of the National Party of Scotland, resolves
to unite with the name of "the Scottish National Party."
B) This Conference of the National Party of Scotland, in as
much as Resolution I had been passed by both this Conference
and by a Conference of the Scottish Party, hereby resolves
to unite with the Scottish Party, and in pursuance of that
resolution to amend Clause I of the Constitution to read
"name: The Scottish National Party."(93)
Once the formalities were over, the new party was finally absolved of the
separatist spectre which had dogged the nationalist movement. The SNP was
a fundamentally different animal from the National Party in that whereas
the NPS had been in favour of something akin to Dominion status, the new
party stressed the continuation of a partnership with England which removed
that possibility of independence in the international sphere. The
argument behind this policy was that it would be wrong for Scotland, as a
mother nation of the Empire, to down-grade herself to a "colonial"
status.(94) In previous times, the National Party acknowledged the
possibility that they could radically change the nature of the British
state, however, there was no such threat from the SNP. The new party
stated quite categorically that the proposed Scottish Parliament should
have authority with respect to those matters considered to be "Scottish
affairs". Previously, the NPS had advocated "national sovereignty" and
"independence within the British group of nations" and many believed that
this included the right to self-determination in the fields of foreign
policy and defence. Although such ideas were subject to a variety of
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interpretations, they did not emphatically limit the amount of national
sovereignty possible to the Scottish nation in the same way as was now
being proposed by the SNP. In this way, the new party was more in line
with the Home Rule movements of former times in that self-government was
firmly placed within the context of the continuation of some form of
overall British government. In the last analysis, it has to be said that
in terms of fighting for "national independence" in the normal sense of the
word, the creation of the Scottish National Party was undoubtedly a
retrogressive step.
However, all this meant very little to MacCormick who was confident that
the proposals would be met with enthusiastic approval from members of both
organisations. Furthermore, to pacify any lingering pangs of doubt, he
argued that in essence the new party was still adhering to the four
principles which were originally embodied in the policies of the National
Party.
"It expresses in simple terms a responsible and dignified
ambition for our country. When that programme has been
carried out, Scotland will be a completely free, self-
governing nation, continuing in friendly partnership with
England, and fulfilling her responsibilities as a mother
nation in the British Empire."(95)
In fact, it would be more accurate to state that the Scottish National
Party was adhering to what MacCormick believed were the original objectives
of the NPS, in spite of the fact that his ideals were not universally
shared by other members. For him, it was simply a matter of clarification
and the removal of obstructive ambiguities. The new name for the party
was chosen by way of a compromise in that it contained the principal
elements of both older titles, but also, it was stressed, maintained a
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continuity with the past. It was claimed that there was "no break in the
chain first formed in 1928".(96) In many ways, the creation of the SNP
can be seen as the culmination of the moderates' campaign to establish
their vision of what was meant by Scottish nationalism. They now had a
political organisation which could back up their case, unhindered by the
separatist stigma which had hounded the National Party to its grave.
In addition to being shorn of the separatist bogey, it was hoped that the
new party would have a broader appeal than the NPS on account of its
narrower and minimalist objectives, which, it was believed, would permit
people of different shades of ideological opinion to join its ranks.
Although the nationalists never specifically mentioned it, the SNP was
clearly influenced by the formation of the National Government and the
idea, which was growing fashionable throughout Europe, that unity on a
"national" basis could overcome conventional political difficulties.(97)
Like many other political groups in Europe which faced an impasse, Scottish
nationalists opted for action of any kind, so long as it was dramatic, in
the hope that they could break out of the stalemate. The dramatic effect
of unification acted as a positive distraction and took members' minds off
previous problems and difficulties although, in reality the political
scenario had not significantly changed. The propaganda of the SNP
reflected this drift towards Utopian idealism rather than political
realities.
"The Scottish National Party is nevertheless a great
political experiment. It differs materially in conception
from the British National Party, so called. That was a
combination brought about by Party leaders in the panic
of a national emergency. No man left his Party...
Conservatives, Liberals and Socialists huddled together
as Lions and Hinds are said to do when floods drive them
close together on the high ground for safety. When the
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floods recede, let the hinds look to themselves...But the
Scottish National Party is not a panic emergency party
scrambled together temporarily. It is a carefully planned
organisation, where the rank and file, as well as the
leaders are drawn together by a great spiritual force -
the desire to serve their nation. Each must leave his
old party, sometimes cutting personal ties of a lifetime,
before he becomes an active member of the new party.
Loyalty to our nation takes the place of loyalty to
party."(98)
In spite of the denials, it is clear from this passage that some of the
rhetoric of the National Government had rubbed off on the thinking of the
SNP. In order to encompass people of widely differing political
ideologies, the Scottish National Party had to abandon most of the social
and economic policies of the NPS, which tended towards the left of centre,
and replace them with a quasi-utopian brand of nationalism. This
philosophy contained little that was specific and veered towards being
apolitical in tone. Another important shift in nationalist opinion
occurred with the formation of the SNP in that whereas nationalism was
regarded primarily as a political strategy by the NPS, it was now believed
to be a credible philosophy in itself. Muirhead and Gibson, for example,
argued that self-government was the best way to achieve economic and social
reforms and for them, a large part of their nationalism was simply a
practical means to an end. However, the new party endeavoured to make
nationalism an end in itself by appealing to concepts of loyalty to one's
nation and that this could solve any type of difficulties.(99)
This political idealism which was afloat in Britain, Europe and the United
States at this time, was also present in the SNP's naive attitude to
surmounting ideological differences. The Scottish National Party
effectively moved back to the Scottish Home Rule Association's dictum that
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the conventional political divide could be overcome by the unifying force
of the demand for self-government. However, the difficulties of adopting
such a strategy soon came to the forefront when the Party tried to come to
terms with the political realities which were now facing them. Even
before the SNP was officially launched the "Reconstruction Committee" which
had been set up by both parties to look into social and economic problems,
could make little progress because of the widely divergent political
beliefs held by individual members.(100) As a result of this there was an
early tendency to take a neutralist approach to specific issues which could
not be reduced to a simple case of Scottish grievances against an uncaring
Britain. When the Scottish National Party entered the political arena,
most of its energies had been diverted away from the real issues of the
day. This in turn made it difficult for them to take a coherent stance on
a whole range of economic and social matters.
The principal reason for the tendency towards a nondescript political
stance can be explained by the undue influence exercised by former members
of the Scottish Party and their bed-fellows who had belonged to the NPS.
In spite of a numerical superiority in the region of ten to one (at least),
MacCormick made every effort to ensure that the Scottish Party was given
equal representation in the newly formed SNP. At the first annual
conference, former Scottish Party members received 45 delegate cards, which
was about the same as that issued to the NPS, in spite of the fact that
they only had a membership of about 500 compared with the exaggerated roll
of over 14,000 claimed by the National Party. (101) The same
over-preponderance manifested itself in the selection of office bearers for
the SNP. The Duke of Montrose was made President, Sir Alexander MacEwen
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was given the Chairmanship and in the other minor offices, there was an
almost even split between former members of both parties.(102) The same
thing happened in the newly formed National Council, to which the former
National Party Chairman, Roland Muirhead, was demoted. The mergerites in
the NPS were only interested in attaching the personnel of the Scottish
Party for prestige purposes and, perhaps most importantly, to give a new
sense of leadership and direction. It was to this end that they were
given such a prominent part to play in the new party. It is perhaps wrong
to describe the merger issue as a fusion of two political parties. For
one thing the Scottish Party was never really a political organisation as
such. It had a very small membership and as a body capable of winning
votes, it had neither the means for conducting electoral campaigns nor none
of the conventional party discipline necessary fpr such undertakings.(103)
In essence, the Scottish Party was little more than an elitist pressure
group. However, it was precisely for this reason that many in the
National Party wanted to take them on board, or to be more accurate, be
taken on board by them. MacCormick and a majority of the NPS National
Council wanted their prestige, money and guidance because, they believed,
it was these vital elements which the national movement needed most, and
which on their own, the National Party could not provide. The reality of
the merger was that the NPS did not join with another organisation, but
rather, accepted a new body of leadership which fused with the old one to
produce a distinctive change in nationalist direction. However, it has to
be emphasised that the National Party of Scotland had been moving down this
road under its own volition for some time and that the creation of the SNP
was merely the finishing touch to a long and tortured process.
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Historians have generally given the merger of the two parties a negative
assessment, principally for the reasons which will be elaborated on in the
following chapter. However, they have been equally unkind towards
MacCormick without setting his achievement in the proper context.
Although the merger ultimately proved to be disastrous for the cause of the
Scottish nationalism as a whole, it should not be forgotten against what
criteria it was set up in. It is far too easy to regard the manoeuvring
of MacCormick as inept and flawed, however, the same cannot be said for his
overall strategy. Principally, he wanted to convert the Scottish
establishment to the cause of Home Rule and, if he had been successful, the
nationalists would have found their task much easier, having support from
the most important and influential section of Scottish society. For
MacCormick, the best way to do this was to tone down policies which
frightened them and court those who seemed favourable to the idea. On
both these counts he was successful and, more importantly, he had the
majority backing of his own party. There was no question of the National
Party being dragged screaming and kicking into a merger that it did not
want. There were few resignations and few protests with most carrying on
as normal.(104) Although this strategy was doomed to failure, few on the
ground doubted its wisdom, nor could they see what lay ahead.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The Wilderness Years (1934 - 1939).
When the Scottish National Party was officially launched on the 7th of
April, 1934, the new Chairman, Sir Alexander MacEwen, immediately set the
tone for the new organisation. Despite the problems of the merger, most
members were confident about the prospect of success for the new party and
its ambition to obtain self-government.. MacEwen believed that the most
damaging factor in the development of the national movement was the
inability of nationalists to refrain from sectarianism and internal
disputes. The electorate, he argued, could hardly be expected to believe
that it would be a good thing for the Scots to rule themselves when the
proponents of the self-government cause were forever squabbling with one
another. It set a bad precedent and MacEwen was determined that the
nationalist proclivity towards factionalism had to come to an end.
"The Home Rule Movement in Scotland has been too often
marked by rivalries and jealousies. Let us hope that era
is now past and forgotten."(1)
From now on Party discipline had to be stressed and adhered to, and members
would have to face up to the fact that, in a broad church movement, there
would inevitably be political differences between people who held opposing
ideological beliefs. However, MacEwen stressed that the attainment of
self-government was a principle which they, as a Party, held to be more
important than any ideological consideration, and, if they all kept this in
mind, it would bind them together. He expanded his optimistic view of the
future as follows:
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"We are entering upon a new stage of cooperative effort.
Men and women of the Scottish National Party are still free
to retain their own views as to social and economic problems,
but they will be prepared to put these aside for the moment
until they have achieved their common purpose - the redemption
of their native land."(2)
The emphasis was now on teamwork and it was expected that members, despite
the fact that they came from different shades of the political spectrum,
would work together in the national interest. Indeed, the idea that there
was a tangible national interest would form one of the mainsprings of the
SNP's political philosophy. The party attempted to elevate itself above
conventional politics and it was hoped that their unselfish pursuit of the
nation's well being would act as a cohesive force.
"The Scottish National Party, in abandoning sectional
interests for national welfare, has harnessed a new force
in Scottish politics which will unify all Scots who have the
welfare of Scotland at heart."(3)
The idea that nationalism or patriotism could act as a palliative for the
social and economic problems of the day was essential to the nationalists'
philosophy as they ruled out taking up a definable left or right wing
political stance. Over the next few months, the SNP would have to set out
in concrete terms what it interpreted the national interest to be and how
they could best serve it. However, in the meantime, the Party could
attack the easy target of British over-centralisation and the lack of
attention paid to Scottish affairs. Airing nationalist grievances
provided a convenient stop gap and it was also an uncontroversial line of
argument which gained approval from all types of members. MacEwen argued
that it was the nationalist stirrings which induced the Government to
transfer the Scottish Office to Edinburgh and that similar agitation had
helped to secure orders for steam locomotives to aid the ailing Scottish
economy.(4)
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The lack of a properly defined political manifesto was not a primary
concern of the leaders of the SNP, who believed that the Party was in a
healthy condition. Most members were buoyant and in confident mood and
the emphasis on teamwork and unity was taken to heart by everyone. Few,
if any, expressed concern at a lack of policies because it was expected
that they would emerge from the national consensus, or more accurately, the
feeling of national consensus, which they had created. This manifested
itself in the various articles which were published in the Scots
Independent in which different authors put forward plans working within the
parameters of the idea of national unity. The majority of the pieces were
uncontroversial with most writers concentrating on one particular theme,
and, in many cases, simply putting a new gloss on old issues.(5) What was
important, however, was the fact that the contributors flung themselves
wholeheartedly into the task of helping to create a national policy. Even
those who had resigned in protest at the fusion of the two parties soon
returned to the fold and accepted the SNP as the legitimate bearer of the
nationalist standard.(6) Previous recriminations and accusations of sell
outs were forgotten in the quest to build a new force in Scottish politics.
Contrary to what many have believed, there was no drop in membership once
the new party had been created and the majority of the old National Party
branches remained in a healthy condition with expansion being the order of
the day.(7)
"The branches have been showing a steady and increased
activity. In spite of fears that the National Party would
shed members because of the union, the reverse proved to be
the case, for affiliation fees at the time of the conference
(April, 1934) were up this year as against last year and
almost twice that of two years ago. The Scottish Party also
showed no loss because of the fusion."(8)
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Throughout the first six months of the life of the SNP, branch activity
flourished with an increase in the number of special events and speaking
tours which culminated in an Autumn campaign designed to be the first
salvos in a general election contest.(9) Throughout this time, there was
a steady increase in the number of new branches formed which, again, is
another indicator of a party in expansion.(10) Not only did the creation
of new outposts and an increasing membership roll help to boost morale and
raise confidence, it helped to provide the necessary funds essential to
establish the Party as an effective political organisation. Among other
things, plans were soon afloat to set up a new weekly newspaper which was a
good indication that they expected a significant increase in their
support.(11) The new spirit of confidence engendered a mood of generosity
among the leadership who helped to pay off previous debts and thus left the
Scottish National Party as the best off, in financial terms, of any
previous nationalist organisation. (12) This was backed up by a fund
raising campaign throughout the branches which was given a new lease of
life by the wind of enthusiasm that was now running through the Party. (13)
In this venture, they were greatly aided by the influx of personalities
from the Scottish Party, whose social standing proved a crowd puller at
bazaars and other fund raising activities. The experience and public
prominence of former Scottish Party members helped to boost the new party's
confidence by giving them what appeared to be added stature and political
weight which were two things that had been previously missing from the
nationalist cause. However, perhaps the best piece of evidence about the
state of health of the SNP is that in November they appointed their first
full time paid official and organiser, which was taken as a step to cope
with the Party's increased membership and activity. Contrary to what many
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historians have hitherto believed, the Scottish National Party, with its
buoyant membership, high morale and increased organisational network, was
better placed than any of its predecessors to make electoral inroads
towards the goal of self-government.(14)
In order for the SNP to enter the electoral fray, it had to face up to the
principal questions facing the Scottish and British political scene.
Perhaps the most important of these was the economic situation with a world
recession causing endemic unemployment and a southward drift of industry
away from Scotland. Together with the economic problem, there was also a
turmoil in international affairs, especially as the rise of the dictators
was threatening world peace. In order to be a credible political force
the nationalists would have to formulate specific policies to deal head on
with these problems which, in fact, were more like crises. Also, they
would have to clarify their position on constitutional matters with regard
to the relationship a Scottish Parliament would hold with Westminster and
the British Empire.
As was stated earlier, the corner stone of the Party's philosophy was one
which promoted the 'national interest' and a great deal of rhetoric was
employed to cover up their lack of detail. In doing this, the SNP courted
a number of obvious difficulties in so far as they risked being associated
with the rise of militant nationalism, which was perceived as being the
greatest threat to democracy and world peace. Strident nationalism was
very unpopular in inter-war Britain and the general public was concerned to
maintain peace by internationalism and the idea of collective security as
propounded by the League of Nations.(15) Not only did the SNP have to
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address the problem of world peace as a political party vying for power,
they also had to dispel any notions that they were similar in thought or
deed to the Nazis, Fascists or militarists in Japan. Indeed, MacCormick
was later to ascribe the SNP's lack of fortune in the thirties to the fact
that by that time nationalism had become a 'dirty word'.(16) It is of
little surprise therefore, to find that one of the Party's first actions
was to issue a statement clarifying their attitude towards Fascism and the
Nationalist dictators.
"The Scottish National Party is opposed to Fascism and
dictatorship in any shape or form, being fully persuaded
that is is repugnant to the ancient Scottish ideal of liberty
and repudiates the suggestion, implicit in Fascist policy, that
Parliamentary government on democratic lines has proved a
failure and maintains that until Scotland has resumed
self-government Parliamentary government in Scotland on
modern lines has not been tried."(17)
The fundamental problem for the nationalists was that by arguing that
'national policies' in the 'national interest' could solve domestic social
and economic problems, they were opening themselves up to comparison with
their militant namesakes. This was especially the case as some of their
members had made favourable noises about Fascism in the past, and some may
even have continued to do so. (18) There was an urgent need for the
Scottish National Party to expound their theory of nationalism and
differentiate it from the national chauvinism which was now threatening
world peace, much to the electorate's alarm.
The starting point for such an elaboration was to emphasis that Scottish
nationalism belonged to the same family as those of the small nations of
Europe whose ideas were liberal, tolerant and progressive. This was in
contrast to the nationalism of the major powers which was strident,
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aggressive and prone to territorial aggrandisement. As such it was
condemned outright:
"If the policies of Hitler and Mussolini and Japan are
Nationalism: then Nationalism is indeed a world danger of
the first magnitude."(19)
It was argued that small-nation nationalism was a counterforce to this new
threat because such countries were the most loyal to the League of Nations
and the idea of collective security. They were also more committed to the
ideal of democracy, it was claimed, and much more prone to maintain good
relations with their neighbours.
"The danger to the peace and well being of the world today
lies not in the unaggressive Nationalism of the little nations
that are comparable to Scotland, but in the sinister policies
and grasping Imperialism of the so called powers which are
preparing the stage for Armageddon."(20)
Although few people, if any, believed that an independent Scotland could
present a military challenge to world peace, Scottish nationalists were
keen to show that self-government could provide an escape from war. Even
the stalwart arch anti-separatist, the Duke of Montrose, jumped on the
anti-war bandwagon, proclaiming that Home Rule would provide an additional
safeguard against being drawn into another futile war.
"We hear a great deal about world peace and the growing
armaments of other nations and we are told that we are going
gradually towards another great war...How does Scotland stand
in this question? It is an appalling situation. We have to
remember that in the House of Commons our Scottish members
number 74 and are outnumbered by eight to one. If every
Scottish member voted against a war, it does not matter a
bit. Scotland would be drawn into this bloodshed like a
trailer on the back of a car. The day has come when, if we
are going to have our men butchered and all we hold dear wrecked
in this country, as educated people we have the right to say
if Scotland goes to war or not.
If we have to face the question of war, and, if the cause is
just, Scotland will be there side by side with England and do her
bit and more: but if there is any doubt about the righteousness
of the cause, Scotland will not go to war as far as the British
Isles are concerned. Self-government for Scotland is a stroke
for world peace, for the peace of the British Isles and a stroke
for the safety of your homes and mine."(21)
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Given the importance of international relations at this time, the
nationalists could not ignore it, although they were ill equipped to deal
with the problem. Montrose was simply cashing in on the concern for world
peace and, in the process, was guilty of bending his own Party's policy.
The SNP was committed only to self-government within the realm of Scottish
affairs and this obviously precluded taking an active role in foreign
issues. Although there had been talk of an independent Scotland taking a
seat as a member of the League of Nations, the matter was never
satisfactorily resolved. Indeed, the whole issue of what part the
Scottish nation would take within the British Empire had yet to be defined,
with most members of the Party believing that something akin to Dominion
status would be the most acceptable option.(22) In spite of the fact that
little of substance had been enshrined in Party policy on this subject,
there was a consensus that foreign policy would still be carried on within
the framework of a British Government. This left the SNP at an obvious
disadvantage because there was little that they could contribute towards
one of the most important political debates of the decade.
In terms of forming a coherent economic policy, the Party was hoping to
make more solid progress, especially with regard to dealing with the
unemployment problem. Using the framework of the 'national interest'
idea, MacEwen, MacCormick and Gibson drew up a short reconstruction policy
pamphlet which would serve as a starting point for expanding the Party's
ideas on social and economic issues. MacEwen and Gibson had formerly been
Liberals and their thoughts on economic policy closely resembled those of
the economic radicals whose ideas were best represented, in a British
context, by the Lloyd George wing of the Liberal Party.(23) The SNP
rejected both the official treasury view and, especially after the debacle
of the second Labour Government, the Utopia of state socialism.
Essentially, the nationalists' economic policy operated on three levels.
The most basic form was one which acted as a national watch dog and,
publicising the imbalance between Scotland and England with regard to the
effects of the depression, hoped to raise public indignation. This policy
operated in conjunction with a statement of broad intent which outlined, in
a basic form only, the Party's plans for economic reconstruction.
Finally, there were more detailed schemes which were drawn up by individual
members purely as options to be considered for approval at a later date.
From the beginning, nationalists argued firmly in favour of government
intervention as a means to stimulate economic growth and although there
were flaws in the capitalist system, they did not believe that it was
fundamentally wrong. What was required, they stated in frequent and
various articles, was the need for the Government to fine tune and regulate
the economy in order to avoid the usual pitfalls associated with the
capitalist system, especially unemployment. In rejecting a class
orientated view of economics while, at the same time, not accepting
outright the doctrine of laissez faire, the nationalists although
propounding something similar to the Liberal Party, were able to produce a
distinct economic policy which they hoped would contrast favourably with
those of the Tory and Labour parties. Also, the 'middle way' between
socialism and full blown capitalism, with its implicit acceptance of social
responsibility for all classes, fitted in neatly with the idea of a
'national interest'.
"We have no intention of maintaining the privileges of
the privileged classes, we equally have no intention of
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carrying out "working class" legislation without reference
to its effect on the whole community. We do not go in to
protect the rate payers' interests, nor to squander public
money without thought of the consequences."(24)
Although the programme was short on detail and contained little of
substance, it did help to set the tone of future nationalist policies.
The basic problem, as the nationalists saw it, was one of under consumption
which inhibited domestic purchasing power. Also, the decline of the
traditional industries, they argued, could only be offset by developing new
sectors of the economy.
"Idle men, idle land, idle millions in banks, idle drifters
in the fishing ports, and idle drifters in the House of
Commons, and the last are the cause of all the rest...We
realize the difficulty of re-establishing shipbuilding and
our heavy industries, but the development of Scotland along
other lines is crying aloud for attention.(25)
The answer to the problem, it was claimed, lay with the actions of central
government and the moral responsibility it had to its people. The idea of
'national unity' was crucial in their philosophy for 'national redemption'.
Unnecessary conflict and confrontation were to be avoided as the whole
community was expected to pull its weight in solving the country's
problems.
"The Scottish National Party makes no appeal to class
interests, to sectional or sectarian prejudices, or to
worn out political creeds. It takes its stand on the
urgent necessity for all men and women of goodwill in
Scotland to unite in the work of national redemption."(26)
The nationalists wanted to use the estimated 10 to 14 million pounds spent
every year on unemployment relief to develop the Scottish economy by
starting public works which would improve the economic infrastructure.
There was, it was claimed, no contradiction in having 'national enterprise'
existing along side private enterprise. As J.L.Kinloch explained, "there
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are certain things which can only be done by a nation and only a nation can
do a nation's work."(27)
The nationalists heartily condemned the National Government's efforts to
promote economic development and likewise dismissed the various bodies and
agencies which had been set up to help and advise in this venture. The
Scottish National Development Council was given a cautious welcome although
it was claimed that it would be impotent because of their refusal to take
an active political stance.(28) Sir Alexander MacEwen attacked the Rose
Report by which, as the Scotsman put it: "the distressed areas are left
with but small expectations."(29) Rose's proposals did not recommend an
active government role for the solution to the south west's endemic
economic problems and MacEwen described them as 'timid, trivial and
partial'. He went on in a bitter tone:
"It is the greatest piece of mental laziness and moral
cowardice ever performed by a Government...Sir Arthur Rose
fails completely to grasp the fact that Scotland's depression
is a national problem which can only be tackled by a
National authority backed up by adequate finance. New and
lighter industries in suitable localities, the construction of
railway locomotives and carriages in Scotland, state aid for
low temperature carbonisation of coal, utilisation of hydro¬
electric power, the development of aviation, motor car
construction, the encouragement of rural industries,
afforestation, small holdings, the building of houses,
roads, bridges, piers, - these are some of the things a
Scottish Government could set on foot."(30)
MacEwen wanted the SNP to adopt a bold and imaginative economic policy and
he believed that this was essential for the Party's success. Indeed, he
attributed the lack of nationalist progress prior to the formation of the
Scottish National Party to the fact that there was no coherent and well
thought out economic strategy to accompany their claims for
self-government.
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"In almost every election we have fought, all the
candidates have declared themselves Home Rulers of
one sort or another, so that while we only promised
Scottish independence, each of the others offered
independence plus something else. That will be altered
at the next election, because the Party is working out a
constructive policy for Scotland."(31)
Although this was not strictly true, (32) the SNP set out in general terms
their blueprint for economic reconstruction. It was proposed that there
should be a scientific survey of Scottish industry, which would show what
industries ought to be reorganised and what openings existed for new types
of manufacturing. Indeed, Tom Gibson accused the Government of not making
available vital information necessary for getting to grips with the roots
of Scotland's economic problems.(33) It was also suggested that there
should be created an 'Industrial bank' which would give assistance, in
suitable cases, to new industries or to help with the reorganisation of
existing industries. Finally, it was proposed that there should be a
'ruralisation' of industry. Perhaps, this was the most significant aspect
of nationalist economic policy and the rural and agriculture sector was
given a priority above all other sectors. The fixation with the land was
a feature the nationalists shared with their European compatriots, who
believed that the rural way of life was healthier and better for the
national community. Undoubtedly, much of this was a romantic search for a
long past, golden age before the industrial revolution and the spread of
international capitalism and, latterly, socialism. Indeed much of the SNP
rural policies were influenced by the activities of nationalist governments
abroad.
"Under the Mussolini Law passed in July, 1929, there are
now being executed throughout Italy systematic schemes of
and drainage and irrigation, coupled with construction of
roads, aqueducts, schools and other public buildings and
farm workers' dwellings. When the land has been made ready
by these means it is colonized by the effort of two
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organisations...A bold system of planning and
reconstruction in contradistinction to the piecemeal
offerings reluctantly accorded to Scotland by Westminster."(34)
The Government's refusal to intervene on a large scale in the economy was
lambasted by the nationalists who regarded such action as part and parcel
of the duties of the elected representatives of the people. They drew
inspiration from the economic initiatives that were now taking place in
other parts of the world and argued that such policies should be examined
and used at home.
"No country is today separating its economic interests from
its system of government. In this age of economic
planning, politics and economics are inextricably blended.
Those who tell us that Parliaments and Governments cannot
influence the economic life of the people are hopelessly
out of touch with contemporary history. Practically all
countries, great and small alike, are experimenting with more
or less success in the art of political interference with
economic and industrial life. In this matter the days of
rigid principle are over, and the era of empiricism has
arrived. Great experiments in national economic planning
are going on in Russia, Italy, Germany and the United States,
besides many other lands, and they are not proving
fruitless or ineffective."(35)
Not only was the Government criticised for not stimulating economic
development, it was also attacked for doing little in the way of setting up
protective legislation for Scottish industry. The 'free market' forces,
which were allowed to apply to the Scottish economy were blamed for the
southward drift of manufacturing production and the unchecked influence of
the City of London was held responsible for putting financial interests
before industrial ones.(36) The nationalists wanted to see the creation
of safety mechanisms which would protect the economy from being determined
by purely financial considerations. For example, Archie Lamont advocated
a scheme whereby it would become law that no company could operate in
Scotland unless a majority of its shareholders were Scots. The ideas
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behind this proposal were to minimise the financial influence of London.
Economic nationalism and the desire to maximise self-sufficiency were
salient parts of the SNP's philosophy.
"Our country is so rich, potentially, that really we stand
in no need of outside capital. London government and London
head offices, as well as being unnecessary, are actually
dangerous...concentration of Scottish wealth and Scottish natural
resources in Scottish hands, is the only way to prevent the
closing down of Scottish industry,"(37)
The SNP used the Clydesdale Bank's economic report as further evidence to
back up their claim for economic nationalism. The report indicated that
the trend towards national self-reliance was one that they expected to
continue and that this would entail nations relying more and more on their
own natural resources in order to undertake the production necessary for
their own needs.(38) It was further argued that this process would
require skillful planning and industrial reorganisation on a massive scale.
All this was fuel to the nationalist fire, and the SNP advocated the full
use of natural resources and toyed with the idea of protectionism as a
means to provide the cover necessary to build up a newly formed industrial
base and a more modern Scottish economy.(39)
However, although industrial regeneration was considered to be important,
it was not the economic sector which received the most attention with a
plethora of detailed policy options being produced. The nationalist's
interest in agricultural redevelopment has already been mentioned, and it
is this area which provides the best insight into the Scottish National
Party's economic and, more importantly, wider political philosophy. The
promotion of land resettlement was an issue upon which there was almost
universal agreement among Party members. The dependency of the ship
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building industries and other export related works on the fluctuations of
world trade led the nationalists to look for economic developments in which
they could control events. It was thought that by putting people back to
small land holdings, the nationalists could solve the unemployment problem.
William Power proposed that it would be possible to settle about 150,000
new cultivators which represented over half a million people, within a few
years.(40) However, it was admitted that those settlers would only be
able to exist at subsistence level and would have to augment their income
by working in rural industries. Tom Gibson was the most vociferous
proponent of a 'back to the land' campaign. He believed that the era of
large centralised economic units was coming to an end and he based this
upon developments in other parts of the world. Henry Ford was quoted to
back up his case: "The real machine age will involve the agriculturisation
of industry and the industrialisation of agriculture. "(41) Gibson
believed that the current economic trend was to develop new local small
scale industries which would be suited to fully exploit the existing local
natural resources and, by using improved transport and cheaply supplied
electricity, their produce would be cost effective enough to compete in the
market place. Evidence of rural modernisation in France, Sweden and Italy
were cited to point the way for the future of the Scottish economy.(42)
Although MacEwen was also interested in rural development, his concern was
largely pragmatic and based upon his experience and involvement in the
Highlands, where he was a public figure. However, unlike MacEwen, Gibson
was more ideologically motivated by the desire to develop a policy for land
resettlement. Like many other nationalists in Europe, Gibson had a
dislike of the cartelised and over-powerful industrial and financial
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concerns which could not be subjected to national control and whose
interests were dictated by an impersonal and international capitalist
system. He was one of many whose faith in the pre war economic system was
shaken to the core by the world recession and the ensuing unemployment
problem. Gibson also believed that industrial society tended to destroy
national values and identities in contrast to that of rural communities
which strengthened a collective sense of community. His tendency towards
a corporatist system of economic management was motivated by a belief that
the people were being squeezed by the interests of international socialism
on the one hand and big business capitalism on the other. His conviction
that the nation had to manage both of these forces in the interests of the
population at large led him to make a dangerous statement in favour of some
kind of dictatorship.
"However much we disagree with part of Hitler's policy and
activity we must not allow such disagreement to make us forget
that the basis of his economic belief, is, to quote an authority,
the destruction of the great industrial and financial state
laboriously erected in Germany during the first quarter of this
century - the cumbrous, complicated, incredibly artificial
tate symbolized by the immense horizontal trusts of the late Hugo
Stinnes. In its place will grow a state of small farmers,
craftsmen, professional workers, a pyramid with agriculture at
its base."(43)
Although Gibson was an astute commentator on economic affairs, his
disillusionment with the free trade capitalist system led him to adopt
romantic notions which, in many ways, were backward looking and the
tendency towards autarky was symptomatic of economic introspectivism. His
remedy for the problems of the Scottish economy was almost quite naive in
its simplicity. Gibson argued that over-centralisation, of any kind, was
the principal source of economic dislocation.
"Build up, however, a strong rural polity around
the industries settled in the rural areas, and at once
there is provided direct employment - spare time and
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otherwise - for those in these areas and the unemployed
in our cities, provide a market at their door for their
products and with the inevitable increase in the aggregate
local taxable capacity for a material reduction in the rates
payable per unit or per person and advance in social
amenities. More and more land would be forced into use
and no longer would we hear the cry that small holding
or small farming was an uneconomic proposition."(44)
However, such proposals were too abstract and far fetched to be of any
practical use as a realistic solution to the contemporary economic malaise.
Although it has already been stated, and it had to be emphasised, that the
SNP did not adopt specific policies other than those of general intent,
such ideas were important in that they flavoured the Party's outlook and
their political image. There were some realistic and immediately
realisable objectives, such as improving the fishing fleet and the
extension of the tourist industry. However, by and large, most of what
the nationalists advocated was general and non specific and, more often
than not, tended to be rural-centric. In spite of this, few members of
the SNP asked the pertinent question as to how such objectives would appeal
to one of the most industrialised nations in the world.
Another aspect of policy that the Scottish National Party had to clarify
was the constitutional question particularly with reference to the role
that a self-governing Scotland would occupy within the British Empire.
All other nationalist policies were ultimately dependent on how much
independence a Scottish Parliament would enjoy to diversify from the
Westminster Government. Also, as the British Empire was considered vital
to economic interests, it was crucial that the SNP cleared up how their
policies would effect Scottish trade. It was with this objective in mind
that the Duke of Montrose proposed a visit to the Irish Free State,
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Northern Ireland and the Isle of Man, in order to compare and draw lessons
from their respective forms of self-government.(45) The purpose of the
delegation was to find evidence to refute the common arguments against the
nationalist policies, especially the claim that Scotland was financially
dependent on England and that left to her own resources she would not be
able to maintain the same standard of living. It was also proposed that
they would make enquiries as to how a Scottish Government would be able to
help industry, agriculture and fisheries.(46) Other things were also to
be considered:
"The working of the various constitutions, questions
elating to tariffs, quotas, etc. financial relations with
Great Britain, matters affecting Empire and foreign policy,
local government, education, unemployment, etc. were all
examined in so far as they have a bearing on self-government.
Above all we wished to ascertain whether the possession
of self-government provided a moral and intellectual stimulus
to the peoples concerned."(47)
Each system of government was examined and those points which suited and
backed up the nationalist case were emphasised, especially with regard to
economic development.(48) However, the real crux of the matter was in
proving that self-government in no way implied a threat to the British
Empire and, with this in mind, the case of the Irish Free State was
dismissed.
"In any case the unhappy history of Ireland has no
parallel in Scotland and Press comments on affairs in
Ireland have no bearing on the question of Self-government
for Scotland."(49)
The SNP were keen to draw fire away from comparisons with the Free State
and were constantly emphasising how relations between the two nations were
improving. (50) The self-government schemes of the Isle of Man and
Northern Ireland were hailed as shining examples of how Home Rule did not
impair loyalty to the Crown.
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"The intense loyalty of Northern Ireland and the Isle of
Man disposes completely of the suggestion that self-
government involves any idea of separation from the
British Commonwealth of Nations or from the Crown as a
symbol of unity."(51)
The report also highlighted how Ulster businessmen were now converted to
Home Rule because of the Administration's efforts to promote their economic
interests.(52) Also, it was shown how self-government led to an improved
use of financial resources with each respective parliament paying what they
considered a proportionate contribution towards the imperial upkeep.(53)
Having resolved the constitutional question, or so it seemed, and having
established a framework for social and economic policies, the leaders of
the SNP hoped to improve the Party's standing by organising an extensive
'Autumn campaign'. Increased speaking tours and local branch activity
were used to try and stir up public support and bring in new members. In
addition to this, the press was courted for publicity and fund raising
activities were set afoot to provide the necessary finance for expansion.
On the surface then, confidence among Party members was high and there were
great expectations for prospects in the new year of 1935.
However, such hopes were forlorn as cracks soon began to appear in the
fragile semblance of unity. As has already been mentioned, the principal
raison d'etre of the SNP was the belief that members could put the
interests of the self-government cause above those of normal political
ideology. However, the expected cohesion which MacEwen and others hoped
for, gradually began to crumble under the weight of trying to reconcile
people who held fundamentally opposing views. The first serious split
occurred at the end of 1934. The cause of the row was a series of
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articles which appeared in the Weekly Herald written by Kevin McDowall who
was one of the principal founders of the Scottish Party. Basically,
McDowall was a fervent imperialist and advocated full support for the
maintenance of the British Empire which, he claimed, was a cause that was
more important than obtaining self-government. He allocated for himself
the responsibility of trying to convert Conservative supporters to the
nationalist cause and the passion of McDowall's commitment was such that
many members of the SNP were worried that they were being represented as a
right wing party.(54) However, it was his emphasis on the British Empire
rather than on self-government which annoyed many nationalists who thought
that although members were allowed to hold their own political views, they
felt that McDowall was causing unnecessary friction and his tactlessness
was endangering unity. As a Party internal memorandum on the issue
explained:
1) On amalgamation it was recognised that there were mere
devolutionists and out and out separatists in the new party.
2) In view of this, all those desirous of carrying on in the
new party and yet of doing everything possible to forward our
cause concentrated on the non-controversial and left alone
points which if discussed could only lead to trouble and which
did not call for an immediate solution."(55)
It was claimed that McDowall's strident views on the Bnpire were both
insensitive and impolitic. Also, his constant forays into the press were
held responsible for misrepresenting Party policy and his aggressive
attitude to those who did not agree with him were another point of
contention. His discipline was condemned as was his unconstructive
attitude.
"Mr.McDowall, practically alone, has persistently defied
this tacit agreement by rather loudly and challengingly
proclaiming his loyalty to the Empire as the first point
in his creed."(56)
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Even those members of the SNP who might have been sympathetic to McDowall's
ideas were appalled by his destructive outbursts. The Duke of Montrose
went so far as to say that "the proper place for anyone with his views was
the Junior Imperial League."(57) The trouble arose from the fact that
McDowall was adamant in his interpretation of Party policy and would not
tolerate any deviation from this view. He claimed that there would be no
withdrawal of Scottish members from Westminster, who would remain there in
order to continue with the running of the British Empire. Although this
was not officially enshrined in Party policy and was open to debate, what
was intolerable was the way in which McDowall castigated those who did not
wholly support him as being separatists and supporters of Sinn Fein.(58)
Even the Duke of Montrose did not escape his wrath. (59) He even went so
far as to accuse leading members of the National Council of breaking with
Party policy.(60) Although there were many in the Party who supported his
ideas on Scottish representation at Westminster, what they could not accept
was the public airing of nationalist disunity and accordingly, McDowall was
given a thorough dressing down by Montrose.(61)
Throughout the first three months of 1935, the SNP leadership endured a
sniping campaign from McDowall and his supporters. The tactics used
became increasingly personal and there were constant threats of
resignations and secessions. A resolution on imperialism was rejected by
the National Council and his attempt to alter the Party's constitution on
the 9th of March, 1935, likewise failed.(62) Although Sir Daniel
Stevenson supported McDowall, his defeat led him and two of his supporters
to resign from the Council including the Treasurer, H.A. Browne. Few
people were unhappy to see him go, especially as he had publicly supported
224
a non-nationalist body. (63) In future it was decided that no member
should take part in any controversy in the press.(64) The Duke of
Montrose wrote to McDowall: "I think it is a great misfortune that you
spend so much time setting snares of an unfriendly nature."(65) while the
National council concluded:
"The cause of the trouble was that Mr.McDowall had supported
another body in the University and at almost every meeting of
the Council had raised trouble, while he had also written the
most insulting letters to the Duke of Montrose."(66)
However, perhaps the most significant aspect about the McDowall secession
was the effect it had on the Party's morale and also the fact that it
raised suspicions about the former Scottish Party group. Former National
Party members increasingly scrutinised their colleagues for sins of
weakness and backsliding. For example, it was thought that McDowall
intended to take Montrose, MacEwen, Sir Daniel Stevenson and Mrs
Burnett-Smith with him. (67) In February, 1935, the Duke was heard to make
favourable noises about the Liberal Party which immediately set off alarm
bells in the mind of Tom Gibson. It was up to MacCormick to reassure him:
"I did not see the Duke's remarks on Liberals but frankly
I am not worried. I know the Duke is sound of head and
anything he says which might jar a little is usually out of
an excess of zeal."(68)
In addition to the prospect of former Scottish Party members forming ties
with other political parties, there was also the problem of a widening of
the left right divide. The Duke of Montrose, for example had made some
rather unflattering remarks about hitch hikers whom he had described as
hooligans. This was picked up by the Forward newspaper, which goaded
socialist nationalists such as R.E. Muirhead and J.L. Kinloch: "Scots
workers are not going to desert their own leaders to follow any Duke or
other well known political reactionary."(69) Further problems were caused
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by the fact that Muirhead had secured for a limited time two columns per
week in Forward to propound the nationalist cause. The two principal
writers were Archie Lamont and Oliver Brown who took a left wing stance on
the self-government question which, again, had to tread a careful line
between adherence to the tacit agreement on avoiding sensitive issues and
expressing a personal opinion.(70) More tension was revealed when R.E.
Muirhead felt it incumbent to correct A.D. Gibb's assertion that his former
comrades in the Labour Party were marxist.(71) All this was further
evidence of a widening gulf between the left and right wings of the SNP.
Not only was there increasing tension between the two opposing ideological
bodies within the Party, there were also considerable strains on the
question of strategy. Many former members of the NPS felt that the
relegation of conventional politics and the promotion of those interests
which only had a national dimension did not favour their particular vision
of Home Rule. It was believed that the Party's present course had an
unnatural bias towards the conservative wing of the movement. Much of
this was purely a question of tactics and where nationalists expected to
gain their electoral support from. Naturally many former National Party
members expected that the reservoir of nationalist support was to be found
among the working classes and accordingly, they expected the SNP would
respond to this fact of political life. However, the restraints of
pursuing a 'national interests' only policy meant that the SNP had the
appearance of a cautious and conservative organisation and made little
direct appeal to those sections of society which were the greatest areas of
potential support. Under the guise of promoting the national interest
Kevin McDowall concentrated his fire on trying to convert former
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Conservative voters and the effect this had on the image of the Party
worried many, including John MacCormick, who expressed his concerns to
MacEwen as early as the Summer of 1934.
"I wonder whether we are in a sense growing too respectable
and too cautious. Are we not more and more shaping our policy
in such a way as to try and appeal to what I might call the
Conservative voter. For example, McDowall's recent
contributions to the press. I would not for a moment wish
to criticize McDowall. He is a great worker and quite entitled
to try and win over the Tories. But on the face of it, should
not our great endeavour as a Party be, to win over that mass
of working and crofting classes...On the one hand the Tory Party
is strong and united as it ever was and more than likely to go
back into power. On the other hand, both the Liberal and
Labour Parties are in very low water."(72)
However, MacCormick was not the only person who began to feel that the SNP
was uncomfortable in its self imposed restraints.
Neil Gunn echoed MacCormick's views to MacEwen and argued that the Party
had to make itself more appealing to their potential supporters. Although
he agreed with the idea of propounding policies in the national interest,
he believed that a more vigorous and direct strategy was required and that
there was little point in trying not to offend Conservative supporters.
He claimed that the SNP had to promote the interests of those people who
were likely to support the nationalist cause at the expense of those who
would not:
"Can we not boldly prepare something for the Autumn
Campaign; a charter for the Liberties, setting forth in
constructive terms the kind of economic and social revolution
we wish to achieve in Scotland. We need to get more idealism,
more passion into the movement and it is along such lines that
it can be done. It is certain that we are not going to capture
the big industrialists and those who follow them. Then why not
forget them when shaping our policy. We need not go cautiously
for fear of offending them, for our very existence offends them
anyway."(73)
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Gunn wanted the Party to clarify and expound directly the nationalist
attitude to the possibility of another war and in his view this meant
pacifism. He also argued that the Scottish National Party ought to take
the side of the smallholder against that of the landowner and that the
rights of tenants had to be improved. Gunn's leftward trend continued by
advocating the nationalisation of key industries such as electricity and
rail transport. Also, he stated that there ought to be more democracy in
the system of government.(74) Although such policies might prove to be
popular with certain sections of society, they would not be accepted by
many key people in the SNP. For example, the Duke of Montrose would not
agree with Gunn's proposals for land reform, nor would any former members
of the Scottish Party countenance the prospect of nationalisation. In the
interest of keeping the peace, such arguments never reached the negotiation
stage and the Party ploughed on with the advocacy of the 'national
interest' idea.
Further pressure was brought to bear on the left when the National
Executive of the National Council decided to bring out a new official
publication in addition to the Scots Independent. The leadership's
commitment to the former NPS newspaper had begun to wane and in January,
1935, publication ceased for a while. Many members of the National
Executive believed that stricter control over official Party publications
was required and that the best way to achieve this was to set up a new
journal with the appropriate safeguards built in from the outset.(75)
Although the Scots Independent did not openly criticise the leadership nor
the strategy that was being followed, it did sail close to the wind on
several occasions with articles propounding the relief of unemployment by
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taxation and withdrawal from the British Empire.(76) As the SI had been in
the hands of radicals since 1926, many former members of the Scottish Party
were naturally suspicious of its motives. The new journal, the Scottish
Standard, was weighted heavily in favour of former Scottish Party members
with three out of the four directors coming from that stable.(77)
Although this widening gulf is evident with the knowledge of hindsight, at
the time such divisions were not considered important and the Party went
ahead with preparations for the forthcoming general election. By the
Spring of 1935 it was proposed that 10 seats would be contested with the
appropriate candidates selected and in place.(78) The Party chose to
fight mainly in constituencies which had already been fought and where
experience had been gained. The leadership believed that the best chances
for the Scottish National party were in Ross-shire, Inverness-shire, and
the Western Isles where political opportunism, branch strength and the land
reform programme combined to give them a fighting possibility of winning.
However, although the leadership was prepared to contest parliamentary
seats, they were not willing to enter into municipal elections, much to the
chagrin of several members on the left.(79)
However, what internal stability and electoral credibility the Scottish
National Party had built up since its inception, was shaken to its core in
May 1935, when the President, the Duke of Montrose, announced his intention
to resign his Conservative whip in the House of Lords and join the Liberal
party. Although he intended to remain with the SNP, his decision shocked
many members. In the first place, few people were even aware that
Montrose held the Tory whip because it was believed that the Party
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constitution outlawed membership of any other political party.(80) At a
previous National Executive meeting the issue had been raised and it had
been decided that dual membership would not be tolerated.(81) Initially,
Montrose proposed in a letter to the Glasgow Herald in May that the SNP and
the Liberal Party ought to merge into one body. (82) The Duke took his
step without any prior consultation and his decision was a unilateral one
which took everyone by surprise. Coming on top of the McDowall secession,
the effect on the Party looked as if it would be calamitous and Neil Gunn
thought that it was imperative that Montrose's decision ought to be kept
secret until after the General Election.
"All I should like to indicate what I feel would be the
result on the fortunes of our Party of the taking of any
decisive or disruptive steps by one at once so eminent
in our Party...There is no doubt that if before the impending
General Election your Grace publicly joined with the Liberal
Party, the effect on the SNP would be near disastrous. I am
just back from a fortnight in the Irish Free State where I
was questioned on the recent break up of the SNP. This
was a reference to the McDowall secession. In short, the idea
has got through that we are disintegrating through repeated
internal disruptions and if you were now made to appear in the
press publicly to sever your connection...with the SNP the effect
on the fortunes of those who continue to fight in the nationalist
ranks would be one of bewildering depression."(83)
Evidently Montrose had either become disillusioned with the Party, or no
longer had any faith in its abilities to bring about self-government on its
own, as his diminishing attendance at National Executive meetings tends to
suggest.(84) He claimed that his principal reason for wishing to join the
Liberals in the House of Lords was that he would be able to use his
influence within that Party to much better effect rather than acting as a
solitary SNP peer. (85) He also argued that he could not represent the
nationalists in the Upper Chamber because there was not a realistic SNP
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policy upon which he could base his actions.(86) Montrose either did not
know that his Party had formulated a limited programme, or he chose to
ignore it. In any case, the impression he gave of being totally out of
touch with the Party of which he was President was an extremely bad
advertisement and embarrassment for the SNP.
On the issue of being a member of another political organisation, Montrose
set the Party a bad example and indeed, his ignorance of what the SNP
strategy was designed to achieve was appalling. He acted as if the long
drawn out and difficult negotiations which had led to the creation of the
SNP had never taken place. On this issue, the President managed to ride
roughshod over most of the inbuilt safety devices that former members of
the National Party had insisted upon before the new party was formed.(87)
For Montrose, there was never any suggestion that he could not belong to
another political organisation and he went so far as to claim that he had
never hidden his membership of the Conservative Party.(88) It became
obvious that he did not believe the SNP was a proper political party as
such.
"The suggestion that I should act as a solitary SNP peer in
the House of Lords without any general policy is quite unpractical
in politics and would do no good whatsoever. I do not see that to
remain Conservative and also a bearer of the SNP is any better
than to become a Liberal and be an office bearer in the SNP -
In either case, a clash of interests is likely to arise at
election times, but it would be more consistent to be a member
of the old party which supports Home Rule than the one who
opposes it."(89)
Montrose could not see any harm in members of the SNP belonging to other
political organisations, so long as they did not oppose Home Rule. The
Duke had a radically different interpretation of nationalist strategy when
compared to others in the Party. As far as he was concerned, the whole
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idea behind the SNP's policy on unity meant that, in a party political
context, members were expected to drop issues concerning conventional
politics.
"I am under the impression that we have agreed to
submerge our opinions on other principles, until such
times as there was a Scots Parliament...You must recollect
that the Scottish National Party has no other policy on
their platform but Home Rule. It is entirely different from
any other Party. But we individually have, no doubt, an
interest in other things besides Home Rule and from time to
time we may wish to promote them. We cannot do so through
the Scottish National Party - it has no general policy, and
therefore it is necessary to do it through other channels or
parties. Do you think that people should really be silent
on tariff questions, financial questions, constitutional or
socialist questions, defence, foreign policy etc?"(90)
The demoralising effect of the Party's President not accepting its own
policies must have been considerable. Also, at the same time, it became
apparent that the popular novelist Annie S. Swan (Mrs Burnett-Smith), who
was one of the SNP's better known catches, was still an active member of
the Liberal Party.(91) Those former members of the NPS who believed that
such actions were incompatible with Party policy now faced the difficult
dilemma of deciding how best to discipline those who would not give an
exclusive commitment to the SNP.
A major problem facing those who wanted to resolve the question of dual
membership was the fact that events had largely overtaken them and there
was no time to organise a coherent response. The annual conference took
place within a week of Montrose's decision and the resolutions submitted
were clumsily put together. It was proposed that members of the SNP
should not be allowed to join other parties, but this was defeated. In
the end, it was left to John MacCormick to cobble together a compromise
resolution which allowed dual membership provided that SNP office bearers
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did not take an active part in the work of an English controlled party. (92)
The very vagueness of the statement effectively allowed things to carry on
as they were and did nothing to put pressure on those in other parties to
leave. With one eye on the forthcoming general election, the leadership
was anxious to prevent any splits or disunity which might affect the
Party's electoral performance. Muirhead and MacCormick favoured a softly,
softly approach to the problem and did not believe that draconian measures
would work. They wanted to gently nudge the offenders back on to the
correct path. As Muirhead explained:
"It was made clear that members of the SNP were expected to
take the same view as the old NPS regarding membership of
English controlled parties...Personally I do not think it is
desirable to expel any member who does not immediately conform
to the NPS practice...It is extremely unfortunate and hurtful
to our Party that several of our prominent members have not
yet left their old parties. We must just continue to show
those members that they are expected to give their whole
interest and attention to the SNP."(93)
In many ways, the biggest barrier to Party unity was MacEwen's original
stress on abandoning conventional politics in favour of an umbrella
organisation which was committed above all to obtaining self-government.
The failure to concentrate on economic and social policies and establish
some form of coherence with regard to overall strategy and Party identity
left gaps, in which divisions and misunderstandings were allowed to develop
and grow. On the eve of the General Election of 1935 the SNP had become
more of a movement, rather than a political party. An irreversible
decline had begun.
Despite some guarded optimism, most members of the Party were not confident
about their prospects for success. The toll of the McDowall secession,
Montrose's and others' involvement with the Liberal Party, and a steady
233
diminution of conmitment in general, meant that the nationalists were in no
fit state to fight a general election. The number of seats to be fought
was cut to seven as a result of inadequate finances and candidates, and
although many members worked enthusiastically and hard, there was an air of
despondency running throughout the campaign.(94)
The leadership did not expect the Party to do well, however, when the
results became known, it was clear that the nationalist movement had
suffered its greatest setback since entering electoral politics.(95) The
SNP had contested five out of seven seats already and in each of them the
Party's performance had declined significantly.(96) Only in Inverness and
the Western Isles, where MacCormick and MacEwen were the respective
candidates, did the SNP put in, by their standards, a decent performance
which in any case was only 16.1% and 28.1% of the votes polled.(97)
A number of reasons can be advanced to explain why the Scottish National
Party did so badly in the General Election of 1935. The principal
weakness of the Party was that their policies were inadequate to deal with
the demands of the electorate. Perhaps the two most significant issues in
the election were the international situation and the problems of the
economy, and in both of these areas, the nationalists were especially weak.
In the international question, the SNP had little to offer in constructive
terms to deal with the problem of heightening tension. As the Party
policy stated clearly that foreign affairs were to be handled by
Westminster Parliament, the SNP could not realistically offer an
independent course on foreign policy and could not detach the Scottish
nation from the British course in the international scene. In any case,
the nationalist candidates on their election manifestoes supported the
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British government's action on Abyssinia.(98) It is hard to believe that
people could realistically be expected to vote for a party which, apart
from only putting up seven candidates, could not bring any pressure to bear
on the course of foreign policy.
On the economic front, the Scottish National Party did propound a number of
policies which were, by and large, constructive. On the election
manifestoes it was proposed that there would be national control of credit,
transport and power and that industry ought to be decentralised, together
with a policy of land reform. (99) However, as it was apparent to members
of the Party that such proposals did not command universal support among
nationalists, it was obvious to the electorate that sincerity and total
commitment were lacking. Given that many of the SNP's policies were of a
leftward persuasion, the fact that many of the Party's leaders projected a
right wing image could not have helped their electoral credibility. This
was not made any easier by the constant portrayals of the SNP as a Tory
organisation by the Labour Party.(100) Perhaps an even greater weakness
was to be found in the fact that the nationalists hardly concentrated on
the problems of the traditional heavy industries and this could not have
endeared them to the working classes in the urban seats. It is
significant that the nationalists did best in Inverness and the Western
Isles where the Party's programmes of land reform, rural development and
promotion of the fishing industry were undoubtedly appealing to the local
electorate.
However, the SNP was not only handicapped by its policies and their
relevance to the electorate, there were also significant organisational
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problems. There is evidence to suggest that many in the Party did not
believe in efficacy of contesting elections and that this was a source of
difficulty in raising finance.(101) Also, many constituencies were
without a proper organisation, and coordination with headquarters was very
poor.(102) There was a failure by the National Council to plan a coherent
election strategy and there was even evidence of confusion among
candidates, especially concerning Elma Gibson who was supposed to have been
replaced by a less experienced nominee.(103) In many constituencies there
were insufficient workers and local branches had not made their presence
felt among the community. Again, it is significant that in Inverness and
the Western Isles, local branches were active and had thoroughly canvassed
their respective areas.(104) Indeed, it was those factors concerning
organisation that the Party leadership put the blame on for their poor
showing, and as such, they were targeted for improvement in 1936.(105)
For many, the election failure could only be attributed to the fact that
the SNP needed a more attractive and coherent set of policies which would
have to be actively promoted by all members of the Party. Others,
meanwhile, believed that it was necessary to reassess current strategy,
even if it meant renouncing contesting elections and instead cooperating
with other political parties. In any case, the one thing all nationalists
agreed upon was that the SNP had, in one way or another, to modify its
approach in its quest for self-government. All this was done amidst an
increasing atmosphere of despondency and a collapsing of morale. On the
7th of February, 1936, Sir Alexander MacEwen offered his resignation as
Party Chairman after a critical article appeared in the January Scots
Independent.(106) It was argued that MacEwen's residence in Inverness was
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a considerable handicap in his dealings with organisation. Also, there
was tacit criticism of the leadership for not pursuing a bold enough
policy. Tom Gibson was aware that the collapse of morale had affected
MacEwen quite badly and it was reported that he was considering rejoining
the Liberal Party. Muirhead, who had always been suspicious of MacEwen's
Liberal tendencies,(107) was convinced that he was intent upon approaching
his former party.
"I also noted in the press recently that Sir Alexander
MacEwen was. considering whether or not he would go forward
as a Liberal Home Ruler...from a conversation with Sir
Daniel Stevenson I think the report in question was correct.
Sir Daniel phoned me at the works today and pressed me for
an agreement that Sir Alexander should go forward on the
joint ticket...I further gathered from Sir Daniel that he
intends to support the candidate of an independent Liberal
unless the SNP agrees to Sir Alexander going forward as a
Liberal Home Ruler."(108)
The prospect of cooperation with the Liberal Party was one which had
existed since the Party was formed. Montrose's decision to take the
Liberal whip was probably aided by the fact that such tendencies abounded
in the SNP. Indeed, the Party organiser, J.B. Webster, was formerly the
full time organiser of the Liberal Party, which, together with a large
number of former Liberals amongst the nationalist ranks, made comparisons
between the two parties obvious. On his election manifesto MacEwen stated
bluntly that he was a Liberal and J.M. MacCormick was especially attracted
to this party. As early as February, 1935, he was toying with the idea of
flirting with the Liberals.
"I do not think that it would do any harm to make our faith
especially attractive to Liberals just now. They are nearest
to us in many respects and more important, are without real
leadership of their own."(109)
MacCormick's intention was undoubtedly to steal the Home Rule mantle from
the Liberal party and establish the SNP as the sole bearer of the
237
self-government standard. Rumours were also circulating in the Party that
MacCormick was planning to form some type of radical movement which would
affiliate to the SNP.(llO) The idea behind this proposal was to provide
those of a more radical persuasion a platform for their ideas. However,
many in the party were opposed to a process of further disintegration and
MacCormick was forced to drop this plan in the meantime.
The shock of electoral defeat and an apparent reversal of the SNP's
fortunes, compelled Sir Alexander MacEwen to reassess the Party's strategy,
especially with regard to cooperation with other parties.
"It seems to me that we should reconsider whether we
should revise our attitude towards members of other
parties...There was a disposition on the part of some
to adopt a too exclusive attitude, and to frown on those
who feel that they can reconcile the promotion of self-
government with allegiance to other political parties. If
we are to attract to our ranks the latent sympathy of which
I have spoken, we must drop this attitude of exclusiveness."(lll)
However, others in the SNP held a completely different point of view and
were determined that the Party ought to stick to its present course. The
failure of the leadership to enter the SNP into the Ross and Cromarty
by-election was lambasted by this wing of the Party, who were doubly
suspicious following MacEwen's pronouncement and the rumours of him toying
with the idea of going forward as an independent Home Ruler.(112) The
official reasons for the SNP's decision not to stand were that after the
general election, the Party did not have enough time to organise a campaign
and also, that in such a large constituency, the logistics were not within
their capacity. Under a banner heading of "How not to do it," the Scots
Independent accused the leadership of a failure of nerve and determination
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and demanded that nationalists ought to contest all by-elections.(113)
All in all, it was hardly an auspicious start to the new year of 1936.
Roland Muirhead's decision to fund the Scots Independent through the
auspices of the Scottish Secretariat opened up a valuable channel for those
who were disgruntled with the direction the Party appeared to be following.
For many, the blame rested fairly and squarely on the shoulders of those
who had shifted nationalist strategy away from that of the NPS towards that
of the Scottish Party. The reason for low morale, it was claimed, lay
with the shift towards moderation.
"The tampering with the wording of the object and policy
which began in 1932 and culminated at the fusion of the
National Party of Scotland with the Scottish Party, must be
held as responsible for the weakening of the enthusiasm
of its members...results of this were the resignation from
the Party of a number of hard working and enthusiastic
Scottish Nationalists, the expulsion of others and the
incoming into the SNP of some very moderate Nationalists.
But more damaging to the Party was its act in putting at its
head a member of the Scottish nobility, that relic of the past,
an action distasteful to the democracy of Scotland."(114)
The Scots Independent also sought to move the SNP over to a much more
radical and left of centre stand point, and was adamant that it was only
from this position that the Party would be able to attain electoral
success. In short, the Labour Party was the hunting ground in which the
nationalists would find the most accessible game.
"Those who engineered the fusion of the NPS and the SP
surely could not have recognised that if the Party was to
grow, it must look to do so from Labour voters, since
Unionists and Liberals (what is left of them) are afraid
of Home Rule as they see quite clearly that if Scotland
gets self-government she will have a radical and Labour
Government, and they hate the idea of Socialism in power."(115)
The original idea of relegating conventional politics in favour of a broad
church movement committed to Home Rule was becoming forgotten as the SNP
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began to divide among a left wing body, which was more strident in the
degree of self-government it wanted, and a right wing or centrist group,
which made more moderate demands. Also, these sections clashed over the
form of strategy the Party ought to follow with the left putting forward
the case for contesting elections, while the right began to stress more and
more the necessity of cooperation with other parties. By the beginning of
1936, both groups had their respective mouthpieces which increasingly began
to disparage each other's point of view.(116)
However, not everything was gloomy in the nationalist camp. The
opportunity of a Scottish Universities by election provided the SNP
candidate, Dewar Gibb, with the chance to redeem the Party's electoral
credibility. For this contest the nationalists were much better prepared
and organised, while Gibb proved to be an able candidate and ran a vigorous
campaign. Of great importance was the fact that all sections of the SNP
enthusiastically supported him. His principal opponent was Ramsay
MacDonald, the National Government's candidate, and Gibb came behind him in
second place, polling over 9,000 votes; 31% of the total votes cast.(117)
Although the nationalist obviously benefited from MacDonald's unpopularity
and the reluctance of Tories to vote for a former Labour Prime Minister,
the result was very respectable and did much to raise Party morale and,
despite Gibb's right wing tendencies, he was momentarily the left's
hero.(118) This achievement was believed to vindicate the strategy of
contesting elections. However, not everybody was convinced.
Immediately after the 1935 General Election, the right began to put forward
an alternative method of obtaining self-government which stressed a cross-
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party and, to some extent, an apolitical approach to the problem. In
December, 1935, the Scottish Standard outlined a set of proposals which, it
was argued, should found the basis of the Home Rule movement. Attention
ought to be paid to propaganda and membership of the SNP be opened to all
those who believed in the cause of self-government. Also, it was
suggested that the Party bring together eminent economists, clergymen and
people from the business world, together with leaders of other political
parties in order to work out schemes which would show how Home Rule would
work in practice. Finally, it was proposed that the cross-party movement
press for a plebiscite on the self-government issue.(119) However, Gibb's
result in the Universities in late January, 1936, temporarily put the
brakes on this argument, and it was decided that some seats would be worth
fighting, but not all of them.
The Scottish National Party contested the Dumbarton by election in March,
1936 and did extremely poorly, securing a mere 6.8% of the poll.(120) The
campaign was badly organised and the Party failed to achieve any momentum,
while the Labour party secured a considerable success. This failure came
at a bad time for the SNP and wiped out the small degree of confidence
which Gibb's result at the Universities had built up. Both sides of the
divide in the Party intensified their campaigns to move the organisation
towards their particular direction and morale was low when members met for
their annual conference in May, 1936. A whole battery of opposing
resolutions were put forward and the end result was an uneasy compromise,
which both sides interpreted as a victory. On the issue of membership, it
was announced that those who belonged to other political parties could
remain on the understanding that they did not hold office. Also, the
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objective of the party was shortened and simplified to "Self-government for
Scotland", with all other subsidiary clauses concerning the Empire and
Commonwealth removed. The idea behind this was to remove all frippery and
there was a forlorn hope that somehow this would prevent disputes if it was
not there. Needless to say there were a multiplicity of interpretations.
Some believed that it meant self-government in the fullest possible sense,
while others argued that it was a broadening of the Party's parameters to
include anybody with an interest in achieving some form of Home Rule. A
resolution concerning cooperation with other parties was held over until a
special conference in October.(121)
Many were unsatisfied with the results, including Tom Gibson who demanded a
purge of all those who belonged to other parties.(122) On the whole the
radical wing seemed to do best, although their account of events was more
pessimistic than that given by the Scottish Standard.(123) Montrose and
MacEwen gave up their positions and were replaced by Muirhead as President
and Gibb as Chairman. Although Gibb was on the right of the Party, he did
not believe in cooperating with other organisations in contrast to his
former allies.(124) However, his assessment of the SNP's fortunes was far
from optimistic.
"The Party seems to be slowly disintegrating. Montrose
is joining the Liberal Party. MacEwen is resigning from
his post as Chairman and I have had to take it on. MacCormick
is (together with Oliver Brown) evidently wanting to form a
Socialist Radical group, with what relationship to the Party
I know not. Resolution after resolution was on the paper
indicating a desire for the conservation of our strength for
the fighting of proper elections to the exclusion of mad
adventures like the last Dumbartonshire election. A good
period of regeneration and reorganisation was plainly the
wish of the Party."(125)
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The nationalist movement was riven with suspicion and although everyone
agreed that recuperation and reorganisation were necessary, a number of
protagonists were keen to put the SNP on a different direction. As far as
the Scots Independent was concerned, the divisions which were now splitting
the Party were irreversible.
"Many delegates stated that fighting elections was a waste
of money. We take an entirely opposite view...this lack of
progress and even the tendency to decrease...is fully
accounted by the fusion of the National and Scottish parties.
When a right wing organisation is fused with a left wing
organisation the whole body suffers a set back."(126)
For this section of the Party, there could be no question of compromise and
they were furious at the decision not to contest the Springburn by
election.(127) For the radicals, the constituency seemed ideal because of
its working class nature and its easy access to SNP activists. Many
believed that a left wing nationalist campaign would prove electorally
popular and would not accept the official explanation that there was not
enough time to organise.(128) For some, it smacked of a right wing
conspiracy. For others such as Tom Gibson and the Duke of Montrose, the
alternate tendencies of the left and right, proved to be too much and both
resigned in protest.(129)
The special conference of October, 1936, paved the way for the leadership
to open up negotiations with other parties in order to obtain cross party
cooperation on the Home Rule issue. The architect of this plan was John
MacCormick who had never really relinquished his pet idea of a Scottish
Convention.(130) He believed that fighting elections was not proving
243
successful and would take far too long to achieve any worthwhile results.
MacCormick wanted nationalists to get under the skin of the establishment
and pursue every possible avenue which could further the aims of the
self-government cause. Accordingly, he started to set up negotiations
with the Liberal Party because he believed that they would be most
susceptible to his ideas.(131) The confusion which existed in the Party
at this time allowed MacCormick a freer hand than would normally have been
the case. Even some of those who would not have previously approved of
such a scheme, such as Neil Gunn, accepted the proposal out of desperation
that the SNP had to somehow get itself out of the morass in which it now
found itself. However, Gunn still had doubts about MacCormick's strategy.
"The inherent danger in your plan is a subtle dissipation
of national energies and a transference of a personal
loyalty to another Party...It might be possible, as you
suggest, to work within the Liberal Party...what is now
before the Party challenges in a fundamental way the past
tactics of the Party."(132)
However, irrespective of whatever strategy the SNP followed, many,
including such diverse personalities as MacEwen, Gunn and Lamont, believed
that the Party had to put forward a coherent economic policy and it was the
absence of this factor which accounted for their poor electoral
performance.
Gunn believed that the SNP's electoral strategy could not be judged
properly and that any attempts at cross-party cooperation might be
pre-emptive in view of the fact that, if they could put forward an
attractive economic programme, the electoral success which they had striven
for, might not prove so elusive. He argued that it was the lack of such a
policy which had crippled the SNP at the polls.
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"In short we are driven back on the old question of
an economic programme...and I am convinced that any
patchwork prograrane - partly socialist, partly Tory etc.,
such as we now have formed up - it is not of the slightest
use...It seems to me, it logically forces on to us one of the
two alternatives: either the Party adopts one of the existing
economic faiths such as socialism or liberalism and goes all
out on it on a national basis or it follows the suggestion
of your (MacCormick's) memorandum and acts through all the
other parties, remaining itself, the rallying ground and
inspiration of the self-government movement."(133)
For Gunn. the SNP had to form an economic policy, or effectively cease to
exist as a normal political party. The left of the Party used the Scots
Independent to voice their claims for a left of centre strategy and
advocated social reform and extensive nationalisation(134) Alexander
MacEwen used the Scottish Standard to put forward his proposals for
reconstruction and enlisted the assistance of prominent economists to
analyse the problems of the Scottish economy and suggest remedial
measures.(135) However, most of these projects were constructed within
the parameters of the British nation and seldom took into account the role
of a Scottish Parliament. Many of the measures put forward were taken on
board by the SNP, although the reality of the situation was little
different from before. The principal problem concerning the nationalist
economic programme was not so much its content, but the degree of
seriousness with which the Party took it.(136) Also, the SNP still had
little to offer in realistic terms with regard to Scottish industry as it
then stood. Within the Party there were two strands of economic thought.
On the one hand, there was the left wing of the movement which advocated
policies dependent on Scotland having more or less total economic freedom.
The right wing, meanwhile, argued that expert and cross-party opinion was
vital in formulating solutions to the problems of the Scottish economy as
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it then existed and were, more often than not, unrelated to the question of
self-government.
By the beginning of 1937, the divisions between the left and right of the
Party had largely become meaningless as the SNP became more firmly a left
of centre political organisation. Most of the prominent former members of
the Scottish Party had either left the Party or had ceased to play an
important role in its organisation.(137) Also, the ease with which
socialistically inclined policies were adopted is further evidence of the
decline of the right, although some, such as A.D. Gibb and Robert Hurd,
remained. (138) The main concern of the SNP was now the question of
electoral strategy, and whether or not to cooperate with other political
organisations. This debate had taken place for several years and, by and
large, the dispute did tend to revolve around the left and right wings of
the Party. However, the diminution of the right meant that such
compartmentalisation was no longer possible by 1937, especially as
individuals such as Oliver Brown and A.D. Gibb took contrary positions from
their normal ideological bedfellows.(139) Perhaps John MacCormick best
represented the position in which the SNP now found itself. It was a
radical left of centre political organisation, but committed to cooperating
with other political parties and this, inevitably, meant that the
seriousness with which it took its policies was not quite what it should
have been.
The Party began the year by questioning its current strategy and the
initial optimism which pervaded the nationalist ranks at its inception had
more or less vanished. The leadership began to advocate policies which
more resembled those of a pressure group rather than those of a serious
political party. In the search for an alternative strategy which would
capture the success which had for so long eluded them, the Party put
proposals forward which were a hotchpotch of different measures, often with
little coherence and little thought. Confidence was at a low ebb,
according to D.H. McNeil, who stated that the SNP could not make up its
mind concerning the correct strategy to take and that the Party did not
have the professionalism of other political organisations necessary to
compete against them. The solution, McNeil believed, was to adopt a
broader approach which allowed nationalists the opportunity to pursue their
preferred avenue for success.
"To my mind, active nationalism must now proceed by sections,
some fighting die hard elections, others forming self-
government wings within the Liberal, Labour, and Tory Parties.
What part is the SNP to play in the future...To my mind it
cannot take complete charge of the movement so long as it
maintains its present constitution."(140)
This was more or less a tacit admission that the SNP had given up hope for
winning a substantial number of seats at elections. Other tactics were
taken on board including the setting up of a Convention for Scottish
Self-Government,(141) and informal talks with other Home Rule bodies such
as the ones which existed within the Labour and Liberal parties.(142)
Petitions were sent to the Scottish Universities calling for a report into
the problems of the Scottish economy and attempts were made to establish a
self-government forum among Scottish M.P.s.(143)
However, this line of argument did not hold much water with a substantial
section of the Party which gathered around the Scots Independent. This
body wanted to maintain the normal functions associated with a conventional
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political party including contesting elections and propounding a specific
set of policies. It was believed that the SNP's election prospects would
improve on account of their vigorously propounded economic policy. Archie
Lamont was one person who believed that this was the correct way forward.
"The SNP has recently made great advances in policies.
Already we have economic formulae calculated to break the
back of large capitalism and ensure individual liberty by
means of the small ownership of land and the national
control of transport and banks."(144)
Lamont argued that the Party would improve its popularity if it took up a
strong stand against involvement in war. Consequently, he put forward the
case that nationalists ought to oppose conscription and any involvement
with the war effort until the Scots had a Parliament. The SNP echoed the
popular concerns about the rising international tension and adopted
Lamont's proposals concerning war at their annual conference in May, 1937.
This was done without any difficulty and even Andrew Dewar Gibb acquiesced
in this decision.(145)
In June, the Party had an opportunity to test how its policies would go
down with the electorate with the announcement of a by election in
Glasgow's Hillhead constituency. As the leadership had decided only to
contest seats in which it was perceived that the SNP would do well,
Hillhead seemed an ideal target. It had a large middle class element
which MacCormick hoped to impress and it also encompassed Glasgow
University which had previously proved friendly to the nationalists'
claims. However, the campaign got off to a bad start with the candidate,
MacCormick, stressing aspects of the sectarian divide rather than
concentrating on the SNP's economic and social policies and their attitude
to war. He argued that section 18 of the Education Act which provided for
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separate Catholic schools ought to be abolished and that no benefit should
be paid to the unemployed Irish labourers who had not been in residence in
Scotland for a certain number of years.(146) Although such proposals won
approval from Andrew Dewar Gibb, they caused great resentment among many
members of the Party who believed that such tactics were divisive. Archie
Lamont was most critical.
"I cannot agree to the tactic of appealing to a popular
prejudice against a class who is attracted to Scotland
under capitalism, to become our poorest wage slaves."(147)
He further argued that if there were to be immigration controls then they
ought to be equally applied to the English, who, Lamont believed, were a
greater threat to Scottish society than the Irish.
The campaign was apparently well run, although MacCormick failed to attract
many people to his meetings, and the local population showed little
enthusiasm for the nationalist cause. The result was a poor one with the
SNP coming in last place, securing only 9% of the votes cast.(148) The
failure to secure even a modest showing meant that the leadership, and
especially MacCormick, devoted more effort into achieving greater
cooperation with other parties. He was apparently unconcerned that
members had been leaving in protest at this manoeuvre and believed that
there were no alternatives to the present course of action. He outlined
his thoughts on the matter to that far from sympathetic body, the Scots
Independent. First of all, he dealt with the defections:
"We recognise that their only fault is their failure to
accommodate themselves to the necessities of working in
harness with others. But their defections have been
marked by neither a real loss of strength by the Party
nor by the establishment of any better or more effective
instrument for the achievement of our common ends."(149)
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However, the loose discipline of the Scottish National Party meant that
many of the most ardent opponents of MacCormick's policy did not leave, but
stayed on, fighting through the columns of the Scots Independent a campaign
of attrition. The majority of those who had resigned, like Tom Gibson,
had done so because they believed that the SNP had ceased to function as an
effective political organisation.
MacCormick believed that it was possible for the Party to exist as a
separate entity while cooperating with other parties. He was impervious
to the dangers of the SNP being swallowed up by the other more powerful
organisations and failed to see how such actions might render the party
superfluous as the larger established bodies could take the lead in the
Home Rule cause.
"Only as an independent force can the Party take advantage
of every opportunity to advance its aims. This does not
mean that the Party can never enter into arrangements
with other organisations. I can foresee that our growing
strength will make it desirable for other bodies to angle
for our support and cooperation. As an independent body
there is no reason why we should not strike a bargain
advantageous to ourselves if such a prediction comes true.
I think it quite possible that the time will come
when all progressive parties in Scotland will seek to
cooperate with each other and there are good grounds why
the Scottish National Party, grown stronger in the meantime,
should benefit by such a move."(150)
MacCormick's strategy was based on unguarded optimism and there was no
evidence to back up his claims. Indeed, the Party's performance in recent
by elections tended to suggest that there was little chance of the
nationalists making any sort of political impact. The negotiations which
had been undertaken with the Liberal Party had borne little fruit, the only
outcome of which was to put forward a joint candidate in the Glasgow
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University Rectorial election.(151) Also, the Labour Party was in no
hurry to push things forward with a Scottish National Convention.(152)
MacCormick now went back, publicly, on the Party's previous strategy and
concluded that only in a few selected seats would it be worth putting up a
candidate. The SNP only had to show that their cause was popular for the
other political parties to join in with the Home Rule cause. According to
MacCormick:
"When the Party was founded most of us believed it would
be necessary to win a majority of seats in Scotland before
we could make our demands. I now feel that we were wrong
and after winning at least a handful of seats we may at last
begin to achieve our objective."(153)
The opposition to such a strategy came principally from two directions.
On the one hand A.D. Gibb rejected such cooperation, largely because of his
political convictions and, on the other hand, there was a group which
largely resembled the Fundamentalists in the old NPS. Gibb argued that the
Party had to maintain unity and that alliances were dangerous in that the
SNP could be taken over, after all, "It is the National Party and no other
which has put the question of self-government into prominence. "(154)
Also, Gibb was ideologically opposed to the Liberal and Labour Parties and
feared that involvement of these bodies could lead to a socialist Scotland,
something which he did not approve of. He argued firmly that the concept
of popular nationalism should take precedence over all other concerns.
By the end of 1937, there was a clearly defined group within the SNP which
was ideologically committed to the left, convinced of the efficacy of
contesting elections and, perhaps most important, argued the case for an
independent Scotland with no strings attached to Westminster. Many of the
Fundamentalists who were expelled from the NPS were back in ranks of the
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Scottish National Party. Arthur Donaldson, Angus Clark and others were
writing in the Scots Independent demanding independence in the fullest
sense of the word and based their vision of the future on the Scandinavian
model, rather than as a partner in the British Empire. Indeed, a
considerable degree of hostility towards the Empire surfaced. According
to Angus Clark:
"Nationalists should never forget that the ills from which
our country suffers come from the English Empire. The
saddest pages in our history were not only made possible,
but inevitable by the foolish and pathetic devotion of our
people to Britishism and Imperialism."(155)
Other nationalists such as Robert Muirhead believed that Empires were a
thing of the past, while Arthur Donaldson argued that, in the event of war,
the British Empire would not last.(156) The idea that Scotsmen should go
to war to defend the imperial tendencies of the British state was one that
was especially repugnant to this group. Indeed, as early as March, 1938,
plans were being made in opposition to the possible introduction of
conscription. Arthur Donaldson was prominent in this movement. He wrote
to Muirhead:
"The intent of this letter is to ask you if you
know of any preparations being made to organise Scottish
opposition to compulsory service under present conditions.
My idea would be the formation of a new organisation...
and the preparation of a covenant pledging all its
signatories to refuse to submit to compulsory service,
military, industrial or otherwise."(157)
However, there were also other indicators pointing to the existence of a
more militant brand of Scottish Nationalism.
In January, 1938, the growing division within the ranks of the SNP was
highlighted in the Scottish Universities by election, where A.D. Gibb was
the nationalist candidate. Almost immediately Archie Lamont announced in
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Forward that he would not be supporting the Party Chairman and instead
urged people to vote for the Labour Party.(158) The reasons for Lamont's
actions were obvious enough. He claimed that Gibb was really a
devolutionist and that his ideas and political convictions were repugnant
to the Scottish people. (159) Lamont was able to do this safe in the
knowledge that there was unlikely to be any disciplinary action taken
against him as the Party's structure and coherence had almost ceased to
exist. In spite of this, Muirhead was furious.(160) Party discipline
was now becoming a major problem especially in view of the fact that just
two months previously Oliver Brown was openly campaigning for the Labour
Party at Greenock.(161) However, given the gulf in ideological
convictions which existed within the SNP and the differences of view
concerning electoral strategy, there was little anyone could do to hold it
together. In many respects the Party simply drifted apart with both sides
of the divide on the issue of cross-party cooperation, effectively going it
alone on their respective projects. The Universities by election only
became acrimonious because Gibb and the Fundamentalists, although agreeing
on strategy, were poles apart concerning ideology. In any case, the
result was a bad one with Gibb only able to secure 18% of the vote, coming
bottom of the poll.(162)
While MacCormick and his wing of the Party pursued the formation of the
Scottish National Convention, the remainder of the SNP fought to establish
ideological superiority. Essentially Gibb was massively outnumbered,
however, he still held the Chairmanship and was respected by MacCormick and
his friends who intervened to ensure that his position was secure.(163)
Gibb was also, to some extent, protected by R.E. Muirhead, who kept out
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some of the more severe criticisms from the Scots Independent.(164)
However, there was nothing he could do to stop the adoption of left centre
policies which, in any case, both Muirhead and MacCormick supported, much
to the chagrin of Gibb, especially the decision to support the anti-Fascist
League. The leftward movement of the Party was something he wanted to
stop but was powerless to prevent, although much of this was only his
imagination and was not universally shared with other moderates. Also,
Gibb was a latent supporter of Fascism which was a fact he kept quite
secret from others in the SNP. Early in 1939, he wrote to MacCormick and
informed him of his intention to resign from the party if certain demands
were not met. These included an overhaul of the SNP's organisation and
MacCormick's position as the Honorary Secretary to be properly defined.
Also, and most importantly, he demanded that the Scots Independent be
purged of its left wing bias and instructed to cease criticisms of the
leadership.(165) Throughout 1938, the intensity of the attacks on the
Party's direction increased and previous attempts to bring it under control
were firmly rejected.
"Prof. Gibb should understand in a paper like the
Scots Independent where all sides have freedom,
never meant the worsting of the truth. I (Archie Lamont)
have dealt with Gibb's prejudices in the past and I
shall deal with them in the future, when and how I
choose."(166)
Also, the Scots Independent was opening up its columns to all sorts of
people whom Gibb described as undesirable, among whom was Hugh MacDiarmid
(C.M. Grieve) who was now putting forward the Communist Party's line on the
Home Rule question. (167)
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Gibb detested communism and socialism and could not rest easy with the
thought of the SNP cooperating with the anti-Fascist League which was
widely perceived as being an organisation of the far left.
"I hate communism with all my heart and, despite the
uninformed outcry against Fascism, I can see it as
the world's greatest danger. In Scotland more than in
England, hatred of Hitler is the order of the day. The
communist rats, recognising in him the single force which
has their measure and can deal with them, are all for
moderation and for an alliance with the other so called
forces of the left against what they please to call the
fascist menace."(168)
For Gibb, the enemy was not Fascism, but Communism, and the fact that the
SNP was in an alliance with the CP appalled him. All the more so because
he was favourably disposed towards Hitler and Mussolini.
"I have every respect for Hitler and Mussolini and intense
admiration for them in almost every way...My own view on
Hitler's Jewish policy, after discussing it with German
supporters of the regime, is that much right is on his side...
I agree that coinnunism is too largely Jewish in origin
and development."(169)
In addition to anti-Catholicism, Gibb had acquired
anti-semitism and should his views have become public, the
the SNP would have been inestimable. However, such
remained private.
Initially, Muirhead was reluctant to give into such pressures concerning
the Scots Independent and, consequently, Gibb offered his resignation on
March 2nd, 1939. His official reasons for wanting to leave were that he





fact that the Party was moving too far to the left.
"Any pretence that the Party is not overwhelmingly socialist
must now be abandoned...it has become intolerable for me to be
constantly confronted with articles in the SI which I find
myself in absolute disagreement with...The Party has a
curiously contradictory determination not to do anything
which would wound the feelings of the Irish Roman
Catholics."(170)
Also, the reply from Gibb's confidant reveals that the circles in which he
was now moving were far from healthy, if indeed, sane.
"The Party's manifesto which appeared in the SI recently
appeared to be convincing evidence of the ascendancy
within the Party's council of a reckless and subversive
element that was prepared to sacrifice Scotland's interests
for the sake of International Jewry and the doctrines of the
Jewish ideology."(171)
However, Muirhead was anxious to prevent another schism and the resulting
bad publicity that would follow the resignation of the Party's Chairman and
reluctantly agreed to bring the Scots Independent under the direct control
of the leadership.(172) As a result of this compromise, Gibb held over
his resignation and agreed to remain on as Chairman for the time being.
In any case, Muirhead, although in sympathy with much of what was written
in his journal, was worried about its increasing tendency towards
extremism. The Scots Independent had given support to the IRA and allowed
Wendy Wood access to its pages and as a result of this, it was decided to
withdraw it from sale at the annual conference.(173) Although the SNP
took over the journal in the late Spring of 1939, it was only an uneasy
peace that ensued and the criticisms, though modified, still flowed.
However, with the approach of war, attention was drawn away from this
dispute which seemed trivial compared with what was happening elsewhere in
the world.
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In January, 1939, the creation of a Scottish National Convention was
announced, which was the result of two years of negotiations carried out by
John MacCormick on behalf of the SNP. It was hoped that this organisation
would be able to find a solution to the impasse which the self-government
movement now found itself in. In many ways, the Convention was a success
for MacCormick because he was able to secure genuine cross-party
cooperation and hopes were high, especially as the Labour Party was once
again showing interest in Home Rule.(174) The attention paid to securing
cross-party cooperation meant that there was a diminution in interest in
contesting elections. In the Sumner of 1938, it was decided that the
Party would contest no more than five constituencies.(175) Also, branches
which requested a sitting candidate were refused.(176) The principal
problem with the Convention was that it was slow in getting off the ground
and was only able to pass draft resolutions in late September, by which
time war had been declared and the project had to be abandoned. Obviously
the exigencies of wartime would put a brake on future progress. However,
by this time, attention in the Party had moved away from the question of
endorsing cooperation or going it alone, and revolved around the issue of
involvement in the war. Unlike the previous dispute, in which members
could back the Convention, while still supporting the principle of
contesting elections, or vice versa, the problem with the war was that it
was a case of being for or against, and there was no halfway house. At
the annual conference of 1939, the SNP backed down over the question of
non-involvement and, reluctantly, agreed to support the war effort.(177)




The SNP During the War, 1939-1945.
When war broke out in September, 1939, the SNP had already begun to display
all the hallmarks of a political organisation which was fundamentally
divided and lacked any sense of a positive direction.(1) For several
years, the Party had built up a continuing mountain of problems, none of
which appeared to be anywhere near to being soluble. Amongst the most
pressing of these were an uninspiring leadership, poor discipline, low
morale, declining branch activity, increasing financial pressures, and
last, but not least, the stigma of being nothing more than an
inconsequential fringe group in Scottish politics.(2) As if this was not
all bad enough, the impact of war compounded the situation by forcing the
leadership to face up to a particularly difficult dilemma and formulate a
wartime strategy which would prevent the nationalists from splitting into
hostile and opposing factions. In many ways, the SNP had created a facade
of unity which had been founded on little more than a unanimous
condemnation of the foreign policy of Neville Chamberlain. Now that the
war had finally arrived, the Party had to take on board the fact that for
three years their members had, in theory at least, pledged themselves to
refuse to serve with any of the Crown forces until the Government acceded
to their demands for self-government. (3) This policy of
anti-conscription, which many in the conservative wing of the organisation
were uneasy about, had come home to roost with a vengence(4). The
leadership was totally unprepared, and their resolution to back the 1937
Conference decision began to waver as they considered the ramifications of
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not only refusing to offer full compliance in the war effort, but also
endorsing a campaign which would be widely interpreted as being unpatriotic
and a hindrance in the armed struggle. The confusion and procrastination
was exacerbated by the nationalist penchant for adopting contradictory and
ambiguous resolutions whose primary function was to appease the various
factions and maximise the semblance of unity. It was in keeping with this
tradition that, while still pledging opposition to the introduction of
conscription, the Party passed a motion at their annual conference in May
1939, which supported "measures for Scotland to play a full part in the
defence of the country."(5) Furthermore it was agreed that compulsory
enrolment in the armed forces would be tolerated, provided that the
Government gave a commitment to the effect that "conscript and all other
forces are only to be used for the defence of Britain or to fulfil the
moral obligations involved in a real system of collective security".(6)
Where the SNP stood on the question of participation in the war effort,
and, more importantly, the issue of whether or not nationalists would do
military service, nobody, not even the leadership, knew. In the first few
weeks which followed the outbreak of the Second World War, the Party
vacillated in all directions, desperately seeking a strategy which would
free them from the contradictions of their previous policies.
Within the hierarchy the clique which had gathered around MacCormick and
William Power, the journalist and former editor of the Scots Observer, took
the decision to give a qualified public declaration in support of the war
effort.(7) This was done without any formal consultation with the other
members of the National Council and was based on the pretext that it was
their duty to defend the Scottish nation from the possible threat of German
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aggression.(8) MacCormick effectively staged a coup d'etat which
by-passed the section of the SNP which advocated a more militant stance
against involvement in the war, much to their extreme annoyance.(9) In
any case, the argument was put to them that, whether they liked it or not,
they were now at war and the realities of the situation left them with no
alternative course of action. MacCormick claimed that to refuse to give a
commitment to the war effort would lower the Party's already limited public
esteem and, more importantly, it was their duty to aid the interests of
national security in order to defend their liberty and democracy.(10)
Also, the leadership was acutely aware that should the NP embark on a
policy of non-cooperation, it would open them up to the charge of
treasonable activities and the full onslaught of a government
clampdown.(11) Furthermore, given the volatile nature of public opinion,
MacCormick was anxious not to be wrong footed into marching the SNP along a
route which went against the popular mood of the nation. In public, the
leadership emphasised that the principle behind the decision to go to war
was right, although in private many harboured serious doubts.
"Scotland and the Scottish people are in ever present danger
of attack from without. We see no alternative to resolute
defence. Our country must be protected with all the means at
our disposal...we are unflinching in our determination to assist
with all means in our power towards the defeat of Nazi Germany."(12)
The public face of the Party, the Scots Independent, was edited by John
MacDonald who was militantly pro-war, and from the outset, the official
nationalist periodical put forward the message that the rank and file
should endeavour to protect their comtry from invasion. Also, it was
claimed that they had a moral obligation to help defend the freedom of
their fellow small European nations.
"The SNP maintains its attitude of last month, and being
prepared to support a war which is fought for the liberties
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of small nations, wishes to be assured that these are the
Government's objectives, and therefore, wishes the
Government to publish its war aims."(13)
In keeping with a policy of cautious acquiescence, the Party offered its
services for civil defence purposes and agreed to give full cooperation to
the Ministry of Information.(14) Also, members were actively encouraged
to apply for posts in wartime administration and the facilities of the SNP
officers were offered to Tom Johnston, the Scottish Regional
Conmissioner.(15) On the surface it appeared as if the nationalists were
prepared to throw their lot in with the struggle against Nazi Germany,
although behind the scenes the reality was quite different.
In spite of the fact that the Party had officially come out in support of
the war, most members of the hierarchy were uneasy about the situation and
were still trying to ascertain the direction in which public opinion was
moving. As part of the policy of keeping a foot in both camps, it was
emphasised that they would not unconditionally follow the lead of the
Chamberlain Government. There was an initial consensus among the
leadership that war could still be avoided and many were convinced that a
peaceful settlement could yet be reached.(16) This line of argument was
most fervently pushed by the Chairman, Andrew Dewar Gibb, who for the next
two years was to spend a considerable amount of time denouncing the
Government for grossly mishandling the international situation.(17)
Others displayed much more ambiguous tendencies, such as John MacCormick,
who, while still supporting the mobilisation for war, attended peace
rallies as a principal speaker and called for an end to hostilities and an
immediate armistice.(18) Other prominent members of the National Council,
such as R.E. Muirhead and J.L. Kinloch, stuck fast to their ILP tradition
261
and argued that the nationalists ought to take the lead in establishing an
anti-war movement, which, they believed, would attract popular support.(19)
However, in spite of these misgivings and political meanderings, the thorny
question of conscription and whether Party members ought to refuse to do
National Service still remained as the Government had no intentions of
meeting the SNP's demands to instigate self-government. In a desperate
attempt to prevent the Party from carrying out its threatened
anti-conscription resolution, MacCormick twice wrote to the Scottish
Secretary of State, John Colville, in an effort to obtain Government
assurances that they "recognise the right of all small nations in Europe,
including Scotland, to self-determination."(20) However, such pleas fell
on deaf ears and no reply was received, and with this went any hope of an
easy opt-out. On the 7th of October, the National Council overwhelmingly
voted to support any young nationalist who refused to be conscripted on
political grounds, and indeed, MacCormick offered his legal services to
defend them.(21)
Given the fact that the SNP was supporting the war on a point of principle
and was participating in the measures for civil defence, while, at the same
time, rapidly moving towards an anti-conscription policy, many members felt
that there was an urgent need to clarify the Party's attitude to wartime
activity.(22) Confusion was rife among the rank and file, who felt that
the leadership's directives were both contradictory and misleading. The
anti-conscriptionists claimed that their case, and official policy for that
matter too, was being adversely affected by the fact that the Government
had been given a bond of loyalty to help in the war effort.(23) Others
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argued that the hierarchy ought to encourage nationalists to refuse
National Service and instigate a more vigorous campaign of opposition.(24)
However, MacCormick refused to issue a statement elaborating on the SNP's
attitude to the war, believing that the time was not yet right for such a
move. Indeed, the first official communique to the local branches from
Headquarters following the outbreak of war contains no mention of the
anti-conscription issue, and the Party was set the rather unimaginative
goal of political survival as the top priority.(25) As was mentioned
earlier, MacCormick was anxious to avoid being pressurised into taking any
steps which might prove to be politically inexpedient. Accordingly, the
SNP embarked on a seemingly ambiguous policy which took just enough steps
to keep both the pro-war and the anti-war factions in check, while
MacCormick mapped out the lie of the political landscape ahead.(26)
However, by keeping the organisation in a deliberate state of limbo, the
leadership bought enough time to dissipate any powerful surges of militant
pacifism which may have been spreading through the ranks.
Although MacCormick was sympathetic to the claims of individual
conscientious objectors, he would not countenance any effort to organise an
anti-conscription campaign as this was a form of action which he believed
to be, in both a moral and political sense, fundamentally wrong and
irresponsible.(27) Some, such as Douglas Young, the Chairman of the
Aberdeen branch, and Arthur Donaldson, leader of the Scottish Neutrality
League, which had now changed its name to the United Scotland Movement,
were becoming more strident in their demands for a high profile plan of
opposition to the introduction of conscription, and called on members to
carry out official Party policy. (28) However, MacCormick and Gibb
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skilfully manipulated the National Council meetings in such a way as to
deny their opponents the necessary forum from which they could launch their
intended campaign.(29) Also, the Scots Independent began to make
strenuous efforts to dampen down anti-conscription enthusiasm and the
membership was repeatedly warned of the dangers of taking precipitous
action.
"In the interests of Scotland we have to save what can be
saved of her. It would be possible for nationalists, no
doubt, to run their heads into the noose, and get themselves
thrown into prison or put before a firing squad. In that way
many would be cut off and the movement disrupted. But would
that be of much avail after the war, when the time comes again
to resume, as nearly as possible, where we left off? Surely
not...Praise peace then, and help on its coming. Keep together
in your organisation. In serving the defence of your country,
keep together in your units as far as possible."(30)
Instead of jumping headlong into militant pacifism, the rank and file were
urged to keep calm and concentrate on the rather mundane task of
maintaining the SNP as a functioning political organisation.
From the outset of war, political survival was deemed to be the National
Party's first and most important priority. With having only a short and
rather turbulent history behind them, and having little or no elected
members serving in any tier of government, the SNP was especially
vulnerable and susceptible to wartime disruptions. Also, by concentrating
on a purely administrative strategy, MacCormick was able to divert
attention away from the more militant forms of activity which were being
bandied about. In order to keep the Party's fragile organisation intact,
members were urged to try and obtain administrative jobs or work connected
with civil defence, rather than join the armed forces. It was proposed
that propaganda efforts would still be carried out and that branch activity
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should continue as near as was possible in the circumstances.(31) The
hierarchy was aware that they did not have the financial reserves or the
grass roots stability of the other political parties and unless concerted
action was taken, there was a very real danger that their own organisation
would be swept away in the ensuing chaos of a society at war. (32) The
issue of conscription was a factor which was responsible for a massive
destabilisation of the SNP and MacCormick tried to defuse the situation by
limiting nationalist ambitions until after the war, by which time, he
claimed, the opportunities would be greater. In the meantime, it was
argued, the rank and file should content themselves with the preparatory
work necessary for the peacetime reconstruction.
"We must preserve the Party. The Council's policy in these
times is guided by the belief that at the end of war, a
great opportunity will be afforded to Scottish nationalists.
It is therefore vitally important that the Party carry on its
work in the meantime, increase its influence on Scottish
opinion, and prepare itself with the full consciousness
of the responsibilities which may yet fall on it."(33)
In many ways MacCormick's strategy was a success. He was able to hold off
the anti-conscription challenge until December, when a special conference
was called to debate future policy. By that time the mood of the SNP,
certainly the National Council, had come to accept that there was no
alternative to fighting Hitler and that any attempts to organise a mass
anti-conscription campaign would be both futile and damaging to the
nationalist cause. In any case, the deliberate stalling and the
leadership's refusal to give a clear line of action, meant that those
members who had been called up in the meantime would have to act according
to their own conscience and judgement, rather than rely on any notions of
official Party policy. The vast majority offered no resistance and by the
end of the year there had only been one reported case of a nationalist
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refusing to be conscripted.(34) More than anything else, the fact that
there appeared to be no popular rank and file support, although it can be
said that few members were likely to stand up on their own, emerged as the
most significant factor in preventing the SNP from adopting any serious
notions of an anti-conscription campaign. With the number of people
backing their case rapidly declining, those who advocated non involvement
in the war effort found that their position had dramatically weakened.
On the 12th of December, MacCormick finally bowed to the pressure of Party
activists and a special conference was held in order to debate proposals
for future strategy and, in particular, the motion from Douglas Young's
Aberdeen branch that "The SNP should not observe the political truce,
should not cooperate with the Government, and should assert the right of
Scotsmen to refuse military service to a non-Scottish government."(35)
However, a grim mood of realism had spread throughout the Party and few had
serious doubts as to the outcome. Most members were aware that the war
in Europe was being fought for ideals with which they totally concurred,
and that such ideals, for the meantime, were more important than the
furthering of party political interests. Neil Gunn captured the
prevailing fatalism with which the recourse to arms was gradually becoming
accepted as inevitable.
"I should imagine that the great majority of members
believe in prosecuting the war, and the (National) Council's
position is accordingly a difficult one, particularly as opinion
is even divided there. I think myself it is very necessary to
keep the Party in being and the effect of any step should be
considered accordingly. Take these Aberdeen resolutions,
for example, do they emanate from a large body of opinion,
or a very small one?...The position therefore, to me, is
that we must press as strongly as possible and by all
means to realize our aims, but not in such a manner
as to disassociate, implicity or explicitly, from such
forces as may be fighting to retain individual expression
266
of opinion...this very freedom is, as I say, implicit in
the Scottish tradition...1 am aware that many members may
think that this is an Imperialist war all round. I have,
I may emphatically say, a great deal of sympathy with that
view. But the fact does remain - and we have to face it -
that here (in contradistinction to some other countries) we
can press publicly for our aims, that we can express our
opinions about the Westminster Government."(36)
In many ways the argument boiled down to a question of priorities and most
members, however reluctantly, were forced to accept that the preservation
of democracy was more important than the transient principle of refusing to
serve a British Government in wartime. Also, although many were
sympathetic towards the aims of the anti-conscription movement, they were
unwilling to support any action which would seriously threaten the fragile
unity of the Party. (37) The Aberdeen motion was defeated, as was a more
extreme one from Bridge of Weir which called for an even greater campaign
of opposition to the war.(38)
However, by way of a compromise and motivated by the prevalent need to
maintain unity, it was agreed that moral support would be forthcoming to
those who refused to be conscripted on account of their political beliefs.
"The Party, while recognising the majority of the Scottish
people have acquiesced in conscription as a necessity in the
present emergency, nevertheless considers, and will strongly
urge, that the definition of conscientious objections should
be enlarged to include objections based on profound political
convictions."(39)
This resolution helped to patch over differences and, more importantly,
provided Young and Donaldson with the necessary loophole through which they
still continued their anti-conscription activities. However, in spite of
this sizeable maverick element, the majority of the SNP decided that they
ought to accept the war as an unavoidable fact of life which would
undoubtedly hamper their progress. In the meantime, it was agreed that
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their energies would be put to most profitable use by conducting themselves
responsibly and preparing the ground for the peacetime effort.
By the beginning of 1940, the Party was formulating the outline of a
coherent policy regarding involvement in the war effort. Increasingly the
leadership put pressure on the anti-conscriptionists to abandon their
campaign. No matter how unpleasant nationalists found the situation it
was stressed that opposition to the war was of no avail.
"An opposition which should confine itself to legal methods
would be ignored. Any other would be silently and easily
suppressed. This is not Ireland or India. The movement is
ten years old not a hundred."(40)
Apart from the practical difficulties which would result from initiating an
anti-conscription campaign, the leadership hammered home the message that
the war was being fought for justifiable reasons. The official policy of
'acquiescence' in the war effort was deemed to be correct because it was
claimed to be in keeping with nationalist philosophy.
"...'acquiescence' is good because the war is just. If a
body of men held fast by freedom, it is surely this Party.
What more natural than that it should range itself behind
those who are seeking to establish freedom in Europe? Were
Scotland free, she should have inevitably taken part in
this war."(41)
In spite of the new official, bellicose attitude, the SNP continued to
exhibit dichotomies within its strategy, as efforts were still being made
to have military tribunals accept the legitimacy of nationalist objections
to military service. While petitions were being sent to Government
officials and MPs on the issue of anti-conscriptionists, the Party was
urging members to take an enthusiastic and active interest in the
war-effort. The rank and file were to maintain a vigilant eye on Scottish
wartime administration and report to headquarters any incidents which
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worked to the detriment of Scottish interests.(42) However, it may be
said that the primary function of such a ploy was, first and foremost, to
involve nationalists in the war effort and draw the sting from those who
advocated a total abstention from England's war.(43) The Scots
Independent toned up its commitment to the struggle against Hitler and the
leadership decided that the newspaper ought to be made more attractive to
the general public, even if this meant that it would no longer reflect the
popular opinions of the SNP membership. (44) Such a move was not popular
with many ordinary activists who believed that they were being left out of
the decision making process which, in turn, only helped to contribute to a
growing feeling of disenchantment with the Party's direction and lack of
coherence.(45)
Although there was a consensus that the SNP should continue to exist as an
independent political organisation, there was still confusion as the exact
role the Party would play in the politics of wartime Scotland. The
leadership was unable to decide whether or not to contest any elections
which might occur or to observe the wartime political trace, in spite of
the fact that they had not been invited to sign it. The pro-war faction
argued the case that to contest by elections would go against the spirit of
supporting the war effort and that the self-government cause would be
better served by concentrating on propaganda and other aspects of pressure
politics.(46) However, such a policy was dangerously inactive and held no
attraction for the bulk of the membership who were increasingly expressing
their frustrations to the organising secretary, J.M. McNicol.(47) By the
time of an announcement of a by election at Argyll in April, 1940, the
issue had not been satisfactorily resolved and various sections of the
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movement were each pursuing their own preferred policy option. MacCormick
was still endeavouring to get the National Convention off the ground, which
had to be postponed indefinitely as a result of the outbreak of war. The
principal idea behind this strategy was to broaden the Party's contacts and
form a Scottish Council of Action which would be composed of various
prominent people. MacCormick sought, and obtained, permission to open up
informal talks with other political parties and influential organisations
with a view to laying down the framework for a united front on the
self-government issue.(48) As part of this process, discussions were held
with the Liberal Party to see if they would be willing to allow J.M.
Bannerman to contest the Argyll seat on behalf of the SNP, and in doing so,
avoid breaking the electoral truce.(49) However, the negotiations were
soon to break down as the Liberals believed that such a strategy was a
trifle risky and were worried about being so closely identified with
extremist elements in the nationalist movement.(50)
Once again opportunism proved to be the determining factor in shaping SNP
policy and MacCormick was reluctant to pass up on the chances that the by
election in Argyll seemed to afford the Party. Given the fact that the
constituency was a Tory seat at a time of rising discontent with the
Government, he believed that it presented them with an ideal situation in
which they could capitalise on Chamberlain's unpopularity. Also, by
registering the discontent with the present course of the war's direction,
the Party was able to convince itself that it was doing no more than its
patriotic duty in demanding a more effective course of action.(51)
Indeed, the clamour for a Tory defeat was such that the editor of Forward,
Bnrys Hughes, wrote to Muirhead suggesting that Oliver Brown, a former
member of the Labour Party, stand as an official nationalist candidate.(52)
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However, the leadership opted for William Power, principally because he was
fiercely anti-fascist and a strong proponent of the war effort, rather than
Brown, who was a leading activist in various peace campaigns.(53) In any
case, Power fitted in with MacCormick's strategy of presenting the SNP as a
patriotic contributor in the struggle to defeat Hitler, and during the
campaign, strenuous efforts were made to play down the Party's involvement
in pacifist activities.(54) In the end, MacCormick's strategy paid off
dividends with their candidate polling over 7,000 votes against the
Conservative's 12,000, which was quite easily the best nationalist
electoral performance to date.(55)
Rather than be taken as evidence of a nationalist upswing, the result was
determined by a number of fortuitous events which combined to give the SNP
an excellent fighting chance. In the first place, Power, as the principal
opposition candidate, was able to pick up the Liberal and Labour vote, as
well as cashing in on the Government's unpopularity. Also, the Tory Party
machine had been adversely affected by the wartime call-up and the SNP was
able to hold a significantly greater number of public meetings than their
rivals.(56) Indeed, it was expected that Power would have done even
better had it not been for the fact that the German invasion of Denmark and
Norway had taken place 24 hours before polling day, which produced a
patriotic swing to the Government.(57) The result helped him to stem the
rising tide of ordinary members' discontents and helped to boost Party
morale. However, perhaps the most significant factor in the campaign was
the aggressive attitude displayed towards the Conservative Party which was
singled out for special treatment on account of its hostility towards
self-government.
271
"Who is not against us is for us. There is but one party
in Scotland avowedly anti-national militantly pro union. We
must sweep that Party out of power in our constituencies. We
must take the lead, we must rally all the enemies of the reaction,
we must achieve that unity of radical thought and purpose which
of itself alone will end the reign of Toryism in Scotland."(58)
This was part and parcel of MacCormick's evolving strategy for the National
Convention and was designed to solicit sympathy from the Liberal and Labour
parties. However, it has to be stressed that the Argyll by election was a
one-off decision and was not, as some members believed, a major policy
initiative. In any case, the issue was further clouded by the outbreak of
German hostilities and the ensuing British political crisis which absorbed
most of the Party's internal debate.
The ending of the 'Phoney war' led to a greater nationalist commitment to
involvement in the war effort and provided the Scots Independent with all
the justification needed to vindicate the current pro-war stance: "with the
brutal invasion of Denmark and Norway, the veil is finally stripped from
the face of Nazi Germany. "(59) More pleas were issued to the rank and
file to join in with civil defence and be on the lookout for fifth
columnists and enemy infiltrators. At the annual conference of May 1940,
members who belonged to pacifist organisations such as the United Scotland
Movement were expelled for engaging in covert actions which both imperilled
the war effort and brought the SNP into disrepute.
"The Council resolved that membership of the United Scotland
Movement - or of any body holding similar aims - is incompatible
with membership of the SNP, and the office bearers of the Party
are hereby authorised to refuse to recognise as a member of the
Party any person who is known to them to be a member of such
bodies."(60)
The foremost victim of this purge was Arthur Donaldson who, with Muirhead's
secret support, was the principal strategist of the anti-conscription
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campaign.(61) The leadership condemned the Movement publicly and,
according to one source, informed the authorities of its activities.(62)
In keeping with the surge towards a greater commitment to the war effort,
the conference took the extreme measure of drawing up plans to form a
provisional Scottish government in the event of communications being cut
with England. The main idea behind this was that they would continue the
struggle against Germany.(63)
However, a more immediate target for the Party's criticism was the
Chamberlain Government and their handling of the military campaign.
"The Council of the Scottish National Party, having considered
the great danger in which the successful German invasion of
Norway has placed Scotland, and being convinced that the present
Government is unfit to undertake the defence of this country,
hereby calls upon the people of Scotland to bring pressure to
bear on their members of Parliament to secure the resignation
of the present Government and demand the appointment of an
effective Secretary of State for Scotland who will be a member
of the war cabinet."(64)
In many ways, the nationalists were merely mirroring the wider attitudes of
society and when the Churchill Coalition was sworn in, the SNP, in a wave
of patriotic enthusiasm, gave them an almost unqualified statement of
support.
"The Council of the Scottish National Party affirms its
intention to support the war effort of the Government,
and its determination to protect Scotland from inequitable
treatment which is not genuinely necessitated by the war
effort."(65)
This keenness to help the Churchill Coalition extended so far as not to
contest elections which might prove embarrassing for the Prime Minister.
However, many members felt that this was going too far, and MacCormick
believed that they could still make political capital by fighting elections
on the issues of "Scottish nationalism and the elementary principles of
democracy. "(66) Dewar Gibb and the pro-war militants put forward the case
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that to fight elections during the current emergency would hinder the war
effort and "would not impress the enemy with the homogeneity of the people
of this country. "(67) The announcement of a by election at Montrose in
the Summer of 1940, brought these tensions out into the open and the
National Council was, more or less, evenly split over the issue. In the
end, it was argued that the present time was not an opportune moment to
contest elections as it would distract people from their civil defence
duties and such action would not be deemed patriotic by the electorate.
However, the most important factor in determining the decision was the
realisation that the Party did not have the requisite resources to mount an
effective campaign.(68) With a significant section of the hierarchy
opposed to the idea of contesting elections, both for political and
practical reasons, the cross-party convention seemed to be the best avenue
for furthering the self-government cause.
In September 1940, John Taylor, the Scottish Secretary of the Labour Party,
published an article in which he outlined proposals for Home Rule after the
war.(69) MacCormick responded warmly to these favourable utterings and
formally put forward the case that self-government would be best served by
the setting up of a united Scottish Front.(70) The principal driving
force behind this idea was a continuation of the anti-Conservative theme
which had been used during the Argyll by-election. MacCormick's position
in the SNP had been strengthened by the resignation of Dewar Gibb, who
found the anti-Tory stance too much to stomach, and his replacement by the
more pliable William Power as Chairman. (71) Gibb had been the stalwart
opponent of the Convention idea and his removal greatly facilitated the
Party's willingness to enter into cross-party negotiations.(72)
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MacCormick was keen to capitalise on the Scottish grievances which appeared
to exist within the Labour movement and he was confident that they would
soon be able to enlist STUC support. As he explained: "they (Scottish
workers) were almost ripe for a movement of secession from the English
Trade Unions, and the discontent at present manifested among the rank and
file would soon be reflected in the Executive."(73) However, MacCormick,
in seeking Labour support, was primarily motivated by expediency and
opportunism, and not any ideological considerations, although such
trappings were used to make the idea more palatable.(74)
Points of contact were soon established in order to set up negotiations
which would formulate proposals for the setting up of a convention which
would debate and put forward plans on self-government and post war
reconstruction. The organisation was described in the following terms:
"Scotsmen and Scotswomen preparing for the attack on
post war problems...composed of representatives from
Scottish industrial, political and cultural bodies
throughout Scotland, so that there may be in being a purely
Scottish representative body which can and will act in
Scottish interests."(75)
The principal SNP demand concerning the Convention was that it would also
press for a plebiscite on the self-government question once the war was
over. Again this was in keeping with MacCormick's philosophy of trying to
find the quickest and least painful way of establishing Home Rule, and it
also had the benefit of circumventing the direct use of political parties
by making the issue the primary concern of a specific popular ballot. It
was hoped that the other political organisations would support this
proposal and it was made known that the SNP would refrain from contesting
elections against official candidates who were prepared to commit
themselves to the plebiscite idea.(76)
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By the beginning of 1941, MacCormick was able to report that his
negotiations with Lady Glen-Coats had been successful and that the
proposals for a plebiscite would soon be discussed by the Liberal Party
Executive.(77) Also, John Taylor had intimated that the Scottish Labour
Party would, in principle, support the nationalists' plans and that they
would ensure that they would suffer little in the way of interference from
their London headquarters.(78) It was agreed that the next step ought to
be the setting up of a special meeting to which all of the parties would
each send three representatives who would plan and frame the proposals for
post-war reconstruction and the plebiscite on self-government. However, a
by-election was in the offing at Dumbartonshire and this, more than any
other factor, coloured the attitudes of the participants involved in the
cross-party talks.
The Liberal Party was the least affected by the ensuing by-election as they
would be unable to contest the seat on account of the electoral pact.
Also, because of their limited number of Scottish MPs, they had little to
fear from the nationalist threat to challenge constituencies which fell
vacant. However, they were keen to ally nationalist support to their
cause and, for sound practical reasons, had no wish to offend them. Many
former members of the SNP had found their way back to the Liberal fold,
which not only helped to strengthen the long standing commitment to Home
Rule, but also acted as an incentive to maintain self-government sympathies
in order to wean potential recruits away from the single issue, and to
date, hopelessly unsuccessful, National Party.(79) MacCormick had always
shown a special dispensation towards the Liberal Party and such attentions
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had not gone unnoticed with many on both sides of the divide claiming that
there was little in the way of policy to differentiate between them.(80)
However, both the Labour Party and the SNP had a lot to gain or lose in the
Dumbartonshire by-election. Few in the Labour Party, which was defending
the seat, needed reminding that it was a National Party intervention in
1932 which kept Tom Johnston from Parliament and John Taylor was candidly
admitting that a similar challenge could present them with problems.(81)
Also, it was the first major test for MacCormick's united front strategy
and a failure at this early stage would have cost him dearly. Although it
is difficult to say exactly how seriously the Labour Party took the SNP
proposals, there was a growing rumbling of nationalist sentiment emanating
from many quarters.(82) However, in the end of the day, pragmatism was
probably the guiding principle as a policy of cautious appeasement was a
small price to pay for the removal of a potentially troublesome electoral
challenge.
MacCormick was convinced that the opportunities afforded by the wartime
truce could be made to work in his party's favour and he was determined to
use this form of political blackmail to wring concessions from the Labour
Party. Concrete assurances were demanded and anything less would not do.
"The Council of the Scottish National Party in
considering its attitude to the Dumbartonshire election,
had before it a friendly reply from the Labour Party in
response to recent approaches. It was decided, however,
to seek further assurances before a final decision should
be reached."(83)
In order to drive the message home, the nationalists went ahead with the
selection of Robin MacEwen, Sir Alexander's son, as their candidate, and
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went through the motions of preparing for an electoral campaign.(84)
MacCormick's ruse worked and the Labour Party was forced to call a meeting
at which they gave the necessary assurances that they were prepared to
support the SNP's proposals for a plebiscite and cross-party cooperation on
the issue of post-war reconstruction.(85) The nationalists grabbed their
opportunity with relish and, after John Taylor had stated quite
emphatically that MacEwen's challenge would present them with problems, one
of the Labour delegation, Bailie McKinlay, was humiliatingly dressed down
and made to publicly recant on his earlier statement that Home Rule was
"nothing more than a political obstruction at the present time."(86)
Also, a further factor in the nationalists' receptivity to the idea of
cooperation with the Labour Party was the appointment of Tom Johnston to
the post of Secretary of State for Scotland on the 9th of February 1941.
A lot was expected from Johnston whose arrival at the Scottish Office was
greeted with a marked degree of enthusiasm. (87) Furthermore, it was hoped
that the conciliatory gesture not to contest Dumbartonshire would rekindle
his former Home Rule fervour and add momentum to the movement for
cross-party campaign for a plebiscite.(88)
"The nationalist decision for or against contesting
Dumbartonshire hinged entirely on the attitude of the
Labour Party towards Scottish self-government in general
and the proposed post-war plebiscite in particular...
After satisfactory assurances were obtained from the Labour
Party, R.R. MacEwen stood down...It is hoped that
Dumbartonshire foreshadows a development in policy which may
yet enable Socialists, Liberals and Nationalists to make common
cause for a Scottish Parliament, and to collaborate in securing
a plebiscite at the end of the war."(89)
Over the next year, MacCormick was to direct all his energy into
establishing a Home Rule united front in which the SNP was expected to play
a pivotal role.
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The principal reason behind the adoption of this strategy was the belief
that, with the political constraints imposed by the war, it was the only
feasible option open to the Party. The massive disruptions which occurred
in wartime society decimated normal branch activity and with every other
month that passed, there was at least one resignation from a member who was
involved with some part of the organisational structure.(90) In any case,
the opportunities for making any kind of electoral impact were likely to
remain few and far between and, as the war dragged on, the SNP's resources
became more and more stretched, leaving only a few constituencies in which
they could mount a credible campaign.(91) MacCormick and the leadership
were highly sensitive to the fact that to take unfair advantage of the
electoral truce would open them up to all sorts of attacks of hindering the
war effort. Bearing this in mind, they set to work in formulating a
strategy which would somehow legitimise electoral interventions. It was
hoped that by securing the tacit approval of the Liberal and Labour
parties, and by stressing a nationalist commitment to the war effort, the
SNP would be able to challenge any vacant Conservative seats by virtue of
the Tory Party's hostility to Home Rule and their pre-war record on
appeasement and unemployment.(92) In any case, a cross-party approach to
the self-government issue had for a long time been MacCormick's preferred
option, especially as he had recently come to believe that the National
Party was not strong enough to initiate political reform by itself.(93)
He was further strengthened in this conviction by the way in which Thomas
Johnston took a similar 'above party politics' approach to the
administration of wartime Scotland.(94) The Secretary of State had set in
motion a series of consultative committees and assorted quangos which were
designed to look into the effects of war effort on the Scottish economy and
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some also had the remit of outlining proposals for post-war reconstruction.
These bodies operated according to the devolutionist principle and took a
Scoto-centric view of contemporary problems which, as many historians have
pointed out, almost resulted in de facto Home Rule under Johnston's
leadership.(95) MacCormick's priority was to make sure that the
nationalists were not left out of the consensus-orientated decision making
process which was developing at the Scottish Office. However, more than
any other factor, Johnston's handling of the Scottish political scene was
to prove to be MacCormick's undoing.(see below).
While having much to recommend in the nationalist strategy, especially in
the way in which it tried to bring the SNP into the mainstream of the
Scottish political establishment, there were also a number of inherent
dangers. In the first place, neither the Liberal nor Labour parties could
openly acknowledge the existence of an informal electoral pact, which meant
that the key element of MacCormick's policy would have to operate on a
covert level. Success was ultimately dependent on individual ad hoc
negotiations which would have to be conducted before each by election.
Such a strategy, existing without any formal guarantees, was bound to be
fraught with difficulties, especially as it could be overturned on the whim
of their theoretical allies. The nationalist plan contained two of
MacCormick's perennial weaknesses; political naivety and a willingness to
conclude bargains without obtaining corresponding promises from the
opposition.(96) Also, the SNP greatly exaggerated its own sense of
political importance by believing that their threat of an electoral
challenge could influence the Labour and Liberal attitudes towards Home
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Rule and the plebiscite. To say that optimism was a necessary ingredient
in their strategy is perhaps an understatement.
Furthermore, such a convoluted policy, with its intricacies and secret
negotiations, was hardly likely to appeal to a membership which was being
kept in the dark and impatient with the lack of dynamic and positive
leadership. What was wanted was action and such manoeuvres tended to
militate against involving the rank and file in normal party political
activity.(see below) Also, MacCormick had to overcome the doubts of
several prominent members who carried out activities which were not
conducive to the success of his strategy. R.E. Muirhead, through the
auspices of the Scottish Secretariat, published anti-war pamphlets and made
known his hostility to cooperating with British parties.(97) Former
Chairman, Andrew Dewar Gibb, opposed the anti-Conservative bias of the
current strategy and gave vent to his frustrations in several articles.(98)
This meant that MacCormick's plans were not pursued with a total commitment
which, in turn, damaged its credibility and spread an aura of confusion
among ordinary members. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the
movement for the establishment of a 'united front' took on the appearance
of being the work of an individual crusader, rather than the goal of a
political organisation.(99)
At first the signs looked healthy and the favourable noises which emanated
from the Labour Party helped to boost confidence. In July 1941, Thomas
Johnston gave heavy indications that he was prepared to support devolution
after the furore which followed the curtailment of the debate of Scottish
affairs in the House of Commons.(100) Such vocal demonstrations in favour
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of self-government by the Labour Party helped to keep in check MacCormick's
opponents within the SNP, and even hardliners such as R.E. Muirhead were
temporarily won over and praised the way Johnston had raised Scottish
grievances at Westminster.(101) The official publication of Labour's
proposals for post-war reconstruction received a cautious welcome from
MacCormick who, although holding minor reservations, was quite confident
that there existed enough common ground between the progressive parties to
justify the setting up of a united front.
"There is now an apparent measure of agreement between
the Liberal Party, the Labour Party and the Scottish National
Party that it by no means should be impossible to devise a
scheme acceptable to all three."(102)
MacCormick wanted assurances from Labour that their plans for
nationalisation of key economic assets would not mean total centralised
control from London. Also, he wanted a more emphatic commitment to the
setting up of a separate Scottish Parliament which was democratically
accountable, rather than what appeared to being proposed, the enlargement
of the Scottish Grand Committee.(103) MacCormick circulated the SNP idea
of a federal system of government in the hope that it would find adherents
within the Labour Party who would push to have it taken on board as
official policy. Although nothing came from this attempt, the mood was
still favourable towards the idea of self-government and MacCormick
believed that all the signs were looking good.(104) In November, Johnston
gave a pledge that there would be more meetings of Scottish MPs in
Edinburgh and in December, the Scottish Council of the Labour Party passed
by 71 votes to 35 the following motion.
"Whatever the exact powers of our new legislature, we
are mostly agreed that a Scottish Parliament elected by the
Scottish people would be the best instrument for the
efficient government of this country."(105)
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Although there was considerable opposition to this movement, mainly from
Patrick Dollan and Emanuel Shinwell,(106) it appeared to many that Labour
was experiencing a Home Rule revival. MacCormick believed that the tide
of events was turning his way towards the creation of a Scottish united
front. However, in his enthusiasm, he had grown impervious to the
mounting discontent which was rapidly building up within his own party.
Throughout 1941 and well into 1942, the ramifications of MacCormick's
policy created a number of distinct tensions concerning the direction in
which he was trying to move the SNP. The area of greatest trouble arose
from the question of support for nationalist conscientious objectors and
the apparent contradictions of the Party pleading on their behalf while
promoting a more aggressive commitment to the war effort. Although the
hierarchy had discouraged members from refusing to enlist, there were a
number of nationalist prisoners which, MacCormick believed, gave the
movement a bad press.(107) However, the anti-conscription issue placed
him in a cleft stick, because, on the one hand, the SNP was tarnished with
an unpatriotic image of being against the war effort, yet MacCormick was
reluctant to disown the militant wing for fear of a backlash against his
policy. (108) The only feasible option open to him was to use every means
at his disposal to distance the leadership from the maverick elements. An
example of this distancing happened in May 1941, after police raids on the
homes of anti-conscription activists, when the Party issued a statement
that none of those arrested were members of the SNP. (109) The incident
was played down and they refused to denounce the searching of Roland
Muirhead's office for fear of the bad publicity which might ensue.(110)
Also, MacCormick was unwilling to press for the release of Arthur Donaldson
who was held under section 18B of the defence regulations, and it was left
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to Muirhead to petition, as an individual, Tom Johnston to have him freed
from custody.(Ill)
This incident led to the first clear lines of demarcation in the ensuing
split which was to effect the SNP in the early Simmer of 1942. In May,
Muirhead set up the Nationalist Mutual Aid Committee as an organisation
designed to provide financial support to conscientious objectors and
encourage them to oppose military service.(112) Also, in the same month
following the police raids, the Donaldson Defence Committee was formed to
campaign for the release of the foremost nationalist anti-conscriptionist.
The issue of anti-war involvement provided a focal point for disgruntled
party activists who wanted a more vigorous defence of Scottish interests
and a lessening of contacts with other political parties.(113) This
'ginger group' was incensed by a Scots Independent editorial written by
MacCormick's ally, J.M.MacDonald, which criticised the activities of
Douglas Young who was refusing to be conscripted on the grounds that the
enforcement of compulsory national service in Scotland was a violation of
the Treaty of Union.(114) Young caused the leadership considerable
difficulties because his objections were not based on pacifist principles,
but on the avowedly nationalist dictum that the Scottish war effort should
be conducted by a Scottish government and that Scottish soldiers should
fight in a separate army.(115) Although such arguments were dismissed as
naive and impractical, they commanded a lot of respect among the rank and
file, who were impressed by Young's courage in taking the British
authorities head on.(116) Such a hardline stance was more in keeping with
the kind of positive action which was being demanded by many elements
within the Party. The resultant press coverage which ensued from the
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controversy gave the SNP more publicity than they had hitherto received and
it also helped to steal the limelight from the leadership's more
respectable approach to politics. Much to MacCormick's chagrin, Young's
action was becoming synonymous with the national movement in the public's
mind, as well as making his own efforts at establishing cross-party
cooperation more difficult. However, although he regarded the whole
incident as an embarrassment, there was little he could do to have Young
disciplined or expelled on account of his growing popularity among ordinary
members.(117) By the beginning of 1942, the divisions within the SNP were
becoming wider and more bitter.
The leadership's advocacy of a total commitment to the war effort had
caused chaos in many local branches with the Aberdeen one, largely spurred
on by Douglas Young and Oliver Brown, disaffiliating from the Party
sometime in the middle of 1941.(118) Furthermore, the Falkirk branch
decided to suspend all activities during the war because, they believed,
there seemed no point to their existence.(119) By 1942, it was apparent
that the hierarchy was losing its grip on the control of the local
organisations and this was exploited by the 'ginger group' whose appeals
for a more active policy found a ready audience. For this body, attention
focused on aspects of the war effort itself, and they demanded more dynamic
action concerning Scottish grievances such as the transfer of conscripted
female labour south, the Government's failure to place new industry in
Scotland, the drafting of soldiers into English regiments and the treatment
of conscientious objectors. For Muirhead, Mclntyre and others, these
issues were considered to be the focal point of nationalist strategy and
were believed to be of greater importance than MacCormick's efforts to set
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up a united front. Although the leadership accepted the validity of these
grievances and regularly passed comment on them, they were not the main
emphasis of the current nationalist strategy.(120) Instead, attention was
concentrated primarily on post-war reconstruction and, largely for fear of
upsetting Johnston, little was done to capitalise on the perceived
injustices which were being committed for the sake of the war effort.
Although the Party made token gestures of protest, neither the Secretary of
State, nor his government, were accorded the blame.(121)
However, perhaps the greatest failing with MacCormick's strategy was the
almost total disregard for the well being of the ordinary members, and by
1942 there was a constant stream of complaints from local branches
regarding the apparent lack of initiative emanating from Party
headquarters.(122) In spite of the appointment of Robert Mclntyre as the
Organising Secretary, and his concerted efforts to form new branches while
still trying to maintain the morale of the existing ones, there was little
he could do to convince the rank and file that the present course of the
SNP was effective.(123) MacCormick refused to bow to the pressure for a
more direct and controversial political strategy, and made matters worse
for himself by accusing the local branches of being too dependent on the
headquarters and lacking in drive.(124) Other complaints concentrated on
the lack of democracy within the Party and the hierarchy's reluctance to
listen to the ideas or advice of anyone who did not belong to the ruling
clique.(125) Morale was at rock bottom and Mclntyre's monthly reports to
the National Council were a dismal catalogue of continual decline with only
the new branches, which were set up largely at his instigation, showing any
signs of progress.(126)
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The leadership's credibility with the rank and file suffered a severe blow
in December 1941, when it transpired that the SNP would not be able to
contest the by election in Edinburgh Central against an official Tory
candidate. Poor finances, inadequate resources and a collapsed morale
were cited as the principal reasons for not making a challenge, although it
was candidly admitted that the hierarchy had been deficient in forming the
necessary organisation.(127) The radical wing of the Party blamed the
leadership entirely for this state of affairs, and it also left a
considerable question mark as to the feasibility of MacCormick's strategy.
Other factors were soon to knock the current policy for six. Labour
interest in the united front began to peter out as Johnston presented an
alternative to self-government in the form of his 'strong man in the
cabinet'.(128) The Secretary of State's ability to secure economic and
political power direct from London and his capacity to deal with the most
pressing of Scottish grievances, relegated the idea of Home Rule from many
Labour activists' priorities.(129) Also, Johnston's tendency to govern by
consensus and utilise the services of many senior Scottish Tories, went
square in the face of MacCormick's objective of forming an
anti-Conservative front. In spite of the apparent Labour commitment to
devolution by the end of 1941, the ensuing months witnessed a dramatic
cooling off and contacts with the SNP were more or less severed.
MacCormick's strategy to take the nationalist movement into the Scottish
political establishment was floundering as Johnston's forums on post-war
reconstruction had been set up without any SNP input and the Party's
proposal for a plebiscite appeared to have died on its feet. With the
leadership's credibility at an all time low, both within the membership and
without, the announcement of a by election at Cathcart, and the hope that
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they could repeat the success of the 1940 Argyll campaign, presented
MacCormick with a final opportunity to vindicate his strategy.
The nationalist campaign in Cathcart and Douglas Young's trial for refusing
to be conscripted, occurred at the same time during April 1942, and brought
the extent of the SNP's divisions into the full glare of publicity.
Indeed, one could be forgiven for thinking that there existed two separate
parties. The by election also tested MacCormick's strategy to the full
and highlighted all its inadequacies. The candidate, William Whyte, was
one of the most vociferous of the pro-war proponents and from the outset,
the tone of the campaign was apologetic.
"Far from being insistent upon any extreme point of view,
I was prepared to cooperate with any member of any party who
was prepared to consistently advocate large measures of Scottish
reform, and who would recognise the individual character of
Scotland's potential contribution to the war effort.
Unfortunately, it would appear that the discipline of the
Tory Party machine had precluded that possibility."(130)
Whyte pressed forward the anti-Conservative stance in the hope that he
would pick up the Liberal and Labour vote. However, he was careful not to
incur any accusations of damaging the war effort and stressed his patriotic
loyalty.
"I believe that the present emergency government led by
Winston Churchill and Sir Stafford Cripps is an essential
to victory. I therefore pledge myself to give general
support to such a government...I should state that I have
the utmost confidence in Mr. Thomas Johnston and will
endeavour to give him every support."(131)
Above all, it is Mbyte's commitment to the war effort which emerges as the
principal message of the nationalist campaign and although there were calls
for an end to the moving of conscripted female labour south, greater
democratic control and the setting up of new industries, these were very
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much minor points. Even the call for Home Rule was watered down to the
setting up of a British Federation, and there was no mention of nationalist
conscientious objectors.(132) Finally, to cap it all, Whyte chose not to
stand under the SNP banner, preferring instead to be labelled an
independent.
The campaign was a disastrous failure, and unlike Argyll where the SNP was
guaranteed a monopoly of the opposition vote, in Cathcart there were other
more experienced and able candidates challenging the Conservative.(133)
Whyte's pro-war stance alienated many Party activists which left the local
organisation with inadequate resources and unable to mount an effective
campaign.(134) Also, the publicity from Douglas Young's trial
overshadowed all other nationalist propaganda and presented the SNP in a
totally different light from what was trying to be projected in Cathcart by
MacCormick and the leadership. Undoubtedly this must have confused
whatever potential support existed and may have been a major factor in
Whyte achieving one of the worst electoral showings made by a nationalist
candidate up until that time. In the end, the efforts to present the
Party as being a loyal supporter of the war effort and a bastion of
respectability had resulted in their man coming in fourth position, having
only secured a mere 5.5% of the vote.(135) With this failure, the current
strategy was left in tatters, especially when it is contrasted with Young's
performance in court, in which the defendant made a passionate and
unapologetic plea for a much more radical nationalist case. Although
Young was found guilty, it was regarded by many as a moral victory and it
was taken to signal the start of a more aggressive campaign. (136) With
the annual conference coming up in May, the divisions between the moderate
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and radical wings had become so great that compromise was impossible.
Indeed, some like William Whyte, were baying for blood.(137)
The issue which was to spark off the 1942 split was the choice of Party
Chairman. MacCormick and the leadership were in favour of continuing with
William Power, while the radicals presented a challenge in the shape of
Douglas Young. Previous historians of the national movement have
identified most of the key features which took part in the power struggle
and Jack Brand has placed particular emphasis on the growing disenchantment
with MacCormick and his tendency to treat the SNP as if it were his own
personal organisation.(138) Professor Hanham, likewise, believes the
issue of personalities to be an important factor in the ensiling split,
although his main stress is on the division between those who favoured a
cross-party approach to obtaining self-government and those who wanted the
Party to be independent of all other organisations.(139) In essence, both
writers are correct in their respective analyses, although some of the more
complex and subtle factors have been lost in the simplification of the
story.
While, with the benefit of hindsight, it may appear as if a split was
inevitable in 1942, it was only the militantly pro-war faction which was
intent upon disruption.(140) The majority of the membership, MacCormick
included, was agreed that there would have to be a major revision of
strategy and this would tend to favour the radical wing's demands.(141) The
old policy was admitted to be a failure and MacCormick accepted that the
Convention would have to be set up without interfering with the normal
political activities of the SNP. Indeed, this was the major reason behind
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his decision to resign as Party Secretary as it would allow him more time
to further his efforts in the cross-party movement.(142) However, this
does not mean that he had lost interest in the SNP, nor that he had ceased
to believe it to be the principal catalyst in the drive for Home Rule.
Although MacCormick had argued that Home Rule could only be realised by the
combined efforts of the nationalists, Liberals, and Socialists, the
National Party was an essential part of his plan because, not only did it
provide him with a power base from which to operate, but also it acted as a
stimulant in making other political organisations take the self-government
issue seriously. Indeed, throughout the war, he had been the most
vociferous advocate of contesting elections within the leadership.(143)
Also, the accusations that he had been conducting secret negotiations with
other parties has been emphasised too heavily by Brand and Hanham.(144) All
the meetings MacCormick conducted to set up the 'united front' were
reported regularly in the Scots Independent and although members were
suspicious about this, they were not as underhand as his endeavours with
the Scottish Party at the time of the formation of the SNP.(145) While
certain sections to the movement could not be appeased, especially Dewar
Gibb, Whyte and other pro-war militants who wanted the anti-
conscriptionists expelled, they were a very distinct minority whose
prominence depended heavily on the support of the moderates.(146)
However, the most significant factor in the split was MacCormick's sense of
rejection and his shouldering of the cumulative blame for the leadership.
After a noisy debate, although no worse than many previous occasions, Young
defeated Power by 33 votes to 29. A number of factors can explain the
result, and the vote should not be taken as evidence of a deeply divided
organisation torn in half between two radically opposing opinions.(147)
In the first place, neither candidate would have been the ideal choice for
a majority of delegates. Power was too old, lacked charisma and seemed to
represent the lethargy and lack of direction associated with the
leadership's policy. However, many would have voted for him, largely to
avoid endorsing Young's militancy, although they would be determined to
have the Party's direction changed by passing motions on strategy. In
other words, the narrowness of Power's defeat does not imply that almost
half of the delegates were satisfied with the SNP's previous direction.
The association of an individual chairman with a particular set of policies
was not a strong facet of the National Party, as the adoption of many
socialist objectives under the Chair of Andrew Dewar Gibb, who was himself
a right winger and opposed to these motions, amply illustrates.(148)
Similarly, it cannot be said that the votes for Young were a total
endorsement for his line of action.
A further complicating factor in interpreting the split was that although
Young was opposed to conscription, he was not of the same political stable
as his most prominent supporters, namely Mclntyre, Muirhead, Donaldson and
Lamont. This body, which Hanham has labelled as the fundamentalist wing,
differed from the present policy in that they argued that the Party ought
to avoid contact with other organisations and seek to win political power
by contesting elections. Also, their definition of self-government meant
sovereign independence and they rejected any notions of federalism or
devolution which was being mooted in various forms by the leadership.
However, Young concurred with neither of these concepts to the same extent
as his supporters, as can be gauged from his previous statements and
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subsequent actions.(149) Had it not been for his anti-conscriptionist
stance, there would have been little to differentiate him from
MacCormick.(150)
However, the reason for his choice as the radical candidate was two fold.
Firstly, he stood for direct action and this quality was what was felt to
be most lacking in the Party. Without a more concerted and assertive
policy, it was believed that the SNP would suffer perpetual political
impotence and Young was the most ideal embodiment of strident, aggressive
and unapologetic Scottish nationalism. Secondly, his undoubted charisma
and personality contrasted favourably with the blandness of the current
leadership. Also, it was believed that a successful challenge from a
convicted anti-conscriptionist would render a complete defeat to the
moderate and conservative elements within the Party. Furthermore, it
would open up the way to enforce more grass roots democracy on the
organisation, which in turn, it was believed, would facilitate a more
direct and positive strategy. As Mclntyre explained to the conference:
"...in his contacts with the branches he had often met
with dissatisfaction at the Party's lack of direction.
For him the question was whether the branches were to
play a full part and the Party to be a broad democratic
organisation or not."(151)
However, and it has to be emphasised, the radicals thought that their
strategy would be imposed without splitting the SNP.(152)
In spite of this desire, MacCormick could not stomach such a shattering
defeat and it went utterly in the face of his deep conviction that Scottish
nationalism would have to make itself more acceptable to the political
establishment. It would appear that on the spur of the moment he decided
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to secede, taking the election of Young to be a personal insult against
him. (153) When MacCormick left he took about half the conference
delegates with him, although the split was not as dramatic as this would
seem to imply. For one, many of those who left were soon to return when
it became apparent that the Party was not going to make such a dramatic
shift in direction as the victory of an anti-conscriptionist seemed to
herald. (154) MacCormick added fuel to the fire by claiming that the SNP
was now an anti-war organisation which was firmly in the hands of
republicans.(155) However, the most conclusive evidence that the split
was not as serious as historians have made out, is to be found in the small
numbers of those who were to found the basis for the National Convention.
It took MacCormick over a year to raise 1000 members, which was perhaps
only a third to a quarter of the strength of the SNP. (156) Also, it has
to be borne in mind that many supporters of the Convention were also paid
up members of the National Party, and it was with the latter organisation
that their loyalties, first and foremost, lay.(157) However, the
development of MacCormick's Convention lies outwith the scope of this
thesis.
Professor Hanham has interpreted the split of 1942 as being the result of
disagreements over strategy, and there is little here to dispute this. He
correctly identifies the MacCormickites' desire to turn the SNP into a more
pressure group orientated organisation, similar to the SHRA, although, as
was mentioned earlier, he fails to take account of the duality of the
leadership's strategy in using conventional electoral politics with the
attempt to create a cross-party movement.(158) The failure of the
hierarchy's strategy created a vacuum which the radicals were able to
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breach by using the rank and file discontentment about the lack of
direction, although it was the specific issue of the election of an
anti-conscriptionist as Chairman which split the Party. However,
MacCormick's secession meant that the SNP could develop as a normal
political organisation unimpeded by the need to take account of emphasising
loyalty to the war effort and free from the constraints of trying to strike
bargains with other parties.
One of the first effects of the election of Douglas Young as Chairman was
to increase the Party's public profile.. Although it was widely reported
that the nationalists had adopted an anti-war policy, they had merely
reverted back to the 1939 conference decision. The principle of the war
against Hitler was still accepted as being valid, yet Young had now changed
the emphasis. "The Party as a whole supported the war effort and so did
he (Young) in his own fashion. But Scotland could only be defended by a
Scottish government and a Scottish army and that is what he stood
for."(159) The new leadership had to spend a considerable amount of time
convincing members that the SNP had not altered its policy concerning the
war but had merely shifted the emphasis. In June 1942, Mclntyre wrote to
Neil Gunn stating emphatically that the split was not due to any change of
policy with regard to the war and that a National Council resolution to
that effect had been passed. (160) As far as Young was concerned the
damage had been done deliberately.
"The ejected droves have spread a mantle of lies that
the Party is anti-war and that I am anti-war...for your
(Neil Gunn) information I have never been anti-war...The
overwhelming majority of branches, delegates, and members
have stayed with the Party, and some who originally left
with the caucus under a misapprehension have returned.
Also, some former members have returned."(161)
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The SNP now wholeheartedly supported those who refused to be conscripted
and Young regarded such action as simply defending Scottish rights and
freedoms. Others, such as R.E. Muirhead and Arthur Donaldson, believed
that there ought to be a more vigorous policy of anti-conscription and they
were heartened by the emulation of Young's example by other young
nationalists.(162) One C.M. Grieve received such encouragement from
Muirhead.
"It is certainly encouraging that quite a number of young
Scots are standing against the English bureaucrats. I
believe that many more would have been with us in this
protest but for a weakness which developed in the SNP
after the war had broken out...no encouragement was given
to younger men to stand out against conscription. A
considerable minority of the Party objected to any
modification of the original resolution (the 1937
decision to oppose conscription), but they were out¬
voted. I explain this to you as I think that had it
not been for the Party weakening on the anti-conscription
question, a larger number of young nationalists would
have stood out against conscription."(163)
Whereas the issue had previously been a point of embarrassment, it had now
been taken on board as part and parcel of nationalist strategy.
MacCormick's secession removed another obstacle in the development of a
more radical nationalist strategy in that the SNP was no longer under the
constraint of trying to appease political opponents in the attempt to
secure cross-party cooperation. It meant that the Party could be more
openly critical of the wartime administration of Scotland and, in
particular, Tom Johnston, as well as continuing the assault on the Labour
Party which had been left in abeyance for several years.(164) One of the
first actions of the new leadership was to "deplore the deporting of female
labour to England, demand the Ministry of Labour and Supply in Scotland be
put under the control of the Secretary of State and condemn the growing
296
displacement of Scottish by English Labour in Scotland."(165) From now on
the Scots Independent would focus on these issues and highlight the
existence of Scottish grievances. A good example of this was the
agitation against making conscripted women travel south to take part in the
production of armaments. The Scots Independent attacked the deportations
as being harmful to family life, as well as recounting stories of bad
living conditions and the strain imposed on young women forced to live in
an alien environment.(166) Johnston and the Scottish Office were likewise
condemned for doing little to stop this and the nationalist campaign was
able to solicit support from many different quarters.(167)
Whereas the Tories had been the principal target of the SNP prior to the
split in 1942, Labour became, once again, the main focus of attention and
was attacked because it was believed that their Home Rule commitment was
spurious, and also, because it was from their supporters that the
nationalists sought to capitalise on Scottish grievances. Muirhead was
the most vociferous proponent of the argument that it was in the best
interests of socialism to support the National Party, and he was not at all
impressed by Johnston's promises on post-war reconstruction.
"No doubt the setting up of such committees and advisory
councils may be quite satisfying to the Quislings and
capitalist imperialists in Scotland as well as the
bureaucrats in London...what the ordinary man cannot
understand is why the present day followers of Keir Hardie
have allowed themselves to be diddled by those Scots and
English capitalists and imperialists who are quite pleased
when Scottish socialists call for international socialism
knowing full well that so long as Scots citizens allow
themselves to be fobbed off with an ideal slogan, instead
of insisting on the first practical step towards the ideal
state, namely self-government, all will be well for capitalist
imperialism. So long as Scots Labour men allow themselves
to be side tracked by the slogan of a socialist Britain,
instead of a self-governing Scotland, there will be little
prospect of a Scottish cooperative commonwealth."(168)
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As had been mentioned earlier, the Labour Party's interest in Home Rule
began to wane during 1942, and although they pressed ahead with proposals
on post-war reconstruction, it was becoming less clear as to whether or not
self-government would be part and parcel of their aims. Muirhead tried to
ascertain Johnston's personal views on the subject, believing that a firm
answer of yes or no would give the nationalists something to sink their
teeth into. It was believed that the failure to give a firm commitment to
Home Rule by the Labour Party could be exploited by the SNP, which would be
able to use the ready catalogue of Scottish grievances at hand to back up
their case. Muirhead believed that any post-war reconstruction without
self-government would be doomed to failure and he communicated these fears
to Johnston.
"I have noted with interest the plans which you have been
preparing in order that at the close of the war, Scotland
might quickly secure reconstruction of her national life.
But with the experience of the management of Scottish affairs
from London after the last war, I feel strongly that it is
quite fatuous to expect these carefully thought out plans of
reconstruction to come to fruition unless Scotland first gets
elf-government in all its fullness. If, as I earnestly hope,
the personal efforts of Mr Douglas Young will ultimately lead
to Scotland securing its freedom fron the stranglehold of
England, all may yet be well."(169)
Johnston's reply is interesting from the point of view in what he does not
say. There is no emphatic commitment to Home Rule, although the sentiment
is there, which, according to his biographer, is indicative of his "fervent
patriotism directed at practibilities and the milking of
opportunities."(170) However, in view of public opinion's hostility to
some of the more damning features of London control, Johnston had to be
careful not to dismiss self-govenment, as his reply to Muirhead in August
1942, reveals:
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"I respect your opinion, but I intend to make an effort to
keep our country meanwhile on the map and to do my utmost -
and within the limits imposed by the circumstances in which
we find ourselves - to persuade Scots and English alike that
it is desirable we should be allowed to work out our own
problems in our own way."(171)
The growing ambiguity of the Labour Party's attitude towards Home Rule was
noted and exploited by the SNP, and Johnston's utterings on the subject may
have been motivated as much from political expediency as from
patriotism.(172)
However, perhaps the most important aspect of the Party's development
following the split of 1942 was the rebuilding of the SNP into a modern
functioning political organisation. The majority of this work was carried
out by the new Secretary, Robert Mclntyre, whose organisational abilities
had been well proven in student politics and in the setting up of new
branches during the war.(173) Mclntyre was different from previous
nationalist leaders in that he had a much greater appreciation of the
necessity of having a vital and well organised membership. Also, he was a
realist and a pragmatist, and was undaunted by the prospect of fighting a
long struggle, believing that the SNP should concentrate on attaining
steady and constant progress, even if it was at a very slow rate.(174)
Mclntyre was a disciplinarian and had decided that the Party's tendency
towards factionalism had to come to an end. From now on, the SNP would
project its aims and would under no circumstances modify its approach for
the sake of short term expediencies. The emphasis was placed firmly on
the necessity of converting the public to the nationalist point of
view.(175) However, central to this strategy was the need to build a
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coherent political identity which would reinforce the rank and file's
commitment to the Party.
Politically, the leadership was more homogeneous than at any other time in
its history. The nucleus of the policy formulation body, Mclntyre,
Donaldson, Wilkie, Lamont, and Walkinshaw, were all to the left of the
political spectrum, they all believed that self-government meant the same
amount of independence as was enjoyed by the Commonwealth dominion nations,
and, perhaps most importantly, they were all committed to the efficacy of
contesting elections.(176) As was mentioned earlier, Douglas Young was
the odd man out, although he proved to be of little hindrance on account of
the fact that he was to spend most of his time in gaol when the major
developments were taking place.(177) Throughout the latter half of 1942
and up until the annual conference in May 1943, the Party took the first
tentative steps towards forming its own economic policy, propounded mainly
in a series of articles written by Colin Walkinshaw for the Scots
Independent. These moves were important because it helped to give the SNP
a sense of a distinct political identity, and the left of centre proposals
for nationalisation of key industries and other pre-war nationalist
economic themes provided members with the opportunity to contrast their own
objectives against those of the Labour Party.(178) However, the issue of
contesting elections proved to be a tough nut for Mclntyre to crack. A
residue of apathy existed about challenging other parties, largely because
this was perceived to be an area in which the nationalists had always come
off badly, and also because the SNP had not a sufficiently strong sense of
political identity.(179) Mclntyre was well aware of these difficulties
and it was decided not to contest the Midlothian by election in February
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1943. His reasons for not pushing the issue were all sound. In the
first place it was recognised that there was not a consensus on the subject
and in keeping with Mclntyre's commitment to democracy, there had been no
opportunity for a meaningful debate nor a proper test of rank and file
opinion. In any case, resources were still depleted and an unsuccessful
campaign which achieved a poor result would not do morale any good, nor
would it help the Party come to a reasoned judgement on the issue. (180)
However, Mclntyre was confident that, with time, the membership would come
round to his opinion. Also, the fact that the SNP was making progress in
other areas helped to reinforce the cautious, but steady approach.
The annual conference of 1943 was judged by many to be the most successful
nationalist gathering for a long time.(181) Mclntyre's vision of a vital
and functioning political party was visibly taking shape and vindicated his
efforts at building up the organisational structure of the SNP. Branch
membership was up by 60%, the largest single increase within one year in
the Party's history, many new local outlets had been set up and the sales
of the Scots Independent had gone up by 13%.(182) Furthermore, steps were
taken to formulate a more coherent objective and the following resolution
was passed:
"The restoration of Scottish national sovereignty by the
establishment of a democratic Scottish government, whose
authority will be limited only by such agreements as will
be freely entered into with other nations in order to further
international cooperation and world peace."(183)
The SNP finally eschewed itself of any notions of devolution or federalism
and this more hardline approach to self-government helped further to create
a distinct nationalist political identity. This trend was also reinforced
by the adoption of a motion which prohibited National and branch office
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bearers from belonging to any other party.(184) Discipline was tightened
up and all aspects of policy were to be printed in the Scots Independent
for the benefit of the rank and file. Perhaps the most striking feature
about the conference was the degree of unanimity with which the decisions
were reached. There is little evidence of division and the resolutions on
the objective and the exclusion of other members from different parties
were the ones which produced the greatest degree of harmony. (185) Even
Tom Gibson was tempted into rejoining the Party.(186) However, Mclntyre
and Donaldson did not get everything their own way as the conference was
unable to come to a concrete decision about contesting elections. This
was not a result of differences over strategy, but simply a reflection of
the lack of confidence in the SNP's political abilities. Members were
still wary of committing valuable resources to a policy which had brought
much grief in the past. Also, the influence of the Chairman, Douglas
Young, was crucial in halting an emphatic endorsement of an electoral
strategy, as he still believed that pressure could be brought to bear on
the Labour Party in order to induce them to enact Home Rule
legislation.(187) Rather than risk opening old wounds, Mclntyre
concentrated on building up the SNP's political identity which, he
believed, once it was strong enough, would take on board the strategy of
contesting elections as part of this process.(188)
However, within a very short time, Mclntyre was to get his way with the
announcement of a by election in Kirkcaldy in December 1943. The Party
had continued to grow stronger in the latter half of the year and the news
that Oliver Brown's Scottish Socialist Party would affiliate to the SNP
helped to boost confidence.(189) Furthermore, one of the principal
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barriers to the adoption of a full blown electoral strategy, Douglas Young,
had been persuaded by Mclntyre and Donaldson to stand as an official
nationalist candidate. The Kirkcaldy campaign proved to be the litmus
test for the new initiatives concerning policy and organisation.
Donaldson was the election agent and planned the SNP strategy with
precision and careful thought. He was also remarkably successful in
managing to control and discipline Young, whose character and personality
was quite unsuited to conventional party politics.(190) The election
marked a turning point in nationalist strategy because it was being fought
against a Labour candidate and finally put any aspirations of a cross-party
campaign on the self-government issue beyond the pale. The SNP also
exhibited a greater degree of professionalism than they had hitherto
displayed and Donaldson organised a steady stream of volunteers to canvass
the constituency. They took advantage of the Labour Party's inability to
choose a suitable candidate and set to work in getting an early start to
their campaign.(191) Mclntyre's efforts in building up the Party's
organisational structure paid off handsomely and the SNP electioneering
machine was, by all accounts, in better shape than their opponents'.(192)
Young's manifesto was also of crucial importance in determining the outcome
of events. The Party campaigned on a number of specific issues which
unequivocally differentiated them from the Labour Party. The nationalists
chose to place the question of the drift south of conscripted women workers
and the unfair allocation of new industries at the top of their agenda, and
this helped to solicit a great deal of sympathy from the electorate.(193)
They also emphasised the Labour Party's guilt in this process by pointing
out that the wartime administration was largely planned and executed by
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socialist members of the Cabinet.(194) Young further highlighted the
difference between the Labour Party and the avowedly left of centre SNP by
attacking Johnston's pet scheme for the hydro electrification of the
Highlands. The socialist credentials of their opponents were brought into
question:
"This (the hydro electrification scheme for the highlands)
promises 10000 nawying jobs for 10 years to the survivors
of the 51st Highland division, and guarantees £30,000,000 to
a few big monopolists to exploit our water resources for
their profit."(195)
The leftward character of the National Party was emphasised by a call for
the immediate nationalisation of the war industries, including mines and
railways, which were to be placed under the control of a democratic
Scottish government. Also, Young called for the implementation of a
number of social policies, such as the building of public housing,
improvements in health provisions and universal education, and the
guarantee of full employment.(196) However, the most dramatic difference
in the strategy of the SNP was their more aggressive attitude towards the
attainment of self-government. The nationalist message was direct and
unambiguous, as well as being presented with a degree of forthrightness and
confidence which had been absent in previous campaigns. Young demanded
that there be:
"...an immediate general election on a Scottish basis
for a Scottish parliament to run a Scottish war effort
and post-war reconstruction, having the powers of the
Parliaments of New Zealand, Canada and other members
of the Commonwealth."(197)
However, the campaign was an unqualified success from almost every aspect.
The organisation had never been in better shape and the members on the
ground worked with a great deal of enthusiasm and dedication.
Furthermore, the new nationalist attitude and ideas were canvassed with a
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missionary zeal and confidence, and, most important of all, the result
seemed to vindicate the new direction and strategy. The Labour candidate,
T.F. Hubbard, polled 8,268 votes against Young's respectable total of
6,621, while the Christian Socialist was pushed into third place.(199)
Unlike the Argyll by election, the SNP was now aggressively advocating
socialistic policies which precluded them from picking up the Liberal and
Tory vote, and judging from the press reports of the campaign, it would
appear that the nationalist championship of Scottish grievances allowed
them to tap into a valuable mine of support and sympathy.(200) The result
helped to further boost confidence and it also brought the rank and file
more firmly behind Mclntyre and Donaldson's new approach.
The greater internal coherence and the growing sense of having a distinct
and separate political identity was further strengthened at the annual
conference of May 1944, when it was decided that they would be "prepared to
accept legislative responsibility for Scottish reconstruction after
Scotland shall have (sic) achieved self-government."(201) This was of
great significance as it meant that the Party was taking a much longer term
of view of its political career. Being a single issue organisation had
always been a handicap for the nationalist movement which could seldom
muster unity of commitment around social and economic policies on account
of the variety of different shades of political opinion that existed within
its ranks. However, the SNP was now formulating distinct policies on a
whole range of issues and - unlike previous times - was going to stick to
them. This, in turn, would help to reinforce their political identity.
Mclntyre and Donaldson put forward the case that the Party would have to
offer the electorate realistic political options and that they would have
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to convince the public that they were serious about their policies. Great
care and attention would have to go into formulating these ideas which,
Mclntyre argued, would have to be precise and accurate if the SNP was going
to be taken seriously as a credible force in Scottish politics.(202) Most
members agreed with this point of view and the task was taken on in earnest
by the appropriate committees.
Other factors can be pointed out to show that that Party was becoming more
vibrant and healthy. After Kirkcaldy, it was decided that the electoral
arena would be the means by which they would seek to attain political
power. The levitation of the policy of contesting elections to the
central pillar of nationalist strategy was emphatic, and it was agreed that
nationalist candidates would stand at local government level, as well as in
parliamentary constituencies.(203) Considerable progress was made on the
organisational level with yet another rise in the membership and an overall
improvement in the financial position.(204) On the propaganda front the
Scottish Secretariat was printing a steady stream of SNP pamphlets which
were widely circulated and the Scots Independent was attracting new
readers. Indeed, the editor, Arthur Donaldson, was able to report to the
annual conference that the journal had achieved its best ever sales in the
previous year.(205) Internal harmony remained intact and a vast majority
of the conference delegates backed the new direction. Also, the infusion
of new and younger members to the National Council helped to strengthen the
resolution to remain on the present course of action, and after May 1944,
there were few members of the MacCormick era SNP left in the
leadership. (206) The extent to which the Mclntyre line had been taken on
board can be illustrated by the fact that preparations were soon under way
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to formulate an electoral strategy for the forthcoming general election
which was expected some time in 1945.(207) By the middle of 1944, the
modern Scottish National Party had clearly begun to take shape.
As had been mentioned earlier, one of the most important developments in
the history of the post-1942 SNP was the evolution of a distinctive
nationalist political identity which would help to reinforce the commitment
to contesting elections and the belief that self-government meant
independence from Westminster in the total sense of the word. Without
this identity the Party would be in danger of splintering into conventional
left/right ideological differences in the organisation after 1942 as most
of the right of centre members left with MacCormick and the few who
remained were heavily outnumbered.(208) Never before had the Party been
composed of people who could all be placed within a fairly narrow band of
the political spectrum, and this made the task of moulding or developing a
political identity much easier as the vast majority of the SNP held the
same ideological values which were to be found firmly rooted in the left of
centre. The adoption of vague policies which were strewn with ambiguities
was no longer a facet of nationalist politics as there was now no need to
fear upsetting Liberals and Conservatives.(209) Unhindered by having to
walk a political tight rope, Robert Mclntyre set to work in formulating the
blueprint for future strategy and a coherent party philosophy.
In 1944 Mclntyre published these ideas in a pamphlet entitled Some
Principles for Scottish Reconstruction, and although many of these policies
had existed before within the national movement, they were now brought
together with a remarkable degree of clarity and coherence.(210) In the
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middle 1930s the Party had tried to formulate a middle way between
socialism and capitalism, but this was more often than not a jumbling of
individual opinions drawn from both the right and left wings of the
movement, and was not an alternative in any real sense to the policies of
either the Tory or Labour parties.(211) The reason why Mclntyre's
philosophy appealed to the membership was that it was a statement of
genuine belief and not as had happened in the past, an uneasy compromise
between two opposing factions. Although belonging to the left of centre
stable, the SNP moved in a different direction from conventional British
socialist thought by placing heavy emphasis on the community and the rights
of individuals rather than centralised planning and control. Mclntyre
distrusted large organisations from either the state or from business and
believed that such developments were harmful to both the nation and the
individual.
"Is it to be the happy hunting ground for big business
and unscrupulous monopolies? Is it to be a bureaucratic
state in which we are labelled and controlled from the
creche to the crematorium in the name of all but for the
good of none?(212)
Democracy fulfilled a central role in this philosophy and Mclntyre was
determined that the SNP should be directed by pragmatism rather than
ideology: "Every Scot must have an effective voice in government and must
be sufficiently independent, from an economic point of view, to exercise
his democratic rights in freedom, without fear of the state, the combine or
laird."(213) Planning was important, but so was an imput from the
community and Mclntyre's consensual approach to social and economic
policies meant that the Party did not engage in the dogmatic pursuit of
championing one class against another. Housing was considered to be the
major post war priority and a demand for the building of half a million
308
houses was made. Mclntyre also pressed for the nationalisation of natural
monopolies, the development of new light industries and agriculture, the
setting up of a central Scottish bank and the removal of all power and
wealth "in the hands of alien government, international finance and private
monopolies."(214) Although he failed to utilise fine detail, as was
expressed in the precise economic tracts produced by Gibson and Donaldson,
and likewise failed to give specific instructions as to how these
objectives could be achieved, Mclntyre was able to produce the first
manifesto which was held together by an underlying coherent set of
principles and was also unmistakably their own.
The mixture of social responsibility and the rights of the individual was
to become the hallmark of future nationalist philosophy and proved to be
the ideal weapon to challenge the centralising tendencies of the wartime
administration.(215) Furthermore, it was different from what was on offer
from the other parties and not only helped to distinguish them in the
public's eye, but helped to reinforce their own sense of political
identity. Whereas Scottish interests were often over-ruled or not taken
into account by British establishments, the SNP was able to use Mclntyre's
philosophy as the rationale to justify their action in highlighting local
grievances. For example, the public was warned of the dangers of the
Labour Party's proposals for nationalisation as, it was claimed, this would
mean effective de-nationalisation because Scottish control of key
industries would be moved to London.(216) However, perhaps Mclntyre's
greatest achievement was the way in which he could bring many of the key
elements of nationalist thought together into the one broad statement and
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express them simply and coherently in such a manner as to win more or less
wholesale approval from his Party.
As the SNP entered into the final year of the war it had begun to speak
with one voice. By February 1945, there were already candidates in place
to fight the expected general election and all efforts were concentrated on
building up resources for the campaign.(217) However, the Party was given
the opportunity to test its new found confidence and ability with the
announcement of a by election in Motherwell. Again this was a Labour
seat, and the leadership quickly mobilised volunteers to assist the
candidate, Mclntyre, in his efforts to prove that contesting elections was
the most emphatic way to further the nationalist cause. Once more the SNP
campaigning machine was to show that it was more than equal to the task
with the activists engaged in canvassing and distributing propaganda and
leaflets.(218) However, the choice of candidate proved to be a crucial
factor. As Christopher Harvie has recently pointed out, Mclntyre had
respectable radical credentials to his name which would not have distanced
him too much from Labour voters.(219) Also, unlike Kirkcaldy where
Douglas Young stood, there was no stigma attached to the SNP candidate on
account of strident anti-conscriptionist activities, and Mclntyre's
espousal of the rights of individuals and his warnings against
over-centralised bureaucratic control would have made him preferable to his
Labour opponent among many Liberals and Tories. A further quality in his
favour was his quiet personality, which was unlikely to give offence, and
his reputation as a medical man.(220) The combination of a radical party
fronted by a man of considerable respectability paid great dividends and
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the nationalists were able to win their first ever parliamentary seat,
capturing over 50% of the total votes cast.(221)
The result was a great personal triumph for Mclntyre and it more than amply
vindicated the Party's strategy and direction. Although he was only to
hold his seat for several months before losing it at the 1945 General
Election, the effect of a nationalist MP sitting in the House of Commons
was to be of great significance for the development of the SNP. First and
foremost, it dealt a blow to those, especially in the Covenant movement,
who believed that contesting elections was a waste of time. Secondly, it
gave the Party greater access to a wider platform and Mclntyre's first
action at Westminster, when he refused to be sponsored by two other MPs on
account of the fact that he claimed this was a purely English tradition,
gave the SNP greater media coverage than at any other time in its
history.(222) Also, he used the opportunities to put forward the
nationalist case in Parliamentary debates and made two notable speeches on
Health and Education.(223) Having a sitting MP within the ranks helped to
boost confidence and lent political credibility to the Party.
In many ways Robert Mclntyre's election on the 12th of April 1945, marks
the beginning of the modern Scottish National Party as we know it today.
Although there would still be difficulties and disputes in the future, they
were never as serious as the ones which had dogged the movement up until
1942. Also, the fundamentals of SNP strategy and identity had been firmly
established. The objective of independence, in the sense that a
self-governing Scotland would not have any limitations placed on its
sovereignty, was firmly enshrined. The adoption of an electoral policy
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was to be the means by which the nationalists' political aims would be
achieved. The exclusion of members from other parties was well under way
to being established and perhaps most important of all, members of the SNP
had developed their own distinctive political identity. The extent to
which these factors had gelled together can be gauged from the fact that in
the aftermath of the 1945 General Election at which the Party made only a
minimal showing,(224) there were no disruptions or recriminations.
Instead, members remained resolved that their direction was the correct one
and enshrined it in an official constitution in 1947.(225)
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Conclusion
The most obvious and striking feature concerning the political development
of the Scottish nationalist movement in the period 1919-1942 was its
divisiveness and the difficulty it had in maintaining a united and cohesive
front. There were two principal sources of contention and dispute. The
first was over the definition of self-government and to what extent it
should be taken. The second was over the means by which this objective
would be achieved. Throughout this era, the Home Rule cause was torn
between two factions which jostled for control of nationalist direction and
strategy. Prior to the formation of the National Party of Scotland in
1928, these two elements existed in their purest forms as separate
organisations. The Scots National League advocated complete independence
from England and was prepared to fight elections in order to win the
political authority necessary to achieve its objective. In complete
contrast to this body was the Scottish Home Rule Association, which had the
goal of administrative devolution and furthered its ends by attempting to
utilise pressure group tactics on the established political parties.
However, it was the latter group's failure which caused these two distinct
and, in many ways, incompatible, organisations to merge to form the NPS.
The National Party of Scotland was created with many inbuilt contradictions
on a foundation of uneasy compromise. The collapse of the SHRA had
provided the 'radicals' with an opportunity, in the absence of any feasible
alternative, to impose their direction on the new united party. However,
when it became apparent that the 'fundamentalist' position was not bearing
fruit and indeed,might be frightening away potential support, the moderates
313
imposed their numerical superiority by expelling the more extreme elements.
The expulsions of 1933 marked a turning point in nationalist direction
which, under the watchful eye of chief strategist John MacCormick, would
now seek to make Home Rule attractive to the establishment. 'King John'
was of the correct opinion that the present policy of the NPS would not
attract sufficient support to make the attainment of self-government a
realisable objective in the current political scenario. He argued that
the nationalists would have to widen their appeal and remove all aspects
which would threaten potential support. This new departure was successful
and facilitated the formation of the SNP which involved the fusion of his
own organisation with the right-wing Scottish Party. The newly created
Scottish National Party encompassed elements from all shades of political
opinion and it was believed that the existence of such a body vindicated
the idea that Home Rule could act as a cohesive force, relying simply on
its own momentum to achieve constitutional change.
However, it was the radical element which had provided the underpinning
philosophy of the nationalist parties. In essence, this involved three
key elements. The first concerned the definition of self-government
which, when the NPS was founded, meant as much sovereignty as was enjoyed
by the Dominion nations. The second concerned the use of the electoral
system to achieve their political objective, while the third sought to
isolate the nationalist movement from other British parties by forbidding
members from belonging to, or becoming involved with, other organisations.
In attempting to widen the appeal of the National Party, MacCormick altered
the objective to place greater emphasis on cooperation with England and
maintaining a Scottish role in the running of the British Empire. When
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the SNP was created, it was likewise built with the same philosophical
underpinning and although the objective was subjected to further
modification, the most important fact was that the Party still had an aim
which would act as the raison d'etre for the existence of their own
political organisation. So long as the SNP maintained the three tenets of
having a political objective, contesting elections and remaining a distinct
and separate organisation, they would be able to preserve a minimum of
political identity which would act as a sufficient cohesive force in
binding them together.
However, in the quest for further modification and the need to appeal to a
wider audience, the Party gradually let go of the props which were
essential in maintaining its existence as a distinct political entity.
The first to crumble was the principle that members of the SNP could not
belong to other parties. The Duke of Montrose's decision to join the
Liberal Party shattered any illusions of political exclusivity and rendered
redundant any attempts to strengthen nationalist political identity by
building up social and economic policies. The two other props which held
up the justification for the existence of a separate nationalist party were
likewise soon to disintegrate. The objective was shortened to
'self-government for Scotland' which was so loose a definition as to be
almost meaningless. Also, the efficacy of contesting elections was called
into question after a series of humiliating defeats and instead attention
increasingly focused on the idea of a National Convention as the means by
which their aims could be achieved. In short, there was little to
distinguish between members of the SNP and their ideological bed-fellows in
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the other respective British parties. By the outbreak of the Second World
War the Scottish National Party had almost ceased to be a conventional
political party.
It was the outbreak of war which provided the radicals with the opportunity
to regain control of nationalist direction. Although they had been out¬
numbered by moderates, their depth of commitment was much greater and
whereas the faint hearted were prone to leave when the going got tough, the
radicals braved it out by maintaining a steady critical barrage on the
leadership's lack of direction. The hierarchy's opportunism during the
war and their failure to support the principle of the anti-conscriptionist
resolution provided the hard line nationalists with valuable ammunition.
Also, the fact that the organisation was allowed to fall into chaos while
MacCormick attempted to form a 'united front' left the field open for the
radicals to exploit the remaining rank and files discontent. Whereas the
moderate position contained fundamental weaknesses which inhibited normal
party political development, the radicals were imbued with innate qualities
which strengthened their cohesiveness. They were all to the left of
centre, they believed in the formulation of specific economic and social
policies, they advocated complete independence, they did not want links
with other organisations and they were prepared to contest elections. In
other words, they made up a coherent entity which was something that could
not be said for the moderates.
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In 1942 the radicals took control of the Party and established a political
character which would last up until the present day. MacCormick's
experiment with moderation and latterly, with cross-party cooperation, had
proved to be a failure. When the radicals took over the nationalist
movement for the second time there were a number of vital differences from
the first. In 1942, they established the SNP's political direction not
through the exploitation of a vacuum, but as the deliberate choice of the
membership. Also, they had acquired more experience and were determined
that principle, and not expediency, would be their guiding light, come what
may.
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